Section 5: First Amendment by Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the William & Mary Law School
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Supreme Court Preview Conferences, Events, and Lectures
1999
Section 5: First Amendment
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at The College of William & Mary School of Law
Copyright c 1999 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/preview
Repository Citation





* LAST TERM: Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc., et al. v.
United States, No. 98-387
Restrictions on Ads OK, But Only if They Are Fair
SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER ..................................... ...... 184
Court Strikes Restriction on Casino Ads
Aaron Epstein ............................................ ........ 186
Casino Ad Ban Goes Bust; Louisiana Broadcasters Prevail on First Amendment Grounds
David 0. Stewart .......................................... ........ 188
LAST TERM: Victoria Buckley, Secretary of State of Colorado, v.
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., et al., No. 97-930
High Court Strikes Colorado's Restrictions on Voter Initiatives
Richard Carei ................................................... 192
Justices Ease limits on Ballot Initiatives; In Ruling Affecting Cakfornia, U.S. High
Court Says Petition-Gathering Curbs Violate ist Amendment
David G. Savage ............................................. ..... 194
Court Turns Back an Effort to Limit Ballot Initiatives
Linda Greenhouse ........................................... ...... 196
NEW CASE: Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,No. 98-1189
NARRATIVE SUMMARY, Student Activity Fees.-An Opportunity for the Court to
Provide Some Coherence to Free Speech?
Matthew Curtis ............................................. ...... 199
Synopsis and Question Presented ...................................... 201
Scott H. Southworth, et al v. Michael W. Grebe, et al., 151 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.) ..... ..... 202
Justices to Rule on Student Fees Use Law; High Court Will Decide Whether State
Universities Can Force Collegians to SubsidiZe Campus Groups
Whose Message They Oppose
David G. Savage ............................................. ..... 216
181
U.S. Appeals Court Bars University of Wisconsin From Foring Students to
Finance Political Groups
Patrick Healy ..................................................... 218
Regents to Appeal Student Fees Case to the Top
Gwen Carlton .................................................... 221
College Student Fees Face Ist Amendment Test
Dave Newbart .................................................... 223
Be Careful What You Ask For, You Might Get It
George F. Will ............................................................ 226
NEW CASE: Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, No. 98-963
NARRATIVE SUMMARY, Campaign Finance Reform: How Much is Too Much?
Matthew Curtis .................................................... 228
Synopsis and Question Presented ................................. ..... 230
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, et al. v. Jeremiah W Nixon, et al.
161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir.) .............................................. 231
Supreme Court Roundup: After 32 Years, Justices Will Revisit Campaign Limits
Linda Greenhouse ............................................ ...... 239
Missouri's Limit on Campaign Donations Favors Insiders, Opponents Tell
U.S. Supreme Court; Brief Filed Monday Attracts Attention Nationwide
Jo Mannies ....................................................... 241
Reed Plans Brief on Campaign Contributions
Amy Keller ...................................................... 243
Campaign Finance just Gets Messier
Richard L. Hasen ........ ......... . .................... ......... 245
NEW CASE: United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group Inc., No. 98-1682
NARRATIVE SUMMARY, Reading the First Amendment Between the Lines
Matthew Frey ..................................................... 247
Synopsis and Questions Presented ...................................... 250
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States ofAmerica, et al.,
D. Del., 30 F.Supp. 2d 702 ........................................... 251
182
Children'sAccess to Sexy Cable TV at Heart of Case
Aaron Epstein .................................................... 262
Justices to Decide if Cable Fare Can be Limited at Night
Joan Biskupic .................................................... 264
Playboy Wins Challenge to Section 505; District Court Declares Law Unconstitutional
Enjoins its Enforcement
PR NEWSWIRE ........................................................ 266
NEW CASE: Erie, Pa. v. Pap's A.M., No. 98-1161
NARRATIVE SUMMARY, Stripping Away the Confusion: The First Amendment and Nude Danng
Matthew Curtis .............................................. ..... 268
Synopsis and Question Presented ................................. ..... 270
Pap's A.M. t/d/b/a Kandyland v. The City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273 ........... ........ 271
When is "Speech" Speech?
Jarnes J. Kilpatrick .................................................... 280
Nude Dancing Still Has Its Limits; Performers in Liquor Licensed Clubs Have
To Wear G-Strings and Pasties
Danielle N. Rodier ....................................... ............... 282
Ban on Nude Dancin Backed by High Court ; The 5-4 Decision Says Public's
Moral Disapproval' Outweighs the Right of Free Expression
David G. Savage ........................................... ....... 285
NEW CASE: Los Angeles Police Department v. United Publishing Corp., No. 98-678
NARRATIVE SUMMARY, Does Prohibiting the Release ofArrestee Records for
Commercial Purposes Violate the First Amendment?
Matthew Frey .................................................... 288
Synopsis and Question Presented ...................................... 290
United Reporting Publishing Corp. v. Cakfornia Highway Patrol and
Los Angeles Police Department, 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.)..............291
States Moving to Block the Sale of Records
Jane Kirtley ...................................................... 296
Appeals Judges Back Release ofArrest Records; The U.S. 9th Circuit Ruling Says that
Police Agenies Must Turn the Information Over to Firms
Davan Maharaj ............................................. ...... 298
183
Last Term:
GREATER NEW ORLEANS BROADCASTING ASSOCIATION, INC., etc., et aL,
petitioners,
V.
UNITED STATES, et al.
No. 98-387
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 14, 1999
RESTRICTIONS ON ADS OK, BUT ONLY IF THEY ARE FAIR
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Tuesday, June 22, 1999
It may be an acceptable exercise of
government power to restrict broadcast
advertising of a legal activity, such as
gambling, but not if the restrictions are
applied unfairly. That is the sensible
conclusion reached by the U.S. Supreme
Court recently in a case out of New
Orleans.
The decision to strike down the 65-
year-old federal ban on ads for casino
gambling was unanimous, but at least one
member of the court wanted to install far
broader protection for commercial
speech.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a
separate concurring opinion calling for the
elevation of constitutional protection for
commercial speech to the level
traditionally afforded political speech.
The rest of the justices, wisely,
declined to join Thomas in his precipitate
approach to such a complex issue. For
most of the court, the fact that the
enforcement of the ad ban was full of
"exemptions and inconsistencies" was
enough to justify its overthrow.
For instance, in 1975 Congress lifted
the gambling advertising ban, part of the
original federal Communications Act of
1934, for state-run lotteries. Then, in
1988, Congress also exempted casinos
owned by Indian tribes.
In some parts of the country, as a
result, private casinos were unable to
advertise on radio or television while their
competitors - state lotteries and Indian
casinos - were.
Writing for the majority, Justice John
Paul Stevens conceded that there may be
something to the theory that government
has a legitimate role in protecting society
from advertising for legal but harmful
products and activities. But, Stevens
wrote, the law in question was "so pierced
by exemptions and inconsistencies" that it
offered little support for that theory.
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But what of less porous laws
restricting advertising for such things as
tobacco or liquor? Do they present a
potential First Amendment conflict?
The court sidestepped that question
for now, despite Thomas' intriguing
suggestion that the First Amendment bars
the government from restricting
advertising on any product that is legal to
sell.
The Supreme Court was wise, if tardy
by a decade or two, in tossing out the
inequitable casino advertising ban; and
wise too in avoiding a headlong rush to
equate the commercial sales pitch with
political speech.
Copyright © 1999 Seattle Post-Intelligencer
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COURT STRIKES RESTRICTION ON CASINO ADS
The Herald-Sun, Durham, N.C.
Tuesday, June 15, 1999
Aaron Epstein, Knight Ridder
WASHINGTON - In a unanimous
free-speech ruling, the Supreme Court
concluded Monday that private non-
Indian casinos are entitled to advertise
gambling activities on radio and television
- despite the Clinton administration's
warnings such ads would encourage
compulsive gambling.
The justices, acting on a case from
New Orleans, nullified a federal law that
permitted states and Indian tribes to
broadcast ads for their gambling
enterprises, but barred private owners of
casinos from doing the same thing.
In another First Amendment dispute,
also from Louisiana, the court stepped
into a church-state issue that could affect
the education of more than a million
children in religious schools, the
administration's drive to connect every
American classroom to the Internet and
the constitutional conflict over school
vouchers.
The justices agreed to decide next year
whether the federal government can
furnish computers, software and library
books to classrooms in parochial schools
without violating the First Amendment's
prohibition of government
"establishment" of religion.
In the gambling case, the
administration argued strenuously that the
advertising restriction was justified as an
effort to reduce the social costs of casino
gambling and to assist those states that
bar casinos within their borders.
Compulsive gamblers are especially
susceptible to broadcast advertising for
casinos, the government said.
But Justice John Paul Stevens
concluded for the court that the
government's goals, while valid, were
betrayed by its actions.
The federal program to control
gambling "is so pierced by exemptions
and inconsistencies that the government
cannot hope to exonerate it," Stevens
wrote.
For example, Stevens said, Congress
has exempted state-run lotteries and
encouraged Indian-operated casinos,
whose ads are exempt from the broadcast
ban even if the broadcaster is in a state
with strict anti-gambling policies.
John G. Roberts Jr., a lawyer for the
American Gaming Association, which
represents 22 commercial casino
companies, said the decision "opens up
this business to the same competitive
advertising that you see in other
businesses, which is beneficial to
consumers."
In its ruling, the Supreme Court
stressed the principle that the government
cannot restrict truthful advertising of
lawful products or activities unless it has a
good reason and acts consistently.
"This ruling says that when there is
hypocrisy and inconsistency in
government regulation, the court is going
to strike down restrictions on speech,"
said Rodney Smolla, a law professor at the
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University of Richmond who specializes
in free-speech issues.
The winners in the case decided by
the Supreme Court, Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Association vs. the United
States, were operators of radio and TV
stations in the New Orleans area who had
sought to broadcast commercials for
private casinos in Louisiana and
neighboring Mississippi.
The Supreme Court intervened after
one federal appeals court upheld the ban
in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, while
another court struck it down in Nevada
and eight other Western states.
The Louisiana parochial school-aid
case accepted for review in 2000 "is likely
to be the most important church-state
lawsuit to come before the Supreme Court
in over two decades," said Barry W. Lynn,
executive director of Americans United
for Separation of Church and State.
The case, Mitchell vs. Helms, began
14 years ago when taxpayers in Jefferson
Parish, La., filed a suit challenging a
provision of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, which
requires public schools receiving federal
aid for educational equipment to share the
equipment with students in private
schools.
In Jefferson Parish, 41 of 46 private
schools were religious, and the taxpayers
argued furnishing the equipment to
parochial schools amounted to direct
government aid to religion in violation of
the principle of separation of church and
state.
In appealing the Louisiana case to the
Supreme Court on behalf of parents of
children attending religious schools,
Michael W. McConnell, a law professor at
the University of Utah, attacked the lower
court's decision as hostile to religion.
But the lower court decision, he wrote
in a legal brief, would restrict students in
parochial schools to the use of textbooks
while students in public schools "are using
graphing calculators to solve polynomial
equations and reading about the latest in
Mesopotamian archeological discoveries
on CD-ROMs."
Copyright C 1999 The Durham Herald
Co.
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CASINO AD BAN GOES BUST
Louisiana Broadcasters Prevail on First Amendment Grounds
Legal Times
Monday, July 12, 1999
David 0. Stewart
The Supreme Court's recent
invalidation of a federal ban on casino
advertising by broadcasters was an
important victory for commercial speech,
but was not startling.
In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
Association v. United States, 119 S. Ct.
1923 (June 14, 1999), a unanimous Court
held that 18 U.S.C. Section 1304 violated
the First Amendment rights of television
and radio broadcasters located in
Louisiana and other states where private
casinos are legal. Eight justices agreed that
the ban failed the Court's four-part test
for commercial speech restrictions
outlined in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
The GNOBA decision continues the
Court's recent trend of limiting the ability
of government to regulate the advertising
of legal "sin" industries, such as gambling
and liquor.
The federal statute bans broadcast
advertising relating to private lotteries and
other games of chance. As even casual
television viewers know from the
drumbeat of state lottery commercials, the
statute is riddled with exceptions. In
addition to state lotteries, advertising has
been permitted for casinos run by Native
American tribes, charitable lotteries, and
betting on horse racing.
Although two other courts found the
law unconstitutional and despite a
Supreme Court remand for
reconsideration in light of the Court's
decision in 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 5t Circuit
upheld the statute. GNOBA, 149 F.3d
334 (1998).
Significant Change
The Supreme Court's view of sin
advertising has changed significantly since
1986, when it approved restrictions on
casino advertising targeted at Puerto Rican
residents in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328. Puerto Rico had argued that
its casinos were designed to serve tourists,
and that the advertising restrictions would
protect local residents from "the
disruption of moral and cultural patterns,
the increase in local crime, the fostering of
prostitution, the development of
corruption, and the infiltration of
organized crime."
Writing for the Court, then Associate
Justice William Rehnquist accepted this
rationale, noting that similar concerns
prompted the "vast majority of the 50
States to prohibit casino gambling."
Rehnquist relied on a syllogism: Because
Puerto Rico had the power to bar
gambling altogether, "the greater power to
completely ban casino gambling
necessarily includes the lesser power to
ban advertising of casino gambling."
Based on Posadas, the federal
government has claimed enhanced power
to regulate advertising of "socially
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harmful" activities such as alcohol
consumption or gambling, even when
they are entirely legal. See United States v.
Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418
(1993).
But the Court spurned this
proposition in a footnote in Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995),
and further buried it in 44 Liquormart Inc.
the following year. Both decisions struck
down limitations on alcoholic beverage
advertising.
In GNOBA, the Court declined an
opportunity to replace the four-part
Central Hudson test. Writing for the
Court, Justice John Paul Stevens, a critic
of Central Hudson, noted that "certain
judges, scholars and amici curiae" have
recommended adopting "a more
straightforward and stringent test for
assessing the validity of governmental
restrictions on commercial speech."
But with a perceptible shrug, Stevens
concluded that Central Hudson is "an
established part of our constitutional
jurisprudence," and "provided an
adequate basis for decision" in the case
before the Court.
It was undisputed that the
broadcasters' proposed advertisements
would satisfy the first prong of the Central
Hudson test, because the speech at issue
concerned lawful activity and was not
misleading.
Applying the second Central Hudson
requirement, Stevens agreed that the
government's asserted justifications for
the advertising ban-to reduce the "social
costs" of gambling and support state anti-
gambling policies-were "substantial,"
but questioned the strength of those
interests:
In the judgment of both the Congress
and many state legislatures, the social
costs that support the suppression of
gambling are offset, and sometimes
outweighed, by countervailing policy
considerations, primarily in the form of
economic benefits. Despite its awareness
of the potential social costs, Congress has
not only sanctioned casino gambling for
Indian tribes through tribal-state
compacts, but has enacted other statutes
that reflect approval of state legislation
that authorizes a host of public and
private gambling activities.... Whatever
its character in 1934 when Section 1304
was adopted, the federal policy of
discouraging gambling in general, and
casino gambling in particular, is now
decidedly equivocal.
Justice Stevens then found that the
casino advertising ban failed the last two
parts of the Central Hudson test: whether
the regulation directly advances the
government's interest, and whether it is
more extensive than necessary to serve
that interest.
The ban did not materially advance
the government's asserted interest in
reducing demand for casino gambling, he
wrote, because "much . .. advertising
would merely channel gamblers to one
casino, rather than another," and would
not increase overall gambling.
More important, the Court found the
statute "so pierced by exemptions and
inconsistencies that the Government
cannot hope to exonerate it." After
reviewing these exemptions, Stevens
concluded:
From what we can gather, the
Government is committed to prohibiting
accurate product information, not
commercial enticements of all kinds, and
then only when conveyed over certain
forms of media and for certain types of
gambling-indeed, for only certain brands
of casino gambling-and despite the fact
that messages about their availability are
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being conveyed over the airwaves by other
speakers.
Stevens also noted that Congress has
undertaken no direct regulation of casino
gambling to reduce the supposed social
costs, a failure that "undermine s the
asserted justifications" for the advertising
ban.
Two justices wrote separately. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, author of the now-
discarded Posadas, contended that if
Congress had elected to regulate casino
gambling directly, the exemptions in the
advertising ban "might well prove
constitutionally tolerable."
In contrast, Justice Clarence Thomas
concurred only in the judgment of the
Court, repeating his view that the Central
Hudson test should be abandoned and
that commercial speech should receive the
same protections as other speech when
"the government's asserted interest is to
keep legal users of a product or service
ignorant in order to manipulate their
choices in the marketplace.'"
Potential Firefights
GNOBA may spark conflict on
several new fronts in the war over First
Amendment protections for advertising.
One likely battleground is municipal
restrictions on billboard advertisements of
legal products. In 1997, the Court refused
to hear a challenge to a municipal ban on
billboard advertising of legal alcohol and
tobacco products, though the case raised
important commercial speech issues. See,
e.g., Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Schmoke,
101 F.3d 325 (4h Cir. 1996), cert. Denied,
520 U.S. 1204 (1997).
In the Court's next term, federal
regulation of tobacco advertising will be at
issue in Food and Drug Administration v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., No.
98-1152, but the question before the
Court is the FDA's jurisdiction over
tobacco products, not the First
Amendment.
For broadcasters and gaming
companies, GNOBA leaves unresolved
the question whether Section 1304 still
applies in those states where private,
nontribal casinos are illegal. The Court
specifically voided the casino advertising
ban only in the 10 states, like Louisiana,
which authorize private casinos. Because
broadcasting and casino marketing cross
state lines, this limited answer is not
entirely satisfactory. For Atlantic City
casinos, for example, New York and
Pennsylvania broadcast outlets best serve
their principal markets, but those states
have not legalized nontribal casinos.
The issue is sharpened because
GNOBA left intact Edge Broadcasting
Co., which upheld the application of
Section 1304 to bar advertising of
Virginia's state lottery by a radio station
located in North Carolina, which did not
itself have a lottery.
Immediately after the Court's
GNOBA ruling, the Federal
Communications Commission warned
broadcasters in states where nontribal
gambling is illegal that they would face
sanctions if they aired ads promoting
casino gambling.
But the reasoning of GNOBA should
invalidate the application of Section 1304
even in those 22 states that have not
legalized nontribal casinos. After all, most
states have legalized gambling
operations-either tribal casinos or state
lotteries-that advertise through
broadcast outlets. The FCC should adopt
regulations barring the application of
Section 1304 in those jurisdictions,
thereby avoiding the need for further
litigation.
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This issue also could be addressed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd
Circuit in the pending appeal of Players
International Inc. v. United States, 988 F.
Supp. 497 (D.N.J. 1997). Although
GNOBA resolves the question whether
New Jersey broadcasters may carry casino
advertising, the 3 rd Circuit might also
address whether broadcasters in Delaware
and Pennsylvania (where nontribal casinos
are illegal) may do so.
In addition, GNOBA questioned the
validity of the federal statute (28 U.S.C.
Section 3702) barring the advertising of
sports betting businesses. Like the casino
advertising ban, that statute, Justice
Stevens wrote, "also includes a variety of
exemptions, some with obscured
congressional purposes."
Most fundamentally, the Court will
continue to hear calls to replace the
Central Hudson standards. At least
Thomas and Stevens remain dissatisfied
with the First Amendment protection for
advertising provided by Central Hudson.
Following GNOBA, however, it is not
clear what type of case might motivate the
Court to reconsider Central Hudson.
David 0. Stewart is a partner in the D.C.
office of Ropes & Gray, where he has
handled a variety of First Amendment
matters.




Victoria BUCKLEY, Secretary of State of Colorado, petitioner,
V.
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOUNDATION, INC., et al.
No. 97-930
Supreme Court of the United States
January 12, 1999
HIGH COURT STRIKES COLORADO'S RESTRICTIONS ON
VOTER INITIATIVES
The Legal Inteigencer
Friday, January 1, 1999
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
Washington. The Supreme Court
yesterday struck down Colorado's
preferred method of regulating voter
initiatives, ruling unconstitutional three
provisions it found "excessively restrictive
of political speech."
Providing important new guidelines
for other states as well, the court said
Colorado went too far in regulating the
circulation of petitions for such measures.
About half the states allow ballot
initiatives, and voters increasingly are
using them to bypass legislatures and
make law. Specifically, the court said states
may not require: (I) People who circulate
petitions be registered to vote. (2) Petition
circulators to wear badges bearing their
names and identifying them as "paid" or
"volunteer." (3) Initiative backers to file
monthly reports with state officials
identifying paid petition circulators and
how much they were paid. "The First
Amendment requires us to be vigilant in
making these judgments," Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg wrote for the court, "to
guard against undue hindrances to
political conversations and the exchange
of ideas." She said the invalidated
provisions "are not warranted by the state
interests administrative efficiency, fraud
detection, informing voters alleged to
justify those restrictions." Ginsburg said
Colorado may, and does, employ other
methods to serve those purposes. The
vote to strike down the badge-wearing
requirement was 8-1, with only Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist saying the
restriction should be upheld. The vote to
strike down the other two requirements
was 6-3, with Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and Stephen G. Breyer joining
Rehnquist as dissenters. Joining Ginsburg
in voting against each of the requirements
were Justices John Paul Stevens, Antonin
Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H.
Souter and Clarence Thomas. All three
requirements had been invalidated by the
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10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals after
they were challenged by a group of state
residents and a public interest group, the
American Constitutional Law Foundation.
Colorado's attempt to reverse the appeals
court ruling got a frosty reception when
the case was argued before the justices in
October. In Colorado, supporters must
collect signatures amounting to at least 5
percent of the total votes cast in the most
recent race for secretary of state to get a
measure on the ballot. After a record 10
initiatives were placed on the state's ballot
in 1992, the Legislature passed a law that
imposed various requirements including
the three at issue in yesterday's decision.
Colorado earlier had reacted to ballot
initiatives begun by commercial interests,
such as backers of legalized gambling, by
banning paid petition circulators. The
nation's highest court struck down that
ban in 1988, ruling that it interfered too
much with "core political speech."
Copyright C 1999 American Lawyer
Media
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JUSTICES EASE LIMITS ON BALLOT INITIATIVES
In Ruling Affecting California, U.S. High Court Says Petition-Gathering
Curbs Violate 1st Amendment
Los Angeles Times
Wednesday, January 13, 1999
David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
The Supreme Court gave greater
freedom Tuesday to those in California
and several other states who want to
change state laws through the ballot box.
On an 8-1 vote, the justices struck
down the rules that require those
gathering signatures to qualify initiatives
for a state ballot to be registered voters in
that state.
The ruling was denounced by
California Secretary of State Bill Jones,
who said that it "will further
commercialize" the initiative process.
Along with California, the decision
will affect at least 18 other states.
A decade ago, the court ruled that
sponsors of initiatives had a right to pay
people to gather signatures. On Tuesday,
the justices went further and struck down
Colorado regulations that, along with the
registration proviso, required paid
circulators to wear badges identifying
themselves and to report their
expenditures to the state.
The process of amending the laws
through the ballot box involves "core
political speech" and is protected by the
Constitution from undue state regulation,
the high court said.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, in
a rare solo dissent, faulted his colleagues
for allowing "out-of-state persons and
political dropouts" to play key roles in
deciding what issues may go on a state
ballot.
The ruling will probably lead to even
more and costlier ballot campaigns in
California, state officials said.
Jones predicted that the ruling would
spawn national companies that go from
state to state gathering signatures for
ballot initiatives. And officials would have
less authority to monitor the process and
prevent fraud, he warned.
A century ago, the initiative process
grew in the West as a form of grass-roots
democracy. Political reformers saw direct
ballot measures as a way to bypass state
legislatures controlled by big-money
interests. In California, that meant the
owners of the Southern Pacific railroad.
These days, critics often complain, the
initiative process has been taken over by
big-money interests. Professional firms,
given a few million dollars, can gather
enough signatures to put a measure on the
ballot. In 1996, for instance, $ 141,274,345
was spent in California on efforts to get
27 initiatives on the ballot in either the
June primary or November general
election, the Council of State
Governments said in a brief filed with the
court.
UCLA professor Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, an expert on election law,
said he is concerned that special interests,
rather than the public interest, increasingly
determine what goes before voters.
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"I think the court is making a big
mistake," he said. "It is the state's ballot,
and I think the state ought to be able to
control that."
But just as with campaign funding, the
justices lean strongly in favor of a free
speech and free market view, rather than
accepting the government's claim that it
needs to regulate the process.
In 1976, the court struck down most
limits on campaign spending as a violation
of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the 1st Amendment. It has resisted recent
pleas to reconsider the matter.
In response to a wave of paid
signature gatherers, Colorado officials
added the new regulations. They were
challenged by several grass-roots activists
and a small public interest law firm.
The activists won before a federal
judge in Colorado and the U.S. Court of
Appeals. They made it a complete sweep
Tuesday with their victory in the Supreme
Court (Buckley vs. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, 97-930).
On Monday, the high court refused to
revive an Arizona measure that declared
English the state's official language and
required its use in most government
transactions. Without comment, the
justices rejected an appeal (Arizonans for
Official English vs. Arizona, 98-167) in
which supporters of the voter-approved
state constitutional amendment argued
that the government has the right to
control its own speech.
The Arizona Supreme Court had
struck down the measure last April, saying
that it violated rights of free speech.
Copyright C 1999 Times Mirror Company
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COURT TURNS BACK AN EFFORT TO LIMIT BALLOT
INITIATIVES
The New York Times
Wednesday, January 13, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court today rebuffed
Colorado's effort to regulate the process
of getting initiatives on the ballot, in a
decision extolling the First Amendment
value of uninhibited "communication with
voters."
The decision, 6 to 3 in most respects,
had possible implications for the Court's
approach to political speech, the doctrine
at the heart of the debate over campaign
finance overhaul. In restating its long-held
view that political messages should be
delivered free of government-imposed
obstacles, the Court gave little comfort to
critics who have speculated that the
Justices might be willing to lower the level
of First Amendment scrutiny for
campaign regulations in general.
Nor are the states that are
increasingly uneasy about the use of ballot
initiatives, the subject before the Court
today, likely to get much help from the
Court in curbing the vigorous populist
impulse that is forcing contentious social
and political issues onto ballots in growing
numbers.
The Colorado regulations that Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg's majority opinion
struck down today included requirements
that people who circulate petitions be
registered Colorado voters, that they wear
badges identifying themselves by name,
and that sponsoring organizations
employing paid petition circulators include
in monthly and final reports the name,
address and compensation of each
worker. The regulations were challenged
by the American Constitutional Law
Foundation, an organization based in
Denver that promotes voter referendums
as a form of direct democracy.
While examining each regulation
separately, Justice Ginsburg said that in
general they were "not warranted" by the
state interests invoked to justify them,
which she identified as "administrative
efficiency, fraud detection and informing
voters." Justice Ginsburg said the First
Amendment's free speech guarantee
required the Court to be "vigilant" in
guarding against "undue hindrances to
political conversations and the exchange
of ideas."
Justice Ginsburg herself has been
critical of the Court's 1976 decision in
Buckley v. Valeo, which in equating
political spending with speech has blocked
efforts to limit the flow of money in
politics. In a campaign finance case three
years ago, she joined a dissenting opinion
by Justice John Paul Stevens, who said, "I
believe the Government has an important
interest in leveling the electoral playing
field by constraining the cost of Federal
campaigns."
So Justice Ginsburg's opinion today,
that political communication is enhanced
in the context of voter initiatives by
limiting regulation, does not necessarily
translate into a position against
government regulation of money in
politics.
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The dissenting Justices today -- Sandra
Day O'Connor, Stephen G. Breyer and
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who
felt strongly enough to write one of his
rare dissenting opinions -- all emphasized
the broader implications of the majority
opinion. They agreed with the majority
that the identification badges were
unconstitutional, but said the financial
disclosure and registered-voter
requirements were reasonable and
necessary. The Court's action in striking
them down "invalidates permissible
regulations that are vitally important to
the integrity of the political process,"
Justice O'Connor said in an opinion that
Justice Breyer also signed.
While requiring petition circulators to
reveal their names on badges "directly
regulates the core political speech of
petition circulation," Justice O'Connor
said, the other regulations were less direct
and so should be evaluated under a less
exacting standard of constitutional review.
The requirement that circulators be
registered voters was a "neutral
qualification for participation in the
petitioning process" and one that was
easily met, Justice O'Connor said, while
the disclosure requirements served the
state's legitimate interest in "combating
fraud and providing the public with
information."
Chief Justice Rehnquist took
particular aim at the ruling that petition
circulators could not be required to be
registered voters.
"State ballot initiatives are a matter of
state concern, and a state should be able
to limit the ability to circulate initiative
petitions to those people who can
ultimately vote on those initiatives at the
polls," he said in his dissenting opinion,
adding that the ruling today, while
seemingly rather narrow, "threatens to
invalidate a whole host of historically
established state regulations of the
electoral process in general."
The case, Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, No. 97-
930, was an appeal by Colorado from a
1997 ruling of the United States Court of
Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in Denver.
Reviewing an array of restrictions on the
initiative process, the appeals court upheld
a number of them, including a
requirement that circulators be at least 18
years old and that they attach to each
petition an affidavit containing their name
and address. These provisions were not
part of the case today, which was limited
to three provisions the appeals court
struck down.
This was not the first time the
Supreme Court had frustrated Colorado's
effort to regulate ballot initiatives. In a
1988 decision, Meyer v. Grant, the Court
ruled that Colorado's prohibition on paid
circulators violated the First Amendment
by curbing "interactive communication
concerning political change."
Colorado's regulatory efforts in turn
reflect mounting concern in many of the
states that once celebrated the openness
of their political processes as reflected in
the initiative process. Colorado moved
earlier and has gone further than other
states in regulating how initiatives are
placed on the ballot, and the case was
closely followed by states considering
such steps.
Twenty-four states, most in the West
and Midwest, provide for voter
referendums. But a backlash has been
growing, as the process has been used
more in the 1990's than in any other
decade. Initiatives on subjects from
abortion and assisted suicide to term
limits and taxes have forced controversial
questions onto ballots, often with the
assistance of out-of-state political
consulting firms that recruit and pay
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petition circulators. The Colorado case
was widely seen as a test of whether the
backlash would continue to develop with
the Court's endorsement.
In striking down the voter registration
requirement, Justice Ginsburg said there
were hundreds of thousands of
Coloradans who were not registered to
vote, including some for whom "the
choice not to register implicates political
thought and expression." The registration
requirement, she said, "cuts down the
number of message carriers in the ballot-
access arena without impelling cause."
Justices Stevens, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy, and David H.
Souter joined the majority opinion. Justice
Clarence Thomas agreed with the result,
but wrote separately to object that Justice
Ginsburg had not subjected the
regulations to the most exacting "strict
scrutiny," a test that he said was
constitutionally required and that the
regulations all failed.
Copyright C)1999 The New York Times
Company
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BOARD OF REGENTS v. SOUTHWORTH
Student Activity Fees: An Opportunity for the Court to Provide Some
Coherence to Free Speech?
Matthew Curtis *
At issue in Board of Regents v. Southworth is whether students at state universities can be
required to fund the political or ideological speech of campus organizations. Scott
Southworth, a law student at the University of Wisconsin filed suit against the University
protesting the use of his mandatory student activity fees for funding a number of student
groups which supported causes such as abortion and gay rights. Students are required to pay
the student fees and are not permitted to graduate until they pay the fees. A portion of the
fees funds the student government and the remainder are provided to certain campus
organizations at the direction of the student government. In the suit, Southworth argues
that students should be permitted to withhold the portion of their fees that fund
organizations with which they disagree.
In Rosenbeger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), Justice
O'Connor suggested the viability of the suit now brought by Southworth against the
University of Wisconsin. The Court in Rosenberger held that the University of Virginia, having
created a public forum by funding certain school newspapers, could not exclude other
newspapers on the basis of their religious bent. O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, held
out the possibility that although the Christian newspaper could not be denied funding if
other newspapers received those funds, the student fee system itself may not conform to the
First Amendment. "Finally, although the question is not presented here, I note the
possibility that the student fee is susceptible to a Free Speech Clause challenge by an
objecting student that she should not be compelled to pay for speech with which she
disagrees." The majority opinion, written by Justice Kennedy also suggested the potential
for a First Amendment challenge. Kennedy wrote, "The fee is mandatory, and we do not
have before us the question whether an objecting student has the First Amendment right to
demand a pro rata return to the extent the fee is expended for speech to which he or she
does not subscribe." Southworth provides this Court the opportunity to directly address
compelled funding of political speech.
Rosenberger may provide a better basis for the Court in Southworth than the case relied on
by the Seventh Circuit: Lehnert v. Feris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). The Court in
Lehnert sought to determine when compelled funding for speech was constitutionally
permissible by applying a three-pronged test. The test, as stated by the Seventh Circuit in
Southworth, required that the mandatory fee be germane to a legitimate government interest,
"justified by vital policy interests of the government," and not "significantly add to the
burdening of free speech." Southworth v. Grebe, 151 F.3d 717. Thus, Lehnert and the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Southworth recognize the permissibility of at least some required
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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funding of political or ideological speech. However, Kennedy's and O'Connor's opinions, as
well as the dissent's, in Rosenberger suggest that the Court will find such funding of political
speech unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
In Rosenberger, Kennedy and O'Connor hinted they might reject the compelled funding at
issue in Southworth. The dissent, penned by Justice Souter rejected any state funding of
religious speech: "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." quoting Jefferson, A Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom. Souter addressed only religious speech and did not discuss
whether the same principle would apply to non-religious speech. Rosenberer raised the
question of whether a distinction between religious and political speech is proper. Southworth
gives the Court an opportunity to decide.
Thus, Southworth provides a potential battlefield for a clash of several opposing ideas.
Should religious speech be accorded different treatment under the First Amendment than
political speech? Is compelled subsidization of speech ever proper? If the Court answers
yes to the latter question, it must at some point determine whether student fees are
somehow different from taxes. If not, will taxpayer funding of artists through the National
Endowment for the Arts be in constitutional jeopardy? The Court could avoid these
questions by adopting the argument of the University of Wisconsin: student fees support a
forum, not the individual political speech of various groups.
Rosenberger could provide the basis for a unanimous decision in Southworth, while a
reliance on Lehnert will almost certainly produce a fractured Court. The Court could use
Rosenberger to provide a bright line rule that would settle the law in this area. Lehnert's three-
pronged test, as Justice Scalia argues, provides only murky waters with no clear landmarks
upon which to fix the Court.
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98-1189 Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth
Ruling below (Southworih v. Grebe, 7th Cit., 151 F.3d 717, 67 U.S.L.W. 1108):
State university's allocation of mandatory student activities fees to political and ideological
groups violates First Amendment rights of students who object to subsidizing those groups'
activities.
Question presented: Is First Amendment offended by policy or program under which
public university students must pay mandatory fees that are used in part to support
organizations that engage in political speech?
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Scott H. SOUTHWORTH, et al., Appellees
v.
Michael W. GREBE, et aL, Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
Decided August 10, 1998
MANION, Circuit Judge.
Students attending the University of
Wisconsin-Madison must pay a student
activity fee. A portion of this mandatory
fee is distributed to private organizations
which engage in political and ideological
activities. Plaintiffs, students at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, sued
the Regents of the University claiming
that forcing objecting students to fund
such organizations violates their First
Amendment rights, as well as other
federal and state statutes. After various
procedural motions and argument, the
district court granted plaintiffs summary
judgment on their freedom of speech and
association claims, dismissed the
remaining claims, and entered an
injunction which both barred such
funding and established a detailed opt-out
mechanism. We affirm the district court's
determination that forcing objecting
students to fund private organizations
which engage in political and ideological
activities violates the First Amendment,
but reverse and vacate portions of the
declaratory judgment and injunction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural and Factual Background
Plaintiffs Scott Southworth, Amy
Schoepke, Keith Bannach, Rebecca Bretz,
and Rebecka Vander Werf each attended
or still attend the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. They sued the members of the
Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System ("the Regents"),
claiming that the Regents' use of objecting
students' mandatory student activity fees
to fund private organizations that engage
in political and ideological advocacy,
activities, and speech violates their rights
of free speech and association, the Free
Exercise clause of the Constitution, the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
("RFRA"), 'and various state laws. They
sought both injunctive and declaratory
relief.
We now proceed to the merits, which
include only the plaintiffs' First
Amendment challenge to the Regents'
mandatory student activity fee policy.
B. Mandatory Student Fee Policy
Students enrolled full-time at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison must
pay a mandatory student activity fee; it's
mandatory because students who refuse to
' The Supreme Court declared the RFRA
unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. P.F.
Flores, Archbishop of San Antonio, 521 U.S.
507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624
(1997).
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pay cannot receive their grades or
graduate. During the 1995-96 academic
year (the academic year during which the
plaintiffs filed suit) the Regents assessed a
mandatory student fee of $165.75 each
semester.
Section 36.09 of the Wisconsin Code
gives both the Regents and the students
control over the funds generated by the
mandatory student fee. The extent of
control depends on the classification
given the student fees: The Regents
classify a portion of the student fees as
nonallocable and a portion as allocable.
* * * Because the plaintiffs challenge
only the funding from the allocable
portion of student fees, we focus on those
expenditures.
The distribution network for allocable
student fees is rather complicated. We
will attempt to draw the money trail to
help explain the source of the complaint.
As just noted, the ASM has authority over
the allocable portion of student fees.
Among other things, these fees fund the
General Student Service Fund ("GSSF")
and the Associated Students of Madison
budget. In turn, both the GSSF and the
ASM distribute the mandatory student
fees to other private organizations,
although the distribution process differs.
The GSSF is distributed to private
organizations by a committee of the ASM
called the Student Services Finance
Committee ("SSFC"). Registered student
organizations, University departments,
and community-based service
organizations qualify for funding from the
GSSF. To obtain money from the GSSF,
the organization must apply to the SSFC.
After reviewing the application, the SSFC
determines whether to grant or deny the
request for money, and if granted the
SSFC also determines the amount of
funding the private organization will
receive. During the 1995-96 school year,
the SSFC distributed about $974,200 in
student fees to private organizations.
The ASM budget also funds private
organizations, although only "Registered
Student Organizations" qualify for
funding from the ASM budget. To qualify
as a Registered Student Organization,
among other things, a group must be a
formalized not-for-profit group,
composed mainly, but not necessarily
exclusively, of students, and controlled
and directed by students. A Registered
Student Organization may obtain money
from the ASM budget in the form of a
grant to support its operations, related
travel, or to sponsor an event. During the
1995-96 school year, the ASM budget
distributed $109,277 in student fees to
private organizations.
In addition to obtaining money from
the GSSF and the ASM budget, a
Registered Student Organization may seek
funding through a student referendum.
With a student referendum, students vote
at large on whether or not to approve an
assessment for the student group. The
Wisconsin Student Public Interest
Research Group ("WISPIRG") obtained
$49,500 in student fees during the 1995-96
academic year as the result of a student
referendum.
After the ASM and the SSFC (or the
students by referendum) have made their
funding decisions, these decisions are sent
to the Chancellor and the Board of
Regents for their review and approval;
while the ASM has complete authority
over most of the allocable funding, the
Regents have final authority to approve or
disapprove the allocations of funds by the
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student government under section
36.09(5) of the Wisconsin Code.
C. Organizations Funded by the
Student Fees
The GSSF, the ASM budget, and
student referendums can fund many
different activities and organizations.
However, the plaintiffs object only to the
funding of organizations which engage in
political and ideological activities with fees
collected from students who object to
such funding. (Henceforth we shall refer
to them as "objecting students.")
Plaintiffs presented evidence of eighteen
organizations which both receive student
fees and engage in political and ideological
activities: WISPIRG; the Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual Campus Center; the Campus
Women's Center; the UW Greens; the
Madison AIDS Support Network; the
International Socialist Organization; the
Ten Percent Society; the Progressive
Student Network; Amnesty International;
United States Student Association;
Community Action on Latin America; La
Colectiva Cultural de Aztlan; the Militant
Student Union of the University of
Wisconsin; the Student Labor Action
Coalition; Student Solidarity; Students of
National Organization for Women;
MADPAC; and Madison Treaty Rights
Support Group.
Reviewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Regents, as we
must, we conclude that the 18
organizations listed above both receive
student fees and engage in political and
ideological activities. While the record is
replete with examples, we limit ourselves
to a sample:
WISPIRG, which received $49,500 in
student fees during the 1995-96 school
year, distributed $2,500 directly to its
parent organization U.S. PIRG for use in
lobbying Congress and developing
candidate-voter guides. WISPIRG also
published a voters' guide, which ranked
congressional candidates based on their
views on various pieces of federal
legislation. During 1995-96, the UW
Greens received $6,905 in student fees.
The UW Greens, along with the
Progressive Student Network (another
group funded with student fees), lobbied
the Wisconsin state legislature, and
encouraged legislators to introduce three
bills which would limit mining in the state.
The UW Greens also distributed literature
for the Green Party USA, a political party,
and distributed campaign literature for
Ralph Nader during his bid for U.S.
President on the Green Party ticket.
Along with WISPIRG and other groups,
the UW Greens also organized a march
on the state capital to show their
opposition to the governor and the
governor's budget.
The defendants do not dispute that
these and other organizations engage in
political and ideological speech. Instead,
the Regents argue that the First
Amendment protects the rights of these
organizations to engage in such speech.
Of course it does. But the students do
not ask that we restrict the speech of any
student organization; they merely ask that
they not be forced to financially subsidize
speech with which they disagree. In other
words, Amnesty International is free to
oppose the death penalty and can
continue to advocate its position; the
Women's Resource Center can still speak
out against informed consent legislation;
and the UW Greens, the International
Socialist Organization and WISPIRG can
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lobby all they want. The Regents and
amici rely on the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech as support for
their position, but the First Amendment
does not guarantee that the government
will subsidize speech. See, FederalElection
Comm'n v. Massachusetts CitiZens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238, 256 n. 9 (1986), ("[T]here is
no right to have speech subsidized by the
Government."). In short there is
absolutely no question here of restricting
the speech of any private organization.
See, e.g., Smith v. Regents ofthe University of
Calfornia, 844 P.2d 500, 503 (1993) ("In
fact, the case has nothing to do with
restrictions on speech. It goes without
saying that all students are free to
organize, to promote their ideas, and to
seek by all legal means to persuade others
that their views are correct....").
This leaves a very limited
constitutional question: whether the
Regents can force objecting students to
fund private organizations which engage
in political and ideological activities,
speech, and advocacy. The district court
concluded that they could not, and
granted the plaintiffs declaratory and




The district court entered a
declaratory judgment that "the
defendants' use of the mandatory
segregated fees to support political and
ideological activities violates the First
Amendment to the United States
Constitution,." The First Amendment
provides:
Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridge the
freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the
Government for redress of
gnevances.
The Supreme Court has long
recognized two necessary corollaries to
the First Amendment's guarantee of free
speech: the right not to speak, West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); and the right
not to be compelled to subsidize others'
speech, Abood v. Detroit Bd ofEduc., 431
U.S. 209 (1977); Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1 (1990). It is based on these
familiar corollaries, and specifically Abood
and Keller, that the plaintiffs challenge
Wisconsin's mandatory student fee policy.
The Supreme Court has yet to
determine whether these First
Amendment corollaries protect objecting
students from being forced by state
universities to subsidize private political
and ideological organizations. However,
in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
Universly of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995),
the Supreme Court provided guidance on
the appropriate analysis for such a
challenge. In Rosenberger, students who
published a Christian newspaper at the
University of Virginia challenged the
university's denial of their request for
funding from the university's mandatory
student activity fees. Although the
university had used student fees to pay for
printing costs for nonreligious
newspapers, the university denied the
plaintiffs' request because of the
newspaper's religious viewpoint. Id. at
825-27, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The Supreme
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Court held that the student activity fees
created a forum of money and that once
established the forum had to be made
available on a viewpoint-neutral basis.
Because the University of Virginia
discriminated based on the religious
viewpoint of the newspaper, it had
violated the First Amendment.
While Rosenberger did not consider the
question we have before us, in noting
what was not before it, the Court directed
us to the Abood and Keller analysis:
The fee is mandatory, and we do
not have before us the question
whether an objecting student has
the First Amendment right to
demand a pro rata return to the
extent the fee is expended for
speech to which he or she does not
subscribe. See Keller v. State Bar of
Cakfornia, 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990);
Abood v. Detroit Board ofEd., 431 U.S.
209, 235, 236 (1977).
Id. at 840. See also, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at
851 (O'Connor, concurring) ("Finally,
although the question is not presented
here, I note the possibility that the student
fee is susceptible to a Free Speech Clause
challenge by an objecting student that she
should not be compelled to pay for
speech with which she disagrees. See, e.g.,
Keller v. State Bar of Calfornia, 496 U.S. 1,
15 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education, 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977)").
2 The Regents try to shoehorn this case
into Rosenberger. However, as the Court
made abundantly clear, it considered only
the disbursement of student activity fees;
it did not consider the constitutionality of
forcing students to fund private political
and ideological organizations. Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 840, 115 S.Ct. 2510.
From Keller's holding ("The State Bar
may therefore constitutionally fund
activities germane to those goals....", 496
U.S. at 13) and Aboods qualification (the
Constitution requires that expenditures
for ideological cause not germane be
financed by voluntary funds, 431 U.S. at
235), courts have named the analysis born
of Abood the "germaneness
analysis."(footnote omitted) Yet Abood
did not provide much guidance as to its
actual application. Keller did more by
setting forth guidelines for determining
permissive expenditures: "[TJhe guiding
standard must be whether the challenged
expenditures are necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of regulating the
legal profession or 'improving the quality
of the legal service available to the people
of the State.' " Id. at 14 (quoting Lathrop v.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (plurality
opinion)). But Keller still left many lines
to be drawn.
Beyond Abood and Keller, the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of
germaneness in several other cases.
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S.
292 (1986); Ellis v. Brotherhood Railway
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961). The most significant development
came in Lehnert v. Feris Faculy Assn., 500
U.S. 507 (1991). In Lehnert, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of
various union expenditures under the
germaneness analysis originating in Abood
and Keller. However, in doing so, Lehnert
explained that this required a three-prong
analysis for determining whether union
expenditures violated the objecting
employees' First Amendment rights: To
be constitutional, the expenditure must be
"germane to collective bargaining; justified
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by the government's vital policy interest in
labor peace and avoiding 'free-riders'; and
not significantly add to the burdening of
free speech that is inherent in the
allowance of an agency or union shop."
Id. at 519. The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed this test. Air Line Pilots Assoc.
v. Miller, 118 S.Ct. 1761 (1998).
Lehnert's three-prong analysis is the
test today. And as Lehnert holds, there is
more to the germaneness analysis than
whether the activity is germane to the
governmental interest, but because
"germaneness" is the first prong, we begin
there.
1. Germaneness.
Under Lehnert, the first prong
considers whether the mandatory fee is
germane to some otherwise legitimate
government scheme, in that case
collective bargaining. This prong really
presents two questions: initially whether
there is some otherwise legitimate
governmental interest justifying any
compelled funding; and then whether the
specifically challenged expenditure is
germane to that interest. We need not
answer the initial question because the
students do not contend that the Regents
lack a legitimate interest in the compelled
funding of the student government or
student organizations.
That leaves the second question:
whether the challenged activity is germane
to the government's asserted interest.
Here the Regents assert an interest in
education. They then contend that
funding private organizations which
engage in political and ideological
activities is germane to education because
the funding allows for more diverse
expression and this in turn is educational.
See reply brief at 2 ("[E]xpression of
diverse viewpoints is germane to the
educational mission of the
UW-Madison.").
However, "germaneness" cannot be
read so broadly as to justify the compelled
funding of private organizations which
engage in political and ideological
advocacy, activities and speech. For
example, in Keller, the State Bar defended
its funding of lobbying on nuclear
weapons, abortion, and prayer in public
schools arguing that it was authorized to
fund activities "in all matters pertaining to
the advancement of the science of
jurisprudence or to the improvement of
the administration of justice." 496 U.S. at
15. The Supreme Court rejected such an
over-encompassing reading of
germaneness, holding instead that
expenditures "to endorse or advance a
gun control or nuclear weapons freeze
initiative," clearly fell at "the extreme end
[] of the spectrum" of expenditures not
germane and therefore unconstitutional.
Id. at 15-16.
In Lehnert the Supreme Court again
rejected a broad interpretation of
"germaneness." Lehnert involved a
challenge to the union's use of dues to
fund lobbying related to financial support
of the employee's profession or public
employees generally. The Court held that
"[w]here, as here, the challenged lobbying
activities relate not to the ratification or
implementation of a dissenter's collective
bargaining agreement, but to financial
support of the employee's profession or
of public employees generally, the
connection to the union's function as
bargaining representative is too attenuated
to justify compelled support by objecting
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employees."' 500 U.S. at 520 (plurality).
The Court further concluded "that the
State constitutionally may not compel its
employees to subsidize legislative lobbying
or other political union activities outside
the limited context of contract ratification
or implementation." Id. at 522 (plurality).
In these cases, the Supreme Court
rejected arguments that political and
ideological speech is germane to the
governmental interest involved. In fact, in
Lehnert, the Supreme Court stated that
germaneness cannot be read so broadly in
the context of a private sector union as to
"include political or ideological activities." Id. at
516 (emphasis added). See also, Ellis, 466
U.S. at 452 (holding that while union
activities in question may benefit
collective bargaining, the benefits were
too attenuated to be germane).
Similarly, here germaneness cannot be
read so broadly as to include forced
funding of private political and ideological
groups. The private groups are voluntary
and may be open to both students and
non-students alike. Many of the groups
mirror organizations which exist outside
In Lehnert, five justices adopted the
three-prong analysis set forth above,
although only four of those five justices
agreed on the application of the factors;
four justices believed that the challenged
lobbying was not germane to collective
bargaining, while one justice thought that
it was. That is nonetheless the Court's
holding. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977). The remaining four
justices also concluded that the lobbying
activities could not be financed, but
applied a "statutory duties test" instead of
the three-prong analysis. Lehnert, 500 U.S.
at 558 (Scalia, concurring in part, dissenting in
parl.
of the University setting (for example,
WISPIRG, the UW Greens, the
International Socialist Organization, and
Amnesty International all have
non-university counterparts). And most
of the private student groups (over 70%)
do not even apply for funding, showing
that the funding is not even germane to
the private organizations' existence, much
less germane to education. Moreover,
unlike, for example, a political science
class on socialism, the International
Socialist Organization is only incidentally
concerned with education. Its primary
goal is the promotion of its ideological
beliefs. The fact that some educational
benefit may come from it is secondary,
and therefore not sufficiently germane to
overcome the objecting students'
constitutional rights. The mere
incantation of the rubric "education"
cannot overcome a tactic, repugnant to
the Constitution, of requiring objecting
students to fund private political and
ideological organizations.
To justify compelling objecting
students to fund the private organizations,
the Regents point to the expansive
governmental interest they have -
education - as compared to the limited
interests involved in Abood and Keller -
collective bargaining and oversight of the
bar - and argue that because the interest is
so broad, more activities are germane,
including political and ideological
activities. The Regents correctly recognize
the breadth of "educational"; everything is
in a sense educational (organizing a
student activity, engaging in political and
ideological speech, even choosing which
political party or candidate to fund) even
if it merely teaches you that you do not
want to do it again. Yet when presented
with a similarly expansive interest in Keller
- the advancement of the law - the
Supreme Court rejected such a broad
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reading of germaneness. Keller, 496 U.S. at
15-16 ("To endorse or advance a gun
control or nuclear weapons freeze
initiative," clearly fell at "the extreme end
[] of the spectrum" of expenditures not
germane and therefore unconstitutional.).
We therefore reject the Regents'
argument.
As Lehnert made clear, "germaneness"
is not the be-all/end- all question in the
constitutional analysis, but rather is only
the first prong: Under Lehnert, not only
must the mandatory fee be germane to
some otherwise legitimate economic or
regulatory scheme, the compelled funding
must also be justified by vital interests of
the government, and not add significantly
to the burdening of free speech inherent
in achieving those interests. Yet Carrmll
did not consider these additional
requirements, and in a case such as this
involving the forced funding of political
and ideological speech, those factors
obtain the utmost significance.
2. Vital policy interests of the
government.
The second prong under Lehnert
considers whether the compelled fee is
justified by vital policy interests of the
government. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 520. In
the context of unions, those policy
interests included both labor peace and
avoiding free riders, and with the bar "the
state's interest in regulating the legal
profession and improving the quality of
legal services" justified the compelled
association inherent in the integrated bar.
Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14. While the
Regents do not address this prong,
throughout this appeal the Regents have
focused on their interest in education.
The Regents also speak of the
government's interest in shared
governance, or in other words the interest
in allowing students to share in the
running of the Wisconsin University
System.
No doubt there is a vital interest in
education, and the government has an
interest in allowing students to share the
governance of the university system
(although whether the latter interest is also
"vital" is not clear). However, for the
vital policy interest to survive scrutiny
under Lehnert, it must justify compelled
funding of the private or quasi-private
activity. Neither of these interests
presents a vital interest in compelling
students to fund private organizations
which engage in political and ideological
speech. "Again, Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 521,
illustrates this.
In Lehnert non-union members
challenged various union expenditures,
including "lobbying activities related not
to the ratification or implementation of a
dissenter's collective-bargaining
agreement, but to financial support of the
employee's profession or of public
employees generally...." Id. at 522
(plurality). In determining the
constitutionality of these expenditures, a
plurality of the Court analyzed the vital
policy interests involved--labor peace and
preventing free riders--and concluded
"[]abor peace is not especially served by
... charging objecting employees for
lobbying, electoral and other political
activities that do not relate to their
collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at
521. Lehnert further explained that labor
peace would not be furthered: "[B]ecause
worker and union cannot be said to speak
with one voice, it would not further cause
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harmonious industrial relations to compel
objecting employees to finance union
political activities as well as their own."
Id.
While labor peace is not at issue here,
the above quotation illustrates the
importance of a common cause for
justifying the compelled funding. In the
context of union cases, where the union
and nonunion members share a common
cause, a vital policy interest justified the
compelled funding. But where that was
missing, the expenditure could not be
justified. In this case while there may be a
common cause in education and shared
governance, there is no common cause
between private organizations which
engage in political and ideological speech
and the objecting students. Thus, we see
no vital policy interest supporting
compelled funding of the private
associations. And we might even
conclude that far from serving the
school's interest in education, forcing
objecting students to fund objectionable
organizations undermines that interest. In
some courses students are likely taught the
values of individualism and dissent. Yet
despite the objecting students' dissent
they must fund organizations promoting
opposing views or they don't graduate.
Even if objecting students were
labeled free riders, the basis underlying the
free-rider concern in Abood is absent here.
In Abood, in holding that an employee's
free speech rights are not
unconstitutionally burdened because the
employee opposes positions taken by a
union in its capacity as
collective-bargaining representative, the
Court clearly recognized that to hold
otherwise would create a free-rider
problem. The reason a free-rider problem
exists in the context of unions, however,
is significant (and in the case of student
organizations lacking): In the case of
unions, the government has imposed on
unions the duty to fairly represent all
employees, including those who do not
belong to the union, and these legal
requirements "often entail expenditure of
much time and money." 431 U.S. at 221.
Forcing non-union employees to fund the
union's collective bargaining agreement
thus "counteracts the incentive that
employees might otherwise have to
become free riders--to refuse to
contribute to the union while obtaining
benefits of union representation that
necessarily accrue to all employees." Id. at
222.
Conversely, here the private
organizations which the plaintiffs object
to funding do not act in a representative
capacity for the students and have no
obligation to fairly represent the students,
as the union does for non-union
members. Rather, the private
organizations' advocacy and speech
further positions espoused by the
organizations and their members. The
political and ideological activities of
private organizations are not limited to the
university setting, and have ramifications
that extend into the diverse aspects of the
student's life. In fact, many of the
ideological and political activities and
speech to which the plaintiffs object
occurred off-campus, further limiting the
benefit to objecting students. These
differences make the free-rider concern
inapplicable here.' * * *
4The Regents also seem to argue that
because all students benefit from "robust
debate," the objecting students are also
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3. Burdening of free speech.
Even if the Regents could satisfy the
first and second prongs, they cannot
satisfy Lehnert's third and final prong by
proving that the forced funding does not
"significantly add[] to the burdening of
free speech inherent in achieving those
interests." This prong recognizes that any
time the government forces individuals to
fund private organizations, a burden on
free speech and association may
incidentally result, but that burden may be
justified by an important governmental
interest. Assuming there is a vital
governmental interest in funding (which
we have concluded there is not), the
question then becomes whether a specific
expenditure adds to the burden on speech
inherent in the mandated funding of the
organization in the first instance. If it
does, funding those expenditures cannot
constitutionally be required even if it is
germane to an organization's mission.
In determining whether using
compelled fees to fund a private
organization which engages in political
and ideological activities "significantly
adds to the burdening of free speech," we
are again guided by Lehnert. In Lehnert, the
Court held that funding political lobbying
and using objecting employees' funds to
garner public support "present[s]
additional 'interference with the First
Amendment interests of objecting
employees.'" 500 U.S. at 521-22. In
doing so, the Court explained:
free riders. While arguably non-speakers
benefit from the additional speech, that is
not enough: "[P]rivate speech often
furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and
that does not alone empower the state to
compel the speech to be paid for."
Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 556 (Scalia, concuring).
[t]he burden upon freedom of
expression is particularly great
where, as here, the compelled
speech is in a public context. By
utilizing petitioners' funds for
political lobbying and to gamer the
support of the public in its
endeavors, the union would use
each dissenter as "an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable." [Wooley v.] Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977). The First
Amendment protects the
individual's right of participation in
these spheres from precisely this
type of invasion. Where the subject
of compelled speech is the
discussion of governmental affairs,
which is at the core of our First
Amendment freedoms, the burden
upon dissenters' rights extends far
beyond the acceptance of the agency
shop and is constitutionally
impermissible.
Id. at 522 (plurality). The Court further
explained that "[a]lthough First
Amendment protection is in no way
limited to controversial topics or
emotionally charged issues, the extent of
one's disagreement with the subject of
compulsory speech is relevant to the
degree of impingement upon free
expression that compulsion will effect."
Id. at 521-22.
If there was any doubt, Lehnert makes
clear that the Regents' policy cannot
stand. Here the burden on objecting
students' speech "is particularly great"; the
private organizations use the funds to
"garner the support of the public in its
endeavors," and as "an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an
ideological point of view" which the
students find objectionable. "The degree
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of impingement upon free expression that
the compulsion will effect" is also
especially severe given the extent and
source of the students' disagreement with
the speech engaged in by the
organizations which receive their fees. In
this case, the speech to which the
plaintiffs object includes such emotionally
charged issues as abortion, homosexuality,
and the United States' democratic system.
The source of the plaintiffs' disagreement,
as explained at length in their affidavits, is
their deeply held religious and personal
beliefs.
Notwithstanding these deep-seated
beliefs, the Regents attempt to justify
forcing the objecting students to fund
these organizations because without
funding less speech will result, and less
controversial speech, and according to the
Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General at
oral argument, "hateful speech has a place
in our society too." That may well be
true, but the Constitution does not
mandate that citizens pay for it. See Regan
v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461
U.S. 540 (1983) ("Although TWR does
not have as much money as it wants, and
thus cannot exercise its freedom of speech
as much as it would like, the Constitution
'does not confer an entitlement to such
funds as may be necessary to realize all the
advantage of that freedom.' "). See also,
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of
Virginia 233 (2d Amer.ed., 1794) ("Mt is
error alone which needs the support of
government. Truth can stand for itself.").
In fact it guarantees the opposite--that
"we the people" will not be compelled to
pay for such speech: "[T]o compel a man
to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical."
Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35 n. 31 (quoting
Irving Brant, James Madison: The
Nationalist 354 (1948)). Yet that is exactly
what the Regents do, and to support this
policy they again point to the educational
benefits flowing from the very speech to
which the plaintiffs so strenuously object.
That by its nature is an interest in the
compelled funding of private speech,
which "significantly adds to the burdening
of free speech."'
'The compulsion which Madison
condemned is of heightened concern
following Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995),
because under Rosenberger it would seem
that if the university opens up funding to
private organizations it must fund not
only the Socialists and the Greens, but the
Republicans, the Democrats, the KKK,
Nazis, and the skinheads; the Nation of
Islam, the Christian Coalition, and
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, and Islamic
organizations. To others, this engenders a
"crisis of conscience." For example,
when a Christian campus group sought an
ASM operations grant, the Ten Percent
Society opposed it, contending that it
would be illegal and unconstitutional to
fund the proselytizing and
anti-homosexual advocacy of this
Christian organization. If the university
cannot discriminate in the disbursement
of funds, it is imperative that students not
be compelled to fund organizations which
engage in political and ideological
activities--that is the only way to protect
the individual's rights. The Regents
themselves recognized this important First
Amendment concern in passing the
University of Wisconsin Financial Policy
and Procedure Paper No. 20 which
prohibited the use of student activities
fees to fund "activities that are politically
partisan or religious in nature." As the
Regents explained in their reply brief:
"The UW-Madison, like the University of
Virginia whose policy was challenged in
Rosenberger, believed at the time that the
policy was adopted that it was required to
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One of the Supreme Court's more
recent compelled-funding cases, Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457
(1997), confirms our conclusion. In
Glickman, a number of growers, handlers,
and processors ("respondents") of
California tree fruits challenged the
constitutionality of various regulations
contained in marketing orders which the
Secretary of Agriculture promulgated
pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937. The orders at
issue imposed assessments on the
respondents that covered the costs of
administrative expenses and included the
cost of generic advertising of California
nectarines, plums, and peaches. The
respondents argued to the Supreme Court
that compelled funding of such generic
advertising abridged their First
Amendment rights. In a 5-4 decision, the
Supreme Court upheld the marketing
orders. In upholding the assessment, the
Supreme Court relied on
three characteristics of the
regulation scheme at issue to
distinguish it from laws that [the
Court has] found to abridge the
freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment. First, the
marketing orders impose no
restraint on the freedom of any
producer to communicate any
message to any audience. Second,
they do not compel any person to
engage in any actual or symbolic
speech. Third, they do not compel
the producers to endorse or to
protect students' rights under the First
Amendment." The Regents properly
recognized the need to protect objecting
students' rights under the First
Amendment, and that need still exists
following Rosenberger--in fact it is now
more acute.
finance any political or ideological
views. (Citing Abood and Keller.)
Id. at 2138.
The third characteristic, that the
assessment does "not compel the
producers to endorse or to finance any
political or ideological views," id., proved
of the utmost significance to the Court's
ruling. Throughout its opinion, the Court
reiterated the last distinction--that the
orders "do not compel the producers to
endorse or to finance any political or
ideological views." See, e.g., id. at 2140 (the
germaneness test is clearly satisfied
because the generic advertising is
unquestionably germane to the purposes
of the marketing orders and "in any event,
the assessments are not used to fund
ideological activities."). In fact, the Court
used the absence of political and
ideological speech to distinguish Abood:
However, Abood, and the cases that
follow it, did not announce a broad
First Amendment right not to be
compelled to provide financial
support for any organization that
conducts expressive activities.
Rather, Abood merely recognized a
First Amendment interest in not
being compelled to contribute to an
organization whose expressive
[activities] conflict[] with one's
"freedom of belief." ... Relying on
our compelled speech cases,
however, the Court found that
compelled contributions for political
purposes unrelated to collective
bargaining implicated First
Amendment interests because they
interfere with the values lying at the
"heart of the First Amendment--the
notion that an individual should be
free to believe as he will, and that in
a free society one's beliefs should be
shaped by his mind and his
213
conscience rather than coerced by
the State." (quoting Abood, 431 U.S.
at 234-35). Here, however,
requiring respondents to pay the
assessments cannot be said to
engender any crisis of conscience.
Id. at 2139.
The very factors the Court used to
distinguish Abood, however, in this case
compel the opposite result. The students,
like the objecting union members in
Abood, have a First Amendment interest in
not being compelled to contribute to an
organization whose expressive activities
conflict with one's "freedom of belief."
Glickman, 117 S.Ct. at 2139. And here,
unlike Glickman, requiring the students to
pay the mandatory student activity fees
does engender a crisis of conscience.
Glickman, at 2130. Finally, in the words of
the Glickman Court: "compelled
contributions for political purposes ...
implicated First Amendment interests
because they interfere with the values
lying at the 'heart of the First
Amendment[--]the notion that an
individual should be free to believe as he
will, and that in a free society one's beliefs
should be shaped by his mind and his
conscience rather than coerced by the
State.' " Id. at 2139 (quoting Abood, at
234-35).6 In essence, allowing the
compelled funding in this case would
undermine any right to "freedom of
belief." We would be saying that students
6 In Glickman, four justices concluded that
the First Amendment protects against the
government compelling individuals to
fund private speech whether or not the
speech at issue is political or ideological.
521 U.S. at ---- , 117 S.Ct. at 2157 (Souter,
dissenting). So in Glickman, all nine justices
rejected as unconstitutional the compelled
funding of political and ideological views.
like the plaintiffs are free to believe what
they wish, but they still must fund
organizations espousing beliefs they reject.
Thus, while they have the right to believe
what they choose, they nevertheless must
fund what they don't believe.
In sum, we conclude that the Abood
and Keller analysis, as explained in Lehnert,
governs the students' First Amendment
challenge of the Regents' mandatory
student fee policy. The Regents have
failed to sustain their burden under this
three-prong analysis; even if funding
private political and ideological
organizations is germane to the
university's mission, the forced funding of
such organizations significantly adds to
the burdening of the students' free speech
rights. Therefore, the Regents cannot use
the allocable portion of objecting
students' mandatory activity fees to fund
organizations which engage in political or
ideological activities, advocacy, or speech.
We also hold that the 18 challenged
private organizations engage in ideological
and political activities and speech, and
cannot be constitutionally funded with
objecting students' fees. (footnote
omitted)
III. CONCLUSION
Under the Lehnert analysis, the
Regents' mandatory student fee policy
cannot stand. Funding of private
organizations which engage in political
and ideological activities is not germane
to a university's educational mission,
and even if it were, there is no vital
interest in compelled funding, and the
burden on the plaintiffs' First
Amendment right to "freedom of belief'
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outweighs any governmental interest.
We therefore hold that the Regents
cannot use the allocable portion of
objecting students' mandatory activity
fees to fund organizations which engage
in political or ideological activities,
advocacy, or speech, and they are hereby
enjoined from doing so. The Regents,
however, are free to devise a fee system
consistent with our opinion and Supreme
Court precedent; we will not mandate one
at this time.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN
PART, VACATED IN PART.
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JUSTICES TO RULE ON STUDENT FEES USE LAW
High Court Will Decide Whether State Universities Can Force
Collegians to Subsidize Campus Groups Whose Messages they Oppose
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, March 30, 1999
David G. Savage, Times Staff Witer
WASHINGTON - The Supreme
Court agreed Monday to decide whether
students at state universities can be forced
to pay fees used to fund campus groups
with a political agenda, ranging from
environmentalists to gay-tights advocates
and socialists.
Though the amounts of money at
stake are small, the issue of who receives
mandatory student fees has become an
ideological battleground on many
campuses.
Young conservatives have attacked
the fees as a violation of their 1st
Amendment rights. They maintain that
they should not be forced to subsidize
groups whose messages they oppose.
University Leaders Support Use of
Fees
Supporting the mandatory fees,
university officials and liberal advocates
say that the 1st Amendment is
strengthened, not violated, when a broad
array of groups can publish magazines and
bring speakers to campus.
The conservatives won an important
victory in October when the U.S. court of
appeals in Chicago struck down the
mandatory fees at the University of
Wisconsin.
Students there are required to pay a
fee of $166 per semester. While most of
the money funds such services as the
university health center and shuttle buses,
a portion is distributed by the student
government to private groups. They
include the UW Greens, an environmental
lobby; the International Socialist
Organization and the Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender Campus Center. In
all, conservative law students disputed the
funding of 18 organizations.
Certainly these groups have a
free-speech right to espouse their views
on campus, the appeals court said, but
forcing all students to subsidize their
message is another matter.
"The Regents [of the university]
cannot use objecting students' mandatory
activity fees to fund organizations which
engaged in political or ideological
activities, advocacy or speech," wrote
Judge Daniel A. Manion.
Manion's opinion for the three-judge
panel relied on earlier Supreme Court
rulings that said schoolteachers and
members of the state bar could not be
forced to pay fees that in turn pay for
political contributions or lobbying. The
appeals court did not decide finally,
however, whether the University of
Wisconsin must stop funding these
campus groups entirely, or whether it
must merely give dissenters a right to a
refund.
In the meantime, the university
appealed to the Supreme Court, which
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agreed to hear the case (Board of Regents
of the University of Wisconsin vs.
Southworth, 98-1189) during the fall.
The Lambda Legal Defense Fund, the
New York-based gay-rights group, had
urged the court to hear the Wisconsin
case. "Just like we all must pay for a public
park, no matter who sets up a soap box
there, students can be required to
contribute to a university fee system for
all student groups, regardless of the
recipients," said Kevin M. Cathcart, the
group's executive director.
But a lawyer who aided the
conservative students said that gay
activists on campus have not been willing
to tolerate the use of student fees to
support Christian groups that oppose
homosexuality.
"When a campus Christian group
applied for a few hundred dollars, the gay
groups opposed it. Ironically, they said
they should not be compelled to fund a
group that says homosexuality is sinful,"
said Jordan W. Lorence of the Northstar
Legal Center in Fairfax, Va.
University officials said Monday that
they have a policy against funding student
groups with a partisan or religious
viewpoint. In 1995, the Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional a
University of Virginia policy that allowed
subsidies for all student publications,
except those with a religious viewpoint.
The dispute over the use of student
fees is not a new one for Californians. The
state Supreme Court, agreeing with
conservative students in 1992, said that
dissenters must be given a right to a
refund for that part of mandatory fees
used for ideologically oriented groups.
Justices Fail to Revive Dallas
Preference Plan
Meanwhile, the Justices refused to
revive an affirmative action program for
Dallas firefighters, signaling again the
court's opposition to preferences based
on race or gender.
In 1976, under pressure from federal
officials, Dallas agreed to the plan that
gave blacks, Latinos and women an edge
in hiring and promotions. It was intended
to remedy the virtual exclusion of
minorities in the ranks of city firefighters.
But in 1995, white firefighter
challenged the plan as no longer needed
or justified, and the U.S. appeals court in
Texas struck it down last year.
Only Justices Stephen G. Breyer and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg voted to hear the
city's appeal in the case (Dallas v. Dallas
Firefighters Assn., 98-966).
Copyright C 1999 / The Times Mirror
Company
217
U.S. APPEALS COURT BARS UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN FROM
FORCING STUDENTS TO FINANCE POLITICAL GROUPS
The Chronicle of Higher Education
Friday, September 4, 1998
Patrick Healy
In a major decision restricting the use
of student fees at public colleges, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
ruled last month that the University of
Wisconsin at Madison could not force
students to finance campus groups that
engage in political and ideological
activities.
The appeals court pointedly did not
strike down the university's use of student
fees to support non-political
organizations, however.
Critics of mandatory-fee policies
hailed the decision as an important victory
for conservative or religious students who
feel that the fees usually end up
supporting liberal groups with which they
disagree. But some legal experts said the
ruling could shortchange students by
narrowing the kinds of extracurricular
opportunities available.
Madison's student-fee policy is similar
to those at many public universities. For
now, however, the appeals-court ruling
applies only to campuses in the Seventh
Circuit states of Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin.
Three Madison students sued the
university in April 1996, challenging the
use of their mandatory fees to finance 18
campus organizations that they said were
at odds with their political, ideological,
and religious beliefs as self-described
conservative Christians. The organizations
included Amnesty International; the
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center;
and the Campus Women's Center.
A three-judge panel of the appeals
court ruled that the university's student-
fee policy had failed a three-prong test set
out by the U.S. Supreme Court's 1991
ruling in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn.
on what faculty unions could do with
members' dues.
Based on that decision, the appeals
court found that:
* The university's support of private
political or ideological organizations on
the campus was not "germane" to the
institution's mission of education.
* There was no "vital policy interest"
in the university's compelling objecting
students to support such organizations.
* The use of mandatory fees to
finance the groups violated the free-
speech rights of those students who
object.
"Under the Lehnert analysis, the
Regents' mandatory student fee policy
cannot stand," the decision said. "Funding
of private organizations which engage in
political and ideological activities is not
germane to a university's educational
mission, and even if it were, there is no
vital interest in compelled funding, and
the burden on the plaintiffs' First
Amendment right to 'freedom of belief'
outweighs any governmental interest."
The university's Board of Regents
voted to ask the full Seventh Circuit court
to rehear the case. University officials
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declined to say much more about the
ruling of the three-judge panel.
The university had argued that its
mission to educate students included
supporting campus organizations that
offer a broad array of perspectives and
activities. It also contended that the First
Amendment protects the rights of
student-financed organizations to exercise
their free speech by taking ideological
stands.
But the three-judge panel said the
First Amendment rights of the 18 groups
were not in dispute.
The plaintiffs "do not ask that we
restrict the speech of any student
organization; they merely ask that they not
be forced to financially subsidize speech
with which they disagree," the decision
stated.
The appeals court upheld the
substance of a 1996 ruling by a federal
district judge in favor of the students. But
the panel found that the judge had been
"overbroad" in barring the university
from "funding private groups that engage
in ideological or political advocacy." The
appeals court said the university was free
to devise a fee system that meets the
three-prong test.
Scott H. Southworth, the lead plaintiff
in the case and a 1997 graduate of the
University of Wisconsin School of Law,
said he was "overwhelmed" by the ruling.
"It's a real victory for students all
around the country, regardless of their
political beliefs," said Mr. Southworth,
who is a research assistant for a Wisconsin
state legislator. "No one should be forced
to pay for speech and activities that they
oppose."
Jordan Lorence, a lawyer for the
plaintiffs, said that the ruling would
protect "freedom of thought" and
"freedom of conscience" on campuses.
Mr. Lorence is representing students who
have filed a similar lawsuit against the
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities.
"These funds do not create a
marketplace of ideas on campus," Mr.
Lorence said. "It is selective funding to
groups that basically reinforce the ruling
orthodoxies at a university. Universities
have to own up to that and stop
pretending that these are somehow noble,
freedom-of-speech endeavors."
As a replacement for the current
system, Mr. Lorence said, he would accept
a process in which students would not
have to give money to a certain group.
For example, he said, a student could
mark a check-off form to pay a fee to a
politically oriented group. If, for whatever
reason, the group wasn't checked off, the
student would owe no money.
Peter D. Fox, director of public
information for the University of
Wisconsin System, said that a fee-
allocation system that operated on a
student-by-student basis would raise
concerns for the university.
"If you've got 150,000 students in the
system and each one wants to fund this
and not that, it's readily apparent that
we've got a tremendous administrative job
ahead of us," Mr. Fox said. "There are
150,000 variations."
Some legal experts said that the
Madison decision stood out among other
court rulings on fee-allocation systems,
which have focused on financial support
for students with particular views or for
certain sorts of political activities.
The Seventh Circuit decision restricts
the distribution of student funds to
student groups as a whole, although it
allows -- even encourages -- the university
to find a new method of allocating student
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fees to groups that do not engage in
political activities.
"This is the broadest First
Amendment claim that has come out of
all of these cases," said Donald A. Downs,
a professor of political science and law at
the University of Wisconsin at Madison.
"It really takes the issue to the next level."
Mr. Downs said that while student
fees should not be used for political
purposes, the existence of the student
organizations themselves was a key part of
the educational experience at universities.
Just as a publicly financed university
offers a range of courses taught by people
of different ideological persuasions, he
said, groups with ideological slants should
be supported, too.
But Jesse H. Choper, a professor of
constitutional law at the University of
California at Berkeley, called the decision
"very sensible" and predicted that the U.S.
Supreme Court would uphold the appeals
court's ruling, if given the chance.
Citing several other court decisions,
Mr. Choper said: "A student at a state
university cannot be compelled, by a
condition of being a student there, to pay
student fees that go to support political or
ideological beliefs that the student
disagrees with. There's nothing terribly
complicated about that."
Copyright © 1998 The Chronicle of Higher
Education
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REGENTS TO APPEAL STUDENT FEES CASE TO THE TOP
Capital Times (Madison, WI.)
Saturday, November 7, 1998
Gwen Carlton, The Capital Times
The Board of Regents' decision to
appeal the Southworth vs. Grebe student
fees case to the Supreme Court clearly
disappointed dozens of students who
packed the regents' meeting Friday to say
it was too weak a case for such an
important issue.
But now that the decision has been
made, they said, they are determined to do
all they can to help the appeal succeed.
" 'The goal is protecting students' free
speech, and I think that's something both
the board and students are interested in,"
said John Grabel, president of the United
Council of University of Wisconsin
Students, an organization representing
140,000 students systemwide.
Kerrie Schumann, president of the
activist organization WISPIRG, agreed.
"If the regents want to go to the
Supreme Court, we're behind them," she
said.
That support was not evident in the
hours before Friday's controversial
decision. Outside Van Hise Hall Friday
morning, about 100 students gathered
with signs and a megaphone to urge the
regents to drop the suit. Later, many of
them filed upstairs to the regents' meeting
to continue the push.
The students described the suit as
factually flawed. Instead of taking it to the
U.S. Supreme Court, they said, UW
should allow one of the other, stronger
free speech suits moving through regional
courts to take up the federal fight.
"It would be selfish of us to take this
case to the national level and jeopardize
students nationwide," Eric Brakken,
president of the UW-Madison student
government, told the regents shortly
before their vote.
The regents, however, remained
unconvinced. Toby Marcovich, one of
two lawyers on the board, pointed out
that in August, students urged the board
to appeal the case to the 7th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals. When the appeal failed,
they asked that the case be dropped.
"I'm terribly, terribly disappointed in
the students," Marcovich said. "The fact
you people feel you have a chance to lose
this case in the Supreme Court is not
sufficient reason not to appeal."
The regents debated the question in
closed session for a half hour. Afterward,
they invited the students and guests back
in and explained their decision.
"This is a strong case and nothing has
changed," regent JoAnne Brandes said
after the decision. "I think a lot more free
speech rights would be lost if we didn't
appeal."
Regent Fred Mohs added that he is
not concerned about setting a poor
national precedent.
"Students in other states are a much
lower priority with me," he said. He added
that even if the appeal fails and some
student organizations find their funding
cut off, they will find ways to survive.
221
"There is such a thing as free speech
without subsidy," he said.
Christian complaint: The Southworth
case dates back to 1996, when three
Christian UW-Madison students sued the
UW System over its policy of allowing the
student government to distribute
mandatory student fees. The litigants
protested that some of the fees were going
to organizations they opposed, such as the
women's center and the Lesbian, Gay and
Bisexual Campus Center.
The UW student government, student
activist groups and the regents, however,
contended that the student fees in
question were not used to promote certain
types of political and ideological speech as
the lawsuit contended. Rather, the fees
were designed to create a forum
encouraging all types of expression
equally, something that is essential to
UW's educational mission.
Students have added that if the
current fee distribution system is
eliminated, some of the more
controversial student organizations - from
those pursuing political causes to those
serving minority groups and women -
could disappear.
"The education we receive in class is
valuable, but what's just as important is
what students teach each other," Ofelia
Delgado, a member of the Chicano
student organization MEChA, told the
regents Friday. "We need these
organizations so we can reach a better
understanding of each other."
It could take a year or more for the
Supreme Court to decide whether it will
hear the regents' appeal. In the meantime,
the current fee system will stay in place.
If the appeal is overturned, one or
more alternative fee systems devised by a
committee of UW administrators and
students would take effect, UW officials
said Friday.
Copyright © 1998 Madison Newspapers,
Inc.
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COLLEGE STUDENT FEES FACE 1ST AMENDMENT TEST
Chicago Tribune
Wednesday, June 4, 1997
Dave Newbart, Tribune Staff Writer
When three Christian law students
sued the University of Wisconsin last year,
charging that forcing them to pay for gay-
rights groups and a campus women's
center violated their 1st Amendment
rights, few at the generally liberal campus
believed the case could upend its entire
system of funding student groups.
But after a federal judge in Madison
last fall ruled that the system was
unconstitutional, the university was left
scrambling to re-evaluate how such
groups are financed.
Now, if an appeal to be argued
Wednesday before the 7th Circuit Court
of Appeals in Chicago fails, public
universities in the Midwest also could be
forced to rethink their funding of student
activities.
The issue has erupted on college
campuses over the years--including a
similar case that went to the California
Supreme Court--but this is the first time
the federal appeals courts have examined
a challenge to the entire system of funding
student groups on 1 st Amendment
grounds, experts said.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
before on the fees, saying in 1995 that the
University of Virginia could not deny a
religious group money if other groups on
campus received it, but it has not ruled
directly on whether the fees violate 1st
Amendment rights.
Some think that if the appeals court in
Chicago rules against the University of
Wisconsin in this case, it could lead to the
death of controversial or unpopular
groups on college campuses, and
eventually hurt the schools' ability to
foster a diverse environment. The groups
often are the lifeblood of campus
activities and organize multicultural
events.
"This is a challenge to something that
is very central to universities," said Susan
Ullman, the assistant attorney general
from Wisconsin who will argue the
university's case. "It threatens the wide
range of speech and activities that are
available at universities."
Jordan Lorence, a Virginia attorney
representing the students, said the
university must find ways of promoting
diversity that do not trample on individual
rights.
"The university has a constitutional
duty not to force people to fund the
advocacy of private groups," he said.
Private universities would be
unaffected by the ruling, but public
universities in Illinois, Wisconsin and
Indiana, which are under the court's
jurisdiction, as well as other public
colleges around the country are watching
the case.
As it stands, in addition to tuition,
most schools charge students a few
hundred dollars each year in mandatory
fees to cover the costs of such services as
student health programs, student unions
and campus recreational centers.
The fees also go to special-interest
groups such as chess clubs, black student
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unions, Asian-American associations and
food science clubs.
In the case of gay and lesbian
organizations and women's centers, the
funds help groups provide services such
as counseling and support groups.
Together, the groups contribute to a
public forum on campus that promotes
free speech, proponents say, and the
students are paying for the existence of
the forum--not specific groups.
"Having the speech by all these
different groups is a very important part
of what the university is all about,"
Ullman said.
But student groups also are where
many students begin political or social
advocacy--an aspect that irked the three
students who sued the University of
Wisconsin in 1996 in Southworth vs.
Grebe.
Although the student Democrats and
Republicans are denied funding on
political grounds, the International
Socialists Organization and the campus
Greens received funding, under the
auspices of providing educational
activities, Lorence said.
But the groups routinely criticized
Wisconsin Republican Gov. Tommy
Thompson, something students shouldn't
be required to support, said Scott
Southworth, the lead plaintiff and a
former head of the student Republicans.
Nor should their money support gay-
rights groups they religiously oppose, or
women's groups that support abortion.
"As the system is set up, if you don't
fund these groups, you can't graduate and
you can't receive your grades,"
Southworth said. "It's morally wrong, and
it's unconstitutional."
Southworth was backed by U.S. Judge
John Shabaz for the Western District of
Wisconsin, who ruled in favor of the
students last November.
John Nowak, an expert on the U.S.
Constitution at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, said the appeals court
ultimately must decide whether the
student fees are closer in nature to union
dues or to tax dollars for government-
related speech.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that workers who must join a union as a
condition of employment can't be forced
to pay for the political advocacy of the
union. But the court has ruled unfavorably
for citizens who object to their money
going to government campaigns with
which they disagree, he said.
In cases involving the student fees, the
California Supreme Court ruled in 1993
that the university system couldn't force
students to contribute to groups they
opposed. An appeal of that case was
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a 1995 case against the University
of Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the university could not deny funding
to a religious student group. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor raised the possibility that
mandatory fees could be susceptible to a
challenge on 1st Amendment grounds.
In the Wisconsin case, the students
who sued said they think the groups have
a right to be on campus but should have
to do what all other non-profit
organizations do: raise their own funds.
The groups that survive have support;
those that fail likely don't belong on
campus, they say.
But supporters of the campus-fee
system say many students then would
have to spend the majority of their time
fundraising, instead of providing activities.
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Without university support, they say,
many groups could fizzle. Although many
students don't mind paying $12 as a part
of their fees, they are much less likely to
write a check directly to groups with
which they aren't familiar.
"This will disproportionately
disadvantage controversial groups or ones
that are small in number, the groups that
need supported access to get their ideas
out," said Ruth Harlow, a New York
attorney with the Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, a national group for
gay and lesbian rights that filed a legal
brief supporting the university.
At the U. of I., students can decide
not to pay the portion of the fees that go
to the special-interest groups, about $7 a
semester. However, by opting out,
students lose their access to other
services, such as the student legal center.
The number of students who asked
for refunds has fluctuated between nearly
half the student body in 1980 to about 3
percent this year.
The University of Wisconsin is
developing a refund provision, in case it
loses in court. But it is unclear whether
that will be a remedy.
The plaintiffs have indicated that they
would challenge a refund system, because
it still takes the money without students'
permission. The protesting students must
seek a refund, often during a limited
period.
They would rather see a system
modeled on the one the United Way uses
to finance charities, which could allow
students to pick the groups they would
like to support.
Campus leaders say either kind of
system would be a nightmare to
administer--and would eat up money in an
era when many state university budgets
are being cut.
"It would get down to saying, 'Here is
your 3 cents back because you object to
this one group,'" said Dan Stoffel, a U. of
I. fees administrator. The cost to refund
such small amounts of money, he said,
could be greater than the amount being
returned to students.
Copyright C 1997 Chicago Tribune
Company
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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASK FOR, YOU MIGHT GET IT
Augusta Chronicle
Sunday, October25, 1998
George F. Will, Washington Post Writer's Group
SCOTT SOUTHWORTH is a
mild-mannered 26-year-old from the small
Wisconsin town of New Lisbon. However,
his lapel pin -- two tiny feet, symbol of the
right-to-life movement -- announces that he
is a Christian conservative not bashful about
announcing his convictions in an
uncongenial setting.
He is a graduate of the University of
Wisconsin, a museum of liberalism, and of
its law school, where he learned the joys of
litigation. Now he is inflicting his legal
learning on his alma mater. And he is
illustrating the temptation of judicial
activism for conservatives.
While a student, he was annoyed that
portions of the mandatory student fee he
paid were distributed to many organizations
-- for example, those promoting
homosexual and liberal causes -- whose
agendas appall him. So he sued, and his
case, successful so far, seems headed for the
Supreme Court.
HIS CAUSE IS JUST, but raises a
question: Do conservatives really want
government -- meaning, inescapably, courts
-- delivering so much justice?
A federal court has said he has a First
Amendment right not to pay fees used to
subsidize ideologies offensive to his
religious and personal beliefs. The court
enjoined the university from collecting from
any student any portion of the fee that
subsidizes anything offensive to that
student.
This is a recipe for an administrative
nightmare, and an incentive for universities
to withdraw from funding any group
potentially offensive to anyone. Which
pleases Southworth.
He says government has a right to
speak for itself, as when the Wisconsin
Legislature denounced the Ku Klux
Klan. However, he says government
does not have a right to force people to
fund offensive speech by others. A
federal court siding with him has
enunciated a broad new First
Amendment right of conscience. When
Southworth is asked if, because of that
right, the National Endowment for the
Arts might be declared unconstitutional,
he says, with quiet relish, 'Give me
time.'
Conservative protests about the
uses of student fees are toiling many
universities, which respond that
academic freedom, properly understood,
requires respecting their broad
discretion to create a stimulating
learning environment. This requires
"diversity," hence the wholesome
cacophony of subsidized advocacy.
CONSERVATIVES REJOIN,
often correctly, that they are turning to
courts only because they have been
provoked. The problem that they say
requires judicial remedy is that of
universities defining diversity in ways
unfriendly to conservatives.
In 1995 conservatives rejoiced
when the Supreme Court said the
University of Virginia could not refuse
to subsidize a Christian magazine
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devoted to proselytizing. The Court said the
university's policy of not subsidizing
religious or political activities constituted
unconstitutional discrimination based on the
content of speech. Southworth, an honest
man who hews to principles more clear than
prudent, favors that decision only if Virginia
students who are affronted by evangelism,
or Christianity, or religion generally, can be
exempt from an appropriate portion of the
mandatory fees.
BUT CAN A conservative be content
to have courts controlling universities and
other institutions of civil society, permeating
their internal operations with government
supervision? The unjust treatment of
conservatives does not justify their
participation in today's reflexive recourse to
litigation rather than persuasion -- politics --
to improve their lot. What litigation like
Southworth's advances is what Jonathan
Rauch of National Journal calls
"microgovernment."
REMEMBER CASEY Martin, the
professional golfer who has a circulatory
disorder that makes him incapable of
walking 18 holes? The Professional
Golfers' Association said he could not
compete riding in a cart because walking is
an essential part of golf. Martin got a court
to overrule the PGA, holding that, under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Martin
has a right to ride.
It is, Rauch says, an interesting
question whether walking is part of golf, but
a more interesting question is why
government should answer such
questions. Such government derogates
society's self-governance through
nongovernmental institutions, such as
the PGA.
Microgovernment's aim, Rauch
says, is to use the lever of litigation to
pry open every aspect of life so
government can fine-tune fairness.
Government increasingly polices
behavior, monitoring work place jokes
to prevent a sexually "hostile
environment," and ordering colleges to
set up as many interviews for female as
for male athletes. A jury applying the
government's rules fined the producers
of Melrose Place $5 million for their
unfairness in not allowing an actress to
play a seductress after she became
pregnant.
SOUTHWORTH'S SUIT should
awaken universities from their dogmatic
slumbers about "diversity" and the
affronts they inflict in its name. But the
suit is an incitement to
rnicrogovernment, which produces,
cumulatively, very big government
indeed.
Washington Post Writers Group




Campaign Finance Reform: How Much is Too Much?
Matthew Curtis *
Nixon v. SHRINK provides the Supreme Court another opportunity to address the
always hot issue of campaign finance reform. In July 1994, the Missouri legislature limited
the amount of campaign contributions that individuals or groups can make to certain
candidates for public office. SHRINK, a political action committee in Missouri, filed suit
claiming the legislation infringed their rights to free speech and association. The Eighth
Circuit ruled in favor of SHRINK concluding that the Missouri law was too much of an
infringement on First Amendment freedoms based upon the standard set by the Supreme
Court in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.
Both the majority and the dissent in the Eighth Circuit's decision in Nixon v. Shrink relied
on a "functionalist," or pragmatic, approach to Constitutional interpretation and applied
identical balancing tests. The Eighth Circuit majority concluded that the limits on campaign
contributions imposed by the Missouri legislature were "different in kind" from the standard
set by the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In Buckly,
the Supreme Court ruled that the $1000 limit placed on campaign contributions for a Senate
or Presidential election was constitutional. The Nixon majority ruled that the Missouri limits
failed to account for inflation since the Buckley decision and consequently resulted in too
great a burden on constitutionally protected speech.
Judge Gibson, dissenting, concluded the Missouri law did not offend the standard set by
Buckley. Gibson contrasted the limits on federal elections upheld in Buckley with the limits
imposed on state elections by the Missouri law. As a result, Gibson determined there was
not a "difference in kind" when all factors (number of people voting, decreased campaign
expenses due to advances in technology, etc.) were properly considered. Furthermore, he
argued, Buckley made no provision for inflation and the majority's decision here effectively
overturned the law that the Court upheld in Buckly.
So, how much is too much? If the Supreme Court applies the same balancing test, it
seems likely that the Court's majority opinion and dissent will mirror those of the Eighth
Circuit. On the other hand, the Court could issue a narrow ruling upholding the standard set
by Buckley but adding an inflationary mechanism to the Buckly standard. It should be noted,
however, that Buckley did not hold that the $1000 limit at issue there was the constitutional
minimum. Thus the Court could also hold that the constitutional minimum is lower than
the $1000 in Bucklej and conclude that Missouri's limits do not offend the Constitution.
The recent decision of the Court in Colorado Republican Federal Campagn Committee v.
FederalElection Comminion, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), suggests as many as eight members of the
current Court could uphold the Missouri law, although the outcome is far from certain. In
Colorado Republican, a majority of the Court distinguished between independent spending and
contributions upholding the distinction made by the Court in Buckley (Buckley held that
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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constraints on spending were more offensive to the First Amendment then were restrictions
on contributions). Only Justice Thomas questioned such a distinction, and concluded that
he would reject the holding in Buckley and require a strict scrutiny analysis of § 441a(d)(3) of
the Federal Election Campaign Act which set federal campaign contribution limits.
However, both approaches still rely on balancing tests and an assigning of values to the
interests involved. We can be relatively certain of the approach the Court will take - a
weighing of the values involved, but far less certain of the eventual outcome of the balancing
test applied by the Court. Thus, the future of Nixon v. SHRINK is uncertain and will likely
come down to a clash of ideologies over the desirability of the campaign contribution limits
at issue in Nixon with the Justices bickering over just how much is too much.
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98-963 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
Ruling below (Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams, 8th Cir., 161 F.3d 519):
State law that limits campaign contributions "made by or accepted from any person other
than the candidate in any one election" to $1,075 for candidates for statewide state office or
any office whose constituency is at least 250,000 people, $525 for candidates for state
senator or any office whose constituency is at least 100,000, and $275 for candidates for state
representative or any office whose constituency is less than 100,000 is unsupported by
evidence sufficient to prove that state has compelling interest - avoiding corruption or
perception of corruption brought about when candidates accept large contributions - that
would be served by restrictions that law imposes, and, even if state had come forward with
such evidence, limits imposed by law are too low as a matter of law, even with biennial
adjustments for inflation that the law permits, to allow meaningful participation in protected
political speech and association, and thus are not narrowly tailored to serve state's
compelling interest in preventing undue influence or corruption, real or perceived, and
therefore violate First Amendment.
Question presented: Did court of appeals err in declaring that Missouri's campaign
contribution limits for statewide office, which exceed limits expressly approved for national
elections in Buckly v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), violate First Amendment?
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SHRINK Missouri Government PAC, et al., Appellants,
V.
Jeremiah W. NIXON, et al., Appellees
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit
Decided November 30, 1998
BOWMAN, Chief Judge.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC
and Zev David Fredman (collectively,
SMG) appeal from the decision of the
District Court granting summary
judgment to members of the Missouri
Ethics Commission, Missouri Attorney
General Jay Nixon, and St. Louis County
Prosecuting Attorney Robert P.
McCullough (footnote omitted)
(collectively, the State) on SMG's
challenge to certain provisions of
Missouri's campaign finance law. We
reverse and remand.
I.
In July 1994, the Missouri legislature,
by enacting Senate Bill 650 (SB650),
adopted certain amendments to the state
campaign finance law that, among other
things, restrict the amount of campaign
contributions that persons can make to
candidates for public office. The limits
were to become effective on January 1,
1995. In November 1994, the electorate
approved Proposition A, a ballot initiative
that imposed even more restrictive
contribution limits than those contained
in SB650. Proposition A became effective
immediately upon voter approval. In
December 1995, this Court held that the
Proposition A limits on campaign
contributions violated the First
Amendment. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d
633 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1033 (1996). (footnote omitted) At that
time, the limits of SB650 became
effective.
Under the provisions of SB650
challenged here, "the amount of
contributions made by or accepted from
any person other than the candidate in any
one election shall not exceed" $1,075 to
candidates for governor, lieutenant
governor, secretary of state, state
treasurer, state auditor, or attorney
general, or for any office where the
population of the electoral district is
250,000 or more; $525 to candidates for
state senator, or for any office where the
population of the electoral district is
100,000 or more; and $275 to candidates
for state representative, or for any office
where the population of the electoral
district is less than 100,000.
SMG, a political action committee
organized and doing business in Missouri,
and Fredman, a resident of and registered
voter in Missouri and an unsuccessful
candidate for the Republican party's
nomination for state auditor this election
cycle, filed suit claiming that the limits
violate their First Amendment rights of
free speech and association. The parties
filed cross motions for summary
judgment; the District Court denied
SMG's motions for summary judgment
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and for injunctive relief, and granted the
State's summary judgment motion. SMG
filed a notice of appeal, and on July 27,
1998, we granted SMG's motion for an
injunction against enforcement of the
campaign contribution limits of SB650
pending appeal.
III.
We proceed now to the merits,
reviewing the decision to grant summary
judgment de novo. The question before
us is straightforward: do the SB650 limits
on political campaign contributions
violate SMG's and Fredman's First
Amendment rights of free speech and
association?
The State insists, as it did in Carver,
that campaign contribution limits are
subject only to intermediate scrutiny, not
the "rigorous standard of review"
employed by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per cunam). But as we
noted in Carver, the Supreme Court
"articulated and applied a strict scrutiny
standard of review" to the federal
contribution limits that were under
challenge in Buckle, and "has not ruled
that anything other than strict scrutiny
applies in cases involving contribution
limits." Carver, at 637; see also CitiZens
Against Rent Control/ Coalition for Fair
Housing v. City of Berkeley, Cal., 454 U.S.
290 (1981) ("[R]egulation of First
Amendment rights is always subject to
exacting judicial review."). The State must
demonstrate, therefore, that it has a
compelling interest and that the
contribution limits at issue are narrowly
drawn to serve that interest. See Buckley, at
25.
A.
The State contends that its compelling
interest is in avoiding the corruption or
the perception of corruption brought
about when candidates for elective office
accept large campaign contributions. The
State further posits, citing Buckley, that
corruption and the perception thereof are
inherent in political campaigns where large
contributions are made, and that it is
unnecessary for the State to demonstrate
that these are actual problems in
Missouri's electoral system. Recent
precedent from this Court is to the
contrary. In both Carver and Russell, we
were not satisfied with the mere
contention that the states have an interest
in maintaining the integrity of their
elections. (citation omitted) We required
some demonstrable evidence that there
were genuine problems that resulted from
contributions in amounts greater than the
limits in place. See Russell, at 568 ("The
defendants mustprove first that there is
real or perceived undue influence or
corruption attributable to large political
contributions....") (emphasis added); id.
at 569 (noting that none of the defendants
"provided any credible evidence" of actual
corruption, nor had they proved a
perception of corruption); Carver, at 638.1
On the subject of the State's burden to
prove its compelling interest, this Court in
Carver quoted (with some alterations by
the Carver Court) the following passage
from United States v. National Treasug
Emplyees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995),
which in turn quoted Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.):
" 'When the Government defends a
regulation on speech ... it must do more
than simply "posit the existence of the
disease sought to be cured." ... It must
demonstrate that the recited harms are
real, ... and that the regulation will in fact
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In reaching its conclusions concerning
the constitutionality of federal campaign
contribution restrictions, the Buckly Court
noted the perfidy that had been
uncovered in federal campaign financing
in 1972. See Buckley, at 27 n. 28. But we
are unwilling to extrapolate from those
examples that in Missouri at this time
there is corruption or a perception of
corruption from "large" campaign
contributions, without some evidence that
such problems really exist. See Russell, at
569; Carver, at 638. We will not infer that
state candidates for public office are
corrupt or that they appear corrupt from
the problems that resulted from
undeniably large contributions made to
federal campaigns over twenty-five years
ago. The State therefore must prove that
Missouri has a real problem with
corruption or a perception thereof as a
direct result of large campaign
contributions.
For its evidence, the State relies on the
affidavit of the state senator who
co-chaired the Interim Joint Committee
on Campaign Finance Reform when the
contribution limits were enacted. That
senator pointed to no evidence that
"large" campaign contributions were
being made in the days before limits were
in place, much less that they resulted in
real corruption or the perception thereof.
See Buckley, at 28 (noting that "the
problem of large campaign contributions
[is] the narrow aspect of political
association where the actuality and
potential for corruption have been
identified") (emphasis added). The
senator did not state that corruption then
existed in the system, only that he and his
colleagues believed there was the "real
alleviate these harms in a direct and
material way.'"
potential to buy votes" if the limits were
not enacted, and that contributions greater
than the limits "have the appearance of
buying votes." Affidavit of Senator Wayne
Goode at 9. * * * There is no way for
us to tell whether this single legislator's
perception of corruption is the "public
perception," whether it is objectively
"reasonable," and whether it "derived
from the magnitude of ... contributions"
that historically have been made to
candidates running for public office in
Missouri. Russell, at 569.
As a matter of law, the State has failed
to come forward with evidence to prove a
compelling interest that would be served
by the restrictions SB650 imposes on
campaign contributions. In fact, the State
has been unable to adduce sufficient
evidence even to show that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact regarding its
alleged interest. Therefore, the limits here
cannot withstand constitutional challenge.
B.
Even if the State had come forward
with evidence sufficient to show that it
had a compelling interest in enacting and
enforcing campaign contribution limits, it
cannot demonstrate that the SB650 limits
on the amount of campaign contributions
are narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
That is, we can say as a matter of law that
the limits at issue here are so small that
they run afoul of the Constitution by
unnecessarily restricting protected First
Amendment freedoms.
After inflation, limits of $1,075, $525,
and $275 cannot compare with the $1,000
limit approved in Buckley twenty-two years
ago. (footnote omitted) We previously
have acknowledged that the Court in
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Buckley did not declare that limits of less
than $1,000 on contributions are
unconstitutional per se, but we also
recognize that the $1,000 figure provides
us with something of a benchmark. See
Day, 34 F.3d at 1366. In today's dollars,
the SB650 limits appear likely to "have a
severe impact on political dialogue" by
preventing many candidates for public
office "from amassing the resources
necessary for effective advocacy." Buckly,
at 21. Even if the State had demonstrated
a compelling interest, the limits set by
SB650, absent the State's having proven
the actual necessity for such a
heavy-handed restriction of protected
speech, can only be regarded as "too low
to allow meaningful participation in
protected political speech and association,
and thus ... not narrowly tailored to serve"
the alleged interest. Day, at 1366.
In the circumstances presented here,
we do not believe that we run the risk of
attempting to "fine tun[e]" the work of
the Missouri legislature, or that we
otherwise are exercising authority that is
not ours in order to hold that these limits
are overly restrictive of freedoms
protected by the First Amendment.
Buckley, at 30. We so conclude because
the difference between these limits of
$1,075, $525, and $275, and larger dollar
limits that might be constitutionally sound
(that is, narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest), are not
"distinctions in degree" but "differences
in kind." Id. (citation omitted). Although,
like the Court in Buckly, we are not
prepared to state definitively what
difference would be one of "degree" as
compared with one of "kind," we can say
these limits are overly restrictive as a
matter of law. We again remind the State
that it has the burden of showing that any
limits it places on campaign contributions
are narrowly tailored to serve the State's
compelling interest in addressing proven
"real or perceived undue influence or
corruption attributable to large political
contributions." Russell, at 568. Once those
who would regulate and limit
constitutionally protected political speech
satisfy their heavy burden of proof, the
problem of judicial line-drawing can be
expected largely to disappear.
IV.
In sum, the campaign contribution
limits at issue in this case, even with the
biennial adjustments for inflation that
SB650 provides, violate SMG's and
Fredman's First Amendment rights of free
speech and association. The judgment of
the District Court is reversed and the case
is remanded with instructions to enter
summary judgment for SMG and
Fredman.
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The Court today departs from the
teaching of Buckle) v. Valeo and gives far
too expansive a reading to the recent
decisions of this Court in Carver v. Nixon
and Russell v. Bums. Upon a record more
slender than the one before us, Buckley
upheld contribution limits of $1,000 per
election for all federal offices, while
Missouri's statute provides a $1,075 limit
for statewide offices. Because I cannot
distinguish Buckley from the present case, I




** * The holdings of Carver and
Russell, that statewide limits of $300 per
election cycle "differ in kind" from the
limit in Buckly of $2,000, point
compellingly to a different conclusion in
this case.
Less evident is how to distinguish
Buckly from the present case. When we
compare the $1,075 contribution limit2
imposed by Senate Bill 650 for each
election with the $1,000 upheld by Buckly,
there is simply no difference in kind. The
$1,075 limit applies to statewide races, just
as Buckleys $1,000 limit applies to the
Senate, a statewide race, and the
presidential elections. Bucklefs reasoning
would similarly uphold Senate Bill 650's
lower contribution limits in non-statewide
elections. * * * When the size of the state
senatorial districts is contrasted with
federal congressional districts as well as
the entire State itself, there is plainly no
"difference in kind" between these
legislative limits and those countenanced
by Buckley. Finally, the same must be said
for the $275 limit for state House
elections. In the last election, the number
of votes cast in such districts averaged
12,325. Id. at 567-80. With the number
of voters in such districts, I cannot
2 The legislation at issue imposes a limit of
$1,075 per election, but a $2,150 limit per
"election cycle." An "election cycle" is
the "period of time from [the] general
election for an office until the next general
election for the same office." It is of
interest that the average household
income in Missoun is about $31,000 per
year.
conclude that the 5275 limit "differs in
kind" from those that Buckley upheld. As
Buckley observed, Congress could have
structured limits in a graduated fashion,
but its failure to do so did not invalidate
the legislation. Buckley, at 30; Carver, at
641. Buckley recognizes, then, that
graduated limits such as Missouri's are an
acceptable solution to the dangers posed
by unlimited campaign contributions.
Buckley, of course, did not establish
$1,000 as the constitutional floor for
permissible contribution limitations; see
Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th
Cir. 1994). But even if it had, I would
reject the argument in Part III B that
inflation has dissipated the similarity
between the limits in this case and those
approved in Buckley. Inflation has not
undermined BuckleYs precedential weight
or modified its holding. The $1,000 limit
upheld in Buckley remains and is the law
today, even though we have used inflation
to compare present contribution
limitations with those upheld in 1976. See
Carver, at 641; Russell, at 570-71; Day, at
1366. Despite ample opportunity to
modify Buckley, the Supreme Court has
never added the "inflation proviso" that
Part III B relies upon. If BuckleYs holding
must wax and wane with inflation, as Part
III B seems to argue, then the very statute
that Buckley upheld would now be
4 In all three cases, the limits at issue were
patently "different in kind" from the
limits in Buckley, with or without the aid of
inflation. Carver and Russell struck election
cycle limits ranging from $300 for
statewide offices to 5100 for other offices,
while Day struck a 5100 limit. (citations
omitted)
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unconstitutional, for inflation alone would
render the $1,000 limit "different in kind"
from when the Supreme Court upheld it.
Whatever may be the pernicious effects of
inflation, I am certain that the First
Amendment's dictates do not depend
upon the Consumer Price Index.
More importantly, even if it were
proper to adjust Buckly for inflation, Part
III B lacks a principled yardstick to assess
the constitutionality of any contribution
limit. Its measure of what "differs in
kind" and what "differs in degree" from
the Buckley limits is standardless and lacks
any explanation to support its bald
conclusion that the limits at issue are
"overly restrictive as a matter of law."s
II.
Putting to one side the facial similarity
between the statute stricken today and
that upheld in Buckley, the State has
adequately justified the contribution limits
at issue. Buckley and our cases both teach
that contribution limits are subject to "the
closest scrutiny." Buckley, at 25; Carver, at
636; Russell, at 567. The State has the
burden to demonstrate a compelling
interest, which Buckley defined as limiting
the reality or appearance of political
5 Indeed, even with the aid of inflation, it
does not follow that today's contribution
limits "differ in kind" from what the
Supreme Court upheld in 1976. Differing
costs, whether higher or lower, of new
communications media (fax machines,
e-mail, and the Internet, as well as more
traditional modes of political speech) and
modern fund-raising methods (the
emergence of "soft money" is but one
relevant post-Buckley development) simply
make comparison a morass of conjecture.
corruption stemnuing from large financial
contributions. 424 U.S. at 26. Both Carver
and Russell found no direct evidence of
real or perceived undue influence. Carver,
at 642-43; Russell, at 569-70. Accordingly,
we struck the contribution limits in both
cases.
The present case is readily
distinguishable from Carver and Russell.
Although the House and Senate in
Missouri preserve no formal legislative
history, the record hardly lacks evidence
that the statute at issue limits the reality or
perception of undue influence and
corruption. In summary judgment papers,
the State presented an affidavit of Senator
Wayne Goode. Goode served twenty-two
years in the Missouri House and nine
years in the Senate before he co-chaired
the Joint Interim Committee on
Campaign Finance Reform that prepared
Senate Bill 650, now the statute before us.
The senator stated that the Committee
heard "a broad spectrum of opinions ...
on the issue of campaign contribution
limits." He described the committee
discussions of what it costs to run a
campaign and the level at which
contributions threaten to corrupt political
officials and to erode public confidence in
the electoral process. The committee
heard testimony on the issue of balancing
the need to run an effective campaign
against the need to limit the potential for
buying influence. Balancing the concerns,
the committee reached the contribution
limits of $250 to $1,000 by consensus.
(footnote omitted) Goode and the other
members believed that contributions over
those limits create both the appearance
that contributors could purchase the votes
of elected officials and the danger of
actual vote-buying. The most recent
elections themselves suggest that the State
has limited at least the appearance of
corruption in the political process. Goode
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Affidavit, T 11; J.App. 171. The limits
prevent disproportionate funding of
particular campaigns and curtail the
opportunities for buying political
influence. Id. This evidence stands in
stark contrast to the lack of evidence on
these issues in Carver and Russell.'
In addition to the description in
Senator Goode's affidavit, what record is
available to us reflects that the House and
Senate in Missouri exerted considerable
effort in reaching accord on the bill finally
enacted. Two bills containing
contribution limits were introduced in the
House, House Bills 1304 and 1523.
Senate Bill 801 was introduced and passed
in the Senate, and the House passed the
House Committee's substitute for Senate
Bill 650. A conference committee
substitute for the House Committee
substitute for Senate Bill 650 was
ultimately adopted by the House and
Senate and signed by the Governor. This
action in both legislative bodies
demonstrated the careful attention given
to this legislation and the give-and-take
before final enactment. We commented
upon this process in Carver. 72 F.3d at
645 n. 18.
** * The Court should not so lightly
cast aside the legislature's findings in favor
of its own. It is hardly counterintuitive
that large campaign contributions might
corrupt politics and invite public cynicism.
The State has imposed only modest
restrictions upon political speech, and it
6 Carver and Russell involved only evidence
of certain specific contributions, without
evidence of their impact, as after-the-fact
justifications for the initiative proposals at
issue.
need not justify them with scientific
precision.
The Court's rejection of the
description of Senate Bill 650's legislative
underpinnings is plainly at odds with
Buckle. Accepting the argument that the
appearance of political corruption could
justify the limitations then at issue, Buckley
stated:
Of almost equal concern as the
danger of actual quid pro quo
arrangements is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stenming
from public awareness of the
opportunities for abuse inherent in a
regime of large individual financial
contributions ... Here, ... Congress
could legitimately conclude that the
avoidance of the appearance of
improper influence "is also critical ...
if confidence in the system of
representative Government is not to
be eroded to a disastrous extent."
424 U.S. at 27 (quoting United States CS. C.
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
It is true that the State must do more than
simply "posit the existence of the disease
to be cured." See Carver, at 638 (citing
United States v. National Treasury Emplyees
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 664 (1994) (Kennedy, J., plurality))).
The State, by the Goode affidavit, has
demonstrated not only the dangers posed
by unlimited campaign contributions, but
also the conclusions reached as to
"alleviat[ing] these harms in a direct and
material way." Id.
I cannot reconcile the short shrift
given the Goode affidavit by the Court
today with the Supreme Court's approach
in Buckley, which cited no actual evidence
that large contributions might give rise to
237
the appearance of political corruption and
which deferred to what Congress could
have reasonably concluded. (footnote
omitted) See 424 U.S. at 27, 28, 30
(Congress "could legitimately conclude"
that avoiding the appearance of
corruption is essential to maintaining
confidence in government; Congress "was
surely entitled to conclude" that disclosure
limitations alone would not adequately
combat corruption and its appearance;
Congress "was justified in concluding that
the interest in safeguarding against the
appearance of impropriety requires that
the opportunity for abuse inherent in the
process of raising large monetary
contributions be eliminated.").
Senate Bill 650 is premised upon just
such reasonable legislative conclusions, as
evidenced by Senator Goode's affidavit.
The Court today rejects those
conclusions, which closely resemble those
recognized by Buckley when it upheld
limitations strikingly similar to those now
at issue. In rejecting the state's evidence,
the Court sidesteps binding Supreme
Court precedent and fails to provide
meaningful guidance to those who might
hope to craft campaign reform legislation
that will survive this Court's
unprecedented scrutiny.
III.
It must also be noted that the Sixth
Circuit has recently approved a Kentucky
law with a contribution limit of $1,000 per
election year. Kentucky Right to Life v. Terry,
108 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir.1997). * * *
Perhaps members of the Court quarrel
not only with the contribution limits at
issue today, but with Buckley itself, as was
made evident during oral argument. We
are bound by Buckley unless and until the
Supreme Court declares otherwise.
I would affirm the summary judgment
of the district court upholding the
contribution limits in Senate Bill 650.
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SUPREME COURT ROUNDUP
After 23 Years, Justices Will Revisit Campaign Limits
The New York Times
Tuesday, January 26, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
In a case that brings the debate over
money and politics back to the Supreme
Court's door, the Justices agreed today to
decide whether the strict contribution
limits the Court upheld for Federal
elections 23 years ago are still
constitutionally valid.
The issue reached the Court not in the
context of the Federal law the Justices
addressed then, in the Buckley v. Valeo
decision, but as a challenge to a 1994
Missouri election law that incorporated
the same limits of $1,000 per election.
In a Nov. 30 ruling, a Federal appeals
court panel in St. Louis struck down the
Missouri law on the ground that the limits
were "so small that they run afoul of the
Constitution by unnecessarily restricting
protected First Amendment freedoms."
Limits that made sense in 1976, when they
were upheld by the Supreme Court in the
Buckley case, have been so eroded by
inflation as to stand in the way of
"meaningful participation in protected
political speech and association," the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit said.
In one analysis in the case, the current
value of $1,000 in 1976 dollars is $2,500.
The Missouri limit has been adjusted for
inflation under a state legislative formula,
and was $1,075 when the appeals court
struck it down; there are now no
contribution limits in effect in the state.
Missouri told the Supreme Court that
the appeals court had placed many similar
state campaign laws in an intolerable
constitutional limbo.
"It would be difficult to find an issue
of greater national significance that both
requires and warrants some measure of
legal certainty," Jeremiah W. Nixon,
Missouri's Attorney General, told the
Court. The constitutionality of the Federal
limits is also at stake, Mr. Nixon said.
While it is by no means certain, or
perhaps not even likely, that the Justices
will use this case as a vehicle for a broad
revisiting of the Buckley decision, the
prospect is there. Inexplicably, the Court
indicated today that it would not hear the
case until next fall, meaning that a
decision might not come until a year or
more from now. The state had filed its
appeal with unusual speed, in less than
two weeks rather than the allowable 90
days, in the hope that the Justices would
be able to hear the case in April and
decide it by the end of the current term in
June. April is the last month during which
the Justices hear arguments, and they have
scheduled only 12 arguments for a
calendar that can accommodate 24.
While accepting the state's appeal,
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government
PAC, No. 98-963, the Court took no
action on a companion appeal that raised
more directly the continued viability of
Buckley v. Valeo.
This second case, filed by a member
of the Missouri House of Representatives,
asked the Court to decide "whether the
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analytic structure undergirding Buckley v.
Valeo has become so confused and
unwieldy as to call for reconsideration of
the relationship between the First
Amendment and content-neutral efforts
to regulate the financing of political
campaigns." (Bray v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, No. 98-978)
The Buckley decision has come under
intense criticism recently, not for its
upholding of the Federal contribution
limits, but for the other half of the
decision, which equated campaign
spending with political speech and struck
down expenditure limits. Despite the
criticism that the decision has made it
impossible to regulate the flow of money
into politics, the Court has not displayed
much appetite for revisiting it.
In fact, the action today may reflect
primarily the Court's sense of obligation
to clarify the contribution issue. In a 1997
case from Kentucky, another Federal
appeals court, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, upheld a
$1,000 contribution limit against a similar
challenge, and it is now clear that the
judicial unanimity that has prevailed for
more than two decades is beginning to
fray.
The Eighth Circuit in the Missouri
case subjected the state law to an analysis
that differed considerably from the
approach the Supreme Court took in the
Buckley decision. The appeals court said a
high level of proof was necessary -
"demonstrable evidence" of "genuine
problems" from large political
contributions -- to justify the limits. The
Supreme Court in the Buckley decision
accepted anecdotal evidence and said that
the Government only had to prove that
the problems were "not illusory."
There were also these other actions on
an extremely busy day at the Court.
Congressional Power
Taking up an important question of
Federal-state authority, the Court agreed
to decide whether Congress had the
authority to make states liable to suit in
Federal court for violating the Federal law
that bars age discrimination on the job. In
a decision last year, the United States
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in
Atlanta, refused to allow an age
discrimination suit against Florida by
current and former faculty members of
two state universities. The Justices
accepted appeals from both the plaintiffs
(Kimel v. Florida, No. 98-791) and from
the Federal Government, which
supported them (U.S. v. Florida, No. 98-
796).
Police Records
Accepting an appeal from the Los
Angeles Police Department, the Court
agreed to decide the constitutionality of a
California law under which various police
records can be released to the public but
may not be used for commercial purposes.
The law was challenged by a
publishing service that provides names of
people who have been arrested or who are
victims of crime and sells the information
to lawyers, insurance companies, driving
schools and others. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
San Francisco, ruled last year that the law
violated the company's First Amendment
right to commercial speech. The case is
Los Angeles Police Department v. United
Reporting Publishing Corp., No. 98-678.
Copyright C 1999 The New York Times
Company
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MISSOURI'S LIMIT ON CAMPAIGN DONATIONS FAVORS
INSIDERS, OPPONENTS TELL U.S. SUPREME COURT
Brief Filed Monday Attracts Attention Nation wide
St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Tuesday, June 8, 1999
Jo Mannies; Post-Dispatch Political Correspondent
As opponents frame the issue before
the U.S. Supreme Court, Missouri's
campaign donation limits are an illegal
political version of "social engineering"
that aids political insiders over outsiders.
Until a lower court threw out the
limits last year, only the state's political
parties could collect donations larger than
$1,075. That meant, opponents say, that
only favored candidates got the benefit of
that big money.
"You can't use the First Amendment
for social engineering," said Clayton
lawyer Bevis Schock, spokesman for the
group Shrink Missouri that filed its brief
Monday in a case that is capturing national
interest.
The Supreme Court is expected to
hear the case this fall in its first major
review of campaign finance laws since
1974. Big names are filing documents on
both sides of the debate. Republican
presidential contender John McCain has
joined a number of states and Common
Cause, who have filed documents siding
with the state of Missouri, which supports
the limits.
In April, the state filed a brief
declaring that all donation limits
throughout the country would be
automatically deemed illegal unless
Missouri's limits are restored.
Sen. Mitch McConnell, R-Ky. and
chairman of the Senate Republicans'
campaign committee, seems to agree. He
asked the high court Monday to use
Missouri's case to review the current
$1,000 federal limit on contributions to
presidential or congressional candidates.
"The limits are the cause of the so-
called 'money chase,' "McConnell said in
a press conference in front of the
Supreme Court, where he filed a brief in
support of Shrink Missouri.
If nothing else, the court should order
that the federal $1,000 limit be increased,
he said. McConnell's brief was co-signed
by the Missouri Republican Party, a
spokesman said.
Schock's group had no notice of
McConnell's action. Shrink Missouri's
legal arguments avoid discussing the
federal limits.
Instead, the group focuses on various
court rulings requiring that governments
demonstrate "proof of corruption" before
imposing limits on how much donors can
give directly to candidates.
The opponents' chief argument is that
limiting contributions is the same as
limiting the right of free speech. "It is
now settled that government must have
substantial evidence of real harm to
regulate speech," the opponents wrote in
Monday's brief.
Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon
has yet to see the opponents' documents.
He contended Monday that the state
should only have to prove "risk of
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corruption." He also accused the
opponents of seeking a political system
controlled by the "precious few."
Nixon plans to personally argue
Missouri's case before the Supreme Court.
Schock, in turn, accused backers of
campaign donation limits of improperly
trying to use the limits to "make sure that
the weak get a fair shake." He asserted
that their tactic, besides being illegal, has
failed.
Before 1995, Missouri had no
restrictions on the size of contributions.
Donations of $20,000 or more were
common. The Legislature approved the
limits in 1994, months before Missouri
voters overwhelmingly approved even
lower limits. The courts threw out those
lower limits, which ranged from $100 to
$300, depending on the office.
Last summer, a federal appeals court
temporarily threw out the latest limits,
which, indexed for inflation, were $275,
$525 and $1,075, depending on the office.
The court threw them out permanently in
December, favoring Shrink Missouri's
argument that the limits hurt more than
they helped.
Shrink Missouri cites the case of Zev
David Fredman, a University City
accountant who unsuccessfully sought the
GOP nomination for state auditor last
year. Fredman got almost 20 percent of
the vote although he had raised only a
fraction of the money contributed to the
primary election victor, then-deputy state
auditor Chuck Pierce. Shrink Missouri
noted that Pierce got financial aid from
the state Republican Party, while Fredman
did not.
Without the limits, Fredman could
have collected some large donations as
"seed money" to leverage more donations,
the opponents said in their brief.
Washington University Professor
Bruce LaPierre wrote most of the brief,
and plans to argue Shrink Missouri's case
before the Supreme Court, Schock said.
"The principle of free speech is more
important than trying to use rules and
regulations to try ensure power for the
'little guy,' " Schock said. "It is free speech
and debate that will most allow the poor
and the little guy" to have a political voice.
Copyright C 1999 St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Inc.
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Concerned that federal campaign
contribution limits may be endangered by
a recent court decision striking down
limits in Missouri, Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.)
and several of his colleagues today will file
a brief with the Supreme Court, which will
review the case later this year.
"The Nixon case, an appeal from an
8th Circuit decision in which the court
invalidated a $1,075 campaign finance
contribution limit, threatens to eviscerate
the ability of Congress to implement
meaningful campaign finance reform,"
Reed explained. "Should the court uphold
the decision of the 8th Circuit, lawmakers
would be prohibited from enacting
campaign finance reforms unless a specific
scandal was being remedied or Congress
was otherwise combating actual
corruption."
Last November, in the case of Nixon
vs. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the
8th Circuit Court struck down the $1,075
campaign contribution limits that Missouri
enacted in 1994, ruling that the limits had
"run afoul of the Constitution" and
unnecessarily violated the First
Amendment.
Lawyers for the state argued in favor
of the limits by charging that the " money
is harmfully distorting" and polluting "the
nation's political process" - thereby
necessitating the contribution limits.
But the judges wanted proof.
"The 8th Circuit decided two very
fundamental points," explained
Washington University Law Professor
Bruce La Pierre, who is representing the
Shrink Missouri Government PAC. "One,
that government must have some
evidence of harm before it can restrict
political speech, and second, the state of
Missouri did not have any evidence of
such harm."
"The case itself was decided on the
question of whether or not the state had
any evidence that these contribution limits
were necessary to prevent corruption, and
of course the court found that they had
no evidence," GOP election lawyer James
Bopp, who also plans to file a brief in the
case, explained.
"Just as in flag burning, or
pornography on the Internet, the
government has to prove their case,"
Bopp said. "Missouri simply had no
evidence that these limits were justified
factually."
This fall, the Supreme Court will
weigh in on the issue and in doing so
reexamine the landmark decision in the
1976 case Buckley vs. Valeo, which
rejected spending limits but established
some contribution limits as constitutional.
"Up until now the issue hasn't reached
the Supreme Court," explained Trevor
Potter, a prominent election lawyer and
former commissioner of the Federal
Election Commission. "That's one reason
I think the court took this case."
"What we know from Buckley is that
having contribution limits is
constitutional," Potter said, explaining
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that that leaves it up to the court to decide
now "what limit is too low."
Potter said he believes the Supreme
Court's review of the case could have a
significant impact on the campaign
finance reform movements that have been
sweeping through the states in recent
years, but was less sure of the implications
for federal campaigns, remarking that it all
"depends on what rationale the court will
use.
But according to Deborah Goldberg,
a senior attorney with New York
University's Brennan Center for Justice,
the case is "critical because if the 8th
Circuit Court's reasoning is allowed to
stand, it really puts in jeopardy not just
Missouri's limits, but also federal limits."
In the brief that Reed is filing today
along with Reps. John Spratt (D-S.C.) and
Amo Houghton (R-N.Y.), the Senator will
"argue that Missouri's contribution limit is
equivalent to the federal limit and is
therefore valid."
Reed also planned to make the case
that "considerable deference should be
given to legislative determination of what
(campaign finance) reforms are
necessary."
"I believe the American people want
reforms now and I don't believe buying
influence with huge campaign
contributions is constitutionally
protected," Reed remarked. "But I am
convinced that reform must originate in
Congress and the courts should not
unnecessarily limit Congress' power to do
so.
The 8th Circuit is not the first court to
take aim at contribution limits.
In 1996, a U.S. District Court judge
struck down a District of Columbia
statute that limited campaign contributors
from giving more than $100 per election
cycle to candidates for district-wide office
and more than $50 per cycle to candidates
for ward office and other political party
posts.
Similar contribution limits have also
been struck down by the courts in Alaska,
California, Oregon and other states.
Copyright C) 1999 Roll Call, Inc.
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE JUST GETS MESSIER
The National LawJournal
Monday, November 2, 1998
Richard L. Hasen, Special to The National Law fournal- Associate Professor at
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, co-authored, with Daniel Lowenstein, "Election
Law: Cases and Materials" (Carolina Academic Press)
THE ONLY law that seems to be at
work these days in the realm of campaign
finance reform is Murphy's law: Anything
that can go wrong, will go wrong. For
example, congressional efforts to fix the
campaign finance system after Watergate,
and the Supreme Court's response in its
landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976), have produced a world of
soft money, issue ads and self-financed
candidates such as Ross Perot, that no one
in Congress intended and few voters like.
But nothing comes close to the
unintended consequences of a valiant
effort of grassroots organizers to pass
voter initiatives imposing very low
contribution limits on local and statewide
campaigns. Ironically, these efforts may
soon result in an unfortunate Supreme
Court decision eliminating the $1,000
individual contribution limit that currently
governs federal elections. We would then
have a system with no individual
contribution limits unless Congress acted
to impose a new, higher limit. Given
intense opposition by some in Congress
to campaign finance reform, this is no
sure bet.
The problem can be traced back to
Congress' 1974 amendments to the
Federal Elections Campaign Act, which
imposed a $1,000 limit -- not indexed to
inflation -- on individual contributions to
federal candidates. In Buckley, the
Supreme Court held that limits were
constitutional, as they prevent corruption
-- politicians exchanging dollars for
political favors -- and the appearance of
corruption. Some of the Buckley
plaintiffs argued that the $1,000 limit went
too far, even assuming the permissibility
of Congress' acting to prevent corruption
or its appearance, because most
contributions above $1,000 would not be
corrupting. The Supreme Court rejected
that argument, saying that it lacked a
"scalpel" to probe whether, for example, a
$2,000 limit might be just as effective as a
$1,000 limit. The court imprecisely
concluded that "such distinctions in
degree become significant only when they
can be said to amount to differences in
kind."
The Fight Continues
Fast-forward to the early 19 9 0s.
Grassroots campaign finance organizers,
fed up with failed efforts to enact federal
campaign finance reform, took their case
to the people, mostly through voter
initiatives. In 1992, Washington, D.C.,
voters passed an initiative imposing
individual contribution limits of $50 to
$100 in candidate elections. Other
jurisdictions imposed similar limits.
A federal district court struck down
those limits in 1996, after concluding that
they prevented candidates "from amassing
the resources necessary for effective
advocacy." The lower limits drove
candidates to spend more time on fund-
raising to raise less money -- too little to
get their message out. National Black Police
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Association v. District of Columbia, 924 F
Supp. 270 (D.D.C 1996). The 8th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar
conclusion in 1995's Carver v. Nixon, 72
E3d 633. The court noted that $100 in
today's dollars, allowing for inflation, is
worth about 4 percent of the $1,000 limit
the Supreme Court had upheld in Buckley.
As opponents of contribution limits
have challenged ever-higher individual
limits, the inevitable has happened. In
Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Adams,
151 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 1988), the 8th
Circuit struck down a $1,075 individual
contribution limit imposed by the
Missouri Legislature. And in California, a
federal district judge struck down limits of
up to $1,000 created by Proposition 208,
in part on the ground that the limits were
too low to permit effective advocacy.
Cakfornia Probfe Council PoliticalAction
Committee v. Scully, 989 F. Supp. 1282
(E.D.Cabf 1998). Neither case is a final
judgment, but the end results are likely to
mirror these interim decisions.
I can see the end of this slippery
slope. Sooner or later, some candidate
will argue that what was once
constitutional is no longer so: The $1,000
limit approved in Buckley used 1976
dollars -- too low for an effective
campaign today.
Eventually, such a case will make its
way to the Supreme Court. Given the
hostility that several members of the
Supreme Court have shown to current
campaign finance regulations, it seems
likely a majority would strike down the
$1,000 limit. Such a holding would not
require overruling Buckley's approval of
contribution limits. It would just state
that, as applied in this case, the $1,000
limit is too low to allow effective
advocacy. The practical result would be
the same, however, as overruling
Buckley's approval of contribution limits:
the end of federal campaign finance
contribution limits. I fear that day is
coming sooner than we think.
Copyright C 1998 The New York Law
Publishing Company
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UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP INC.
Reading the First Amendment Between the Lines
Matthew Frey *
The Playboy Channel is likely the last place one would tune in for a discussion of the
how's and why's of "signal bleed," "time-channeling," or "channel-mapping converters."
Yet these and other telecommunications-industry buzzwords will figure prominently in
Playboy's defense this term of a lower federal district court opinion striking down a portion
of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) that seeks to prevent children from partially
viewing sexually explicit cable television channels. The Court's ruling will decide whether
Playboy and other adult cable networks will in effect be required to broadcast their programs
late at night.
The case marks the second time the government has found itself before the High Court
defending the CDA, part of the omnibus Telecommunications Act of 1996. Taking
advantage of the CDA's accelerated review provision, government lawyers in the previous
case, Reno v. ACLU, sought to reverse the decision of a three-judge district court panel that
had issued a preliminary injunction preventing the government from enforcing CDA
provisions aimed at protecting children from harmful material on the Internet. Justice
Stevens's 1997 opinion for the Supreme Court in the case affirmed the lower court's ruling,
noting that the challenged provision was both vague and overbroad. (See page 456 for more
on the fallout from Congress' attempt to conform to the Court's decision.)
At issue in the present case before the Court is whether Section 505 of the CDA violates
the First Amendment. Entitled "Scrambling of Sexually Explicit Adult Video Service
Programming," the provision was meant to eliminate signal bleed, the partial reception of
audio or video over a scrambled channel that generally occurs when certain combinations of
scrambling and decoding equipment are used. Seeking to curb children's exposure to signal
bleed from sexually explicit channels, Congress, in crafting Section 505, essentially presented
cable companies with a choice: fully scramble adult channels by installing new and expensive
blocking devices in millions of homes or limit the broadcast of partially scrambled channels
to between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., a practice known as "time-channeling."
Playboy, along with Graff Pay-Per-View, owner of two adult cable networks, argued that
the statute forced them to limit their broadcasts to the 10 p.m.-to-6 a.m. time slots, and that
this limitation infringed their expression of free speech. In 1996, three days before Section
505 was scheduled to take effect, Playboy won a temporary stay against the enforcement of
the measure, arguing that a related CDA provision - Section 504 - represented a less-
restrictive alternative method of protecting children. (Section 504 requires cable companies
to install in-home blocking devices at their customers' request.)
A special three-judge panel, however, refused to issue a permanent injunction, holding
that no evidence existed to demonstrate that Section 504 represented a viable and therefore
acceptable alternative to Section 505. Both Playboy and Graff challenged this ruling, but
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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when the Supreme Court in 1997 affirmed the three-judge panel's decision not to enter a
permanent injunction, Graff dropped out of the lawsuit and Playboy persevered alone,
seeking to protect its access to the pool of 3 million yearly subscribers to adult programming.
The result of Playboy's efforts was another decision by the same three-judge panel that
had denied Playboy the permanent injunction. This time, however, the court concluded that
Section 504, the alternative that requires cable companies to install in-home blocking devices
at their customers' request, had not been fully considered. Accordingly, the court sided with
the entertainment company.
Writing for the court, Judge Jane Roth of Wilmington, Delaware, accepted that the
government has a compelling interest in protecting children from signal bleed, this despite
her misgivings over the "troubling" lack of evidence the government introduced to support
its contention that watching sexually explicit cable channels is harmful to children. But she
denied the government's related assertion that Section 505's time-channeling provisions
represented the available alternative least restrictive of Playboy's First Amendment rights.
Instead, Judge Roth sided with Playboy and Section 504.
"To be a less restrictive alternative," Judge Roth wrote, "Section 504 must be both less
restrictive in the sense that it inhibits protected speech to a lesser degree and it must be a
viable alternative in that it allows the Government to achieve the ends that are its compelling
interest. We think it is clear that Section 504 is in fact less restrictive."
Noting that the court in its earlier decision may have been too quick to assume that most
people objected to signal bleed, Judge Roth endorsed the voluntary nature of 504. "Section
504 provides for voluntary blocking," Judge Roth continued. "Those consumers who
request a blocking device will have one installed free of charge. However, for those who
wish to receive Playboy programming, [cable companies] will be able to broadcast it 24
hours per day. In this way, neither Playboy nor its subscribers will suffer any First
Amendment ill-effects."
Concern about consumer awareness of Section 504 remained, however. "The basic
difference between Sections 504 and 505 is in determining who takes the initiative to
remediate the signal bleed problem," Judge Roth wrote, implying that cable customers could
take the initiative only if they were aware of their rights under 504, and that cable companies,
fearing the cost of having to install perhaps millions of new blocking devices, weren't about
to tell them about 504 or take the initiative themselves. The court addressed this problem by
ordering Playboy to include language in its contracts with cable companies mandating that
the companies notify their customers of their rights under Section 504, through, for
example, inserts in their monthly billing statements or on-air advertisements. (The court
lacked the jurisdiction to require cable companies themselves to initiate notice.)
In closing, the court observed that its notice requirement did not ensure that Section 504
would be a perfect solution. But it hinted that perfection in this realm is elusive. "The
Government is undoubtedly correct that some minors will find access to signal bleed from
sexually explicit programming if they are determined to do so," wrote Judge Roth. "As the
Supreme Court explained in the context of dial-a-porn regulations: '[i]t may well be that
there is no fail-safe method of guaranteeing that never will a minor be able to access the dial-
a-porn system.'... Nonetheless, the Court did not [believe] the desire to prevent 'a few of
the most enterprising and disobedient young people,' from securing access to [...]
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pornography ... justifqied] a statutory provision that had the 'invalid effect of limiting the
content of adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children."'
In this context, it appears as though the government will have to go a long way to
distinguish televisions from telephones.
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98-1682 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group Inc.
First ruling below (D. Del., 30 F.Supp. 2d 702):
Section 505 of 1996 Communications Decency Act, which requires cable television
operators either to fully scramble or time channel "sexually explicit adult programming or
other programming that is indecent" in order to eliminate "signal bleed," which is partial
reception of video images and/or audio sounds on scrambled channel, is content-based
restriction on adult programmers' speech that has effectively limited viewing of adult
programming to period between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., and is not least restrictive means of
advancing government's compelling interests in protecting children from exposure to
patently offensive sex-related material, supporting parental claims of authority in household,
and ensuring individual's privacy in home in view of content-neutral alternative afforded by
Section 504 of statute, which requires cable operators to provide blocking device to
subscribers upon request and is viable alternative when subscribers are provided with
adequate notice of its availability; accordingly, Section 505 is enjoined as violating adult
programmers' First Amendment rights.
Second ruling below (D. Del., 3/18/99):
Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate government's motions to alter or amend judgment and
to correct judgment due to government's subsequent filing of notice to appeal to U.S.
Supreme Court.
Questions presented: (1) Does Section 505 of 1996 Telecommunications Act violate First
Amendment? (2) Was three-judge district court divested of jurisdiction to dispose of
government's post-judgment motions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(a) by government's
filing of notice of appeal while those motions were pending?
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PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
Decided December 28, 1998
ROTH, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc. ("Playboy") challenges the
constitutionality of section 505 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996,
47 U.S.C. § 561 ("CDA") which regulates
signal bleed, i.e., the partial reception of
sexually explicit adult cable television
programming in the homes of
non-subscribers to that programming.
Playboy seeks a declaratory judgment that
§ 505 violates the First Amendment and
the Equal Protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and also seeks injunctive
relief, preventing the United States, the
United States Department of Justice,
Attorney General Janet Reno, and the
Federal Communications Commission
(collectively "the Government") from
enforcing Section 505.
I. Procedural Background
Playboy contends that § 505 infringes
the free speech protections provided by
the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Additionally, Playboy
asserts that the language of § 505 is
unconstitutionally vague. Finally, Playboy
claims that § 505 violates the Equal
Protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by
singling out Playboy as a network
"primarily dedicated to sexually oriented
programming," while not regulating signal
bleed from other premium networks
which transmit sexually oriented
programs. * * *
II. Findings of Fact
1. Playboy challenges § 505 of the
CDA, * * * entitled "Scrambling of
sexually explicit adult video service
programming." This section requires a
multisystem operator ("MSO") * * * either
to fully scramble * ** or to time channel
"sexually explicit adult programming or
other programming that is indecent" on
any of its channels that are "primarily
dedicated to sexually-oriented
programming." The purpose of this
provision is to eliminate "signal bleed,"
which is the partial reception of video
images and/or audio sounds on a
scrambled channel. The stated methods
of eliminating signal bleed are either by
blocking the transmission of the targeted
programming or by limiting its
transmission to the hours of the day when
a significant number of children are not
likely to view it ("safe harbour hours").
The FCC regulation implementing time-
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channeling would limit adult
programming to the period between 10:00
p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
3. Playboy and Graf provide MSOs
with adult, sexually oriented video
programming. The MSOs then transmit
the programming to premium subscribers
and pay-per-view purchasers. Playboy
owns two adult-programming networks,
Playboy Television and AdulTVision. The
programming on the Playboy network is
virtually 100% sexually explicit adult
programming. On a yearly basis, 3 million
households subscribe to and/or receive
pay-per-view sexually explicit adult
programming through the Playboy or
Graf channels.
6. Because of the additional cost of
premium and pay-per-view programming,
MSOs seek to secure [this programming]
for subscribers only. To prevent a signal
from reaching the home of a
non-subscriber, MSOs "scramble" the
signal in an analog system by using either
"RF" or "baseband" technology.
Generally, the scrambling affects only the
video portion of the transmission.
7. Cable television technology has
evolved over the last 20 years. A variety of
scrambling technologies are used by
MSOs when broadcasting in analog form.
* * * Forms of scrambling are ["RF," or
"baseband," positive traps, negative traps,
and addressable converters.]
8. Section 505 was enacted to remedy
the problem of "signal bleed." Signal
bleed occurs when a signal is not
completely scrambled by the MSO's RF
or baseband equipment, and the video
and/or audio is wholly or partially
discernible. While signal bleed is caused
by inadequate RF or baseband technology,
bleed does not occur when RF or
baseband technology is used in
conjunction with positive or negative
traps ("double scrambling"). In addition,
bleed does not occur in systems where
TVs have converter boxes, addressable or
otherwise, with channel mapping.
However, bleed does occur when
consumers do not have a converter box
with channel mapping or when they have
a cable-ready TV, obviating the need for a
converter box. Bleed does not occur
when MSOs broadcast their signal in
digital, as opposed to analog form.
9. Signal bleed becomes a problem
when a cable subscriber, who does not
subscribe to a premium channel, tunes to
that scrambled channel and receives a
signal which may include all or portions of
the video picture and/or audio signal.
The cause of this phenomenon is known
as random lockup. The severity of the
problem varies from time to time and
place to place, depending on the weather,
the quality of the equipment, its
installation, and maintenance. Because of
the existence of this problem, a child may
tune to a scrambled channel and receive
discernible images even though the parent
is a not a subscriber to the channel. This
result is of particular concern where the
programming is sexually explicit, intended
for an adult-only audience.
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10. In addition to § 505, there are a
variety of technologies available to
consumers to ensure that they do not
receive signal bleed. Under § 504 of the
CDA, * * * an MSO, upon request of any
cable service subscriber, must, free of
charge, fully scramble or fully block both
audio and video signals. This would
eliminate reception both of undesired
channels and of undesired signal bleed. In
addition, modem TVs and VCRs have
both lockout and V-chip features by
which a consumer can program the TV or
VCR to block reception either of an
undesired channel or of offensive types of
programmmng.
12. The Government has presented
evidence of only a handful of isolated
incidents over the 16 years since 1982
when Playboy started broadcasting. The
Government has not presented any
survey-type evidence on the magnitude of
the "problem." Nor has the Government
demonstrated that the theoretical
calculation * * * on potential for signal
bleed is actual reality-that in fact x
million children are exposed to signal
bleed. ***
Harm from Exposure to Signal Bleed
of Sexually Explicit Programming
16. Playboy's expert witness, Dr.
Richard Green, a psychiatrist specializing
in the field of psychosexual development,
testified that in his opinion there were no
adverse effects demonstrated from
exposure of children or adolescents to
sexually-explicit video materials. Dr.
Green did acknowledge on cross-
examination that he had written a book
entitled Sex and the Life Cyle in which he
stated at page 26 that
The overlap between many of the
physical behaviors involved in typical
sexual conduct and those involved with
aggressive conduct renders the visual
experiencing of adult sexuality by young
children potentially confusing and
hazardous.
17. The Government presented no
evidence of a clinical nature showing any
harm associated with signal bleed. The
Government's expert witness, Dr. Elissa
P. Benedek, a board-certified child
psychiatrist, testified about the nature and
duration of harm that minors might suffer
by virtue of being exposed to sexually
explicit programming. Dr. Benedek then
hypothesized that viewing signal bleed of
sexually explicit programming would have
a similar effect, perhaps to a lesser degree,
as watching sexually explicit
programming. For this postulation, Dr.
Benedek relied on clinical studies done in
a related area: the effect on minors of
television violence, as well as on anecdotal
evidence-a few isolated incidents of
exposure by minors to signal bleed and
their reactions.
The Technological and Economic
Impact off 505
18. At the time of the preliminary
injunction hearing, it was not clear what
any given MSO, with a system emitting
signal bleed, would do when faced with
complying with § 505. Each MSO would
have the option of upgrading its
technology from analog to digital
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transmission, of time channeling, or of
distributing channel-mapping capable
converters, lockboxes, or positive or
negative traps to all their customers.
Plaintiffs argued that MSOs would find
time channeling the least costly choice,
losing only 3 0% of their revenues,
whereas losses would average 50% of
revenues for the next best option, double
scrambling, i.e., scrambling via baseband
or RF technology plus a positive trap. * *
* As predicted, the vast majority (in one
survey, 6 9 /6) of cable operators have, in
response to 5 505, moved to time
channeling. * ** Neither Playboy nor
the Government could identify a single
cable system that had adopted double
scrambling to comply with § 505. In
effect, the practical impact of § 505 has
been to reduce the broadcast day for
sexually explicit programming to an
eight-hour safe harbor period of 10:00
p.m. to 6:00 a.m. This is because most
MSOs have no practical choice but to
curtail such programming during the other
sixteen hours or risk the penalties
imposed by the CDA if any audio or
video signal bleed occurs during these
times.
19. The effect on Playboy of cable
systems moving to time-channeling is
primarily economic. However, Playboy
argues that the economic impact of 5 505
is significant and serves as a quantitative
measure of the lost First Amendment
opportunities suffered by Playboy and its
viewers. Time-channeling, the removal of
sexually explicit programming during
two-thirds of the broadcast day, precludes
all households from receiving such
programming during that time. Given
that 30 to 50% of all adult programming is
viewed by households prior to 10 p.m.,
** * the impact on Playboy and its
viewers *** is significant. Playboy
estimates its losses at $25 million through
2007, or 15% of revenues. The
Government estimates Playboy's losses
through 2002 at $6 million. * * * The
actual amount of Playboy's losses is of
little relevance to our First Amendment
analysis. Suffice it to say that Playboy will
lose a significant amount of money as a
result of cable operators' time channeling
in order to comply with § 505.
Efficacy of Section 504
20. Section 504 of the CDA also
requires MSOs to completely block upon
request any programming that a cable
systems customer desires, whether
sexually explicit or otherwise. The MSO,
not the subscriber, must bear the cost of
providing the blocking mechanism.
Playboy argues that § 504 presents a
constitutionally "less restrictive
alternative" to § 505 because it would
achieve the same purpose: complete
blocking for those who want it, with less
restriction of Playboy's First Amendment
rights. A key variable in the efficacy of §
504 is the type of notice that cable system
customers receive about their rights under§ 504. As we found at the preliminary
injunction stage, "[i]f the § 504 blocking
option is not being promoted, it cannot
become a meaningful alternative to the
provisions of § 505." *** There, we
invited the parties to present further
evidence of "the actual and predicted
impact and efficacy of § 504." ***
22. If, however, § 504 is to be an
effective alternative to § 505, adequate
notice of the availability of the no-cost
blocking devices is critical. In order for
Playboy to prevail on its claim that § 504
is a less restrictive alternative to § 505,
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Playboy must demonstrate that § 504 is
efficacious. The type of notice given is
crucial to the implementation of § 504.
Parents must be aware that MSOs have
the ability to, and are required to, block
channels that parents find offensive.
Parents must also be aware that the MSOs
are required to do so free of charge. The
Government notes that "cable operators
communicate the availability of channel
blocking devices to their subscribers
through a variety of means such as
monthly billing inserts, special mailings,
barker channels, and adult-channel
advertisements." * * *
23. Notwithstanding the adequacy of
any notice given, the Government argues
that § 504 is not a less restrictive
alternative because it is not effective at
controlling the problem of signal bleed;
the mere fact that so few lockboxes were
distributed suggests that voluntary
requests for lockboxes will not solve the
problem. Playboy provides an alternate
explanation for the low number of boxes
distributed-the lack of parents' concern.
If parents don't think signal bleed is a
problem, they won't request lockboxes,
whether free or otherwise. The
underlying premise of Playboy's argument
is that parents are aware of the occasional
signal-bleed situation and have decided
that it is not a problem.
24. The Government enumerates
other potential problems -regarding § 504.
The Government suggests that it may take
weeks for cable operators to comply with
a subscriber's request for a lockbox. * * *
The Government also contends that the
device may fail. * * * In addition, after a
subscriber has installed a blocking device,
the cable operator may move the adult
network to a different channel, rendering
the block ineffective. * * *
25. Concerning the economic
feasibility of § 504, the Government
presented evidence that the distribution of
lockboxes to a sufficient number of
customers to effectively control the
problem of signal bleed is not
economically feasible. The Government's
economics expert, Dr. Dertouzos studied
the "break-even" point-the point at
which the cost of distributing lockboxes
would exhaust all of a cable system's adult
channel revenues. He determined that
even if a substantial number of parents
requested lockboxes, it is "economically
unfeasible to distribute more than a trivial
number of [lockboxes] to subscribers."
* * * Using Playboy's buy rate for the first
quarter of 1997 and the average retail
price for Playboy programming during
that period, the number of traps that
could be distributed is 3.0 percent of the
subscriber base. * * * If one considers a
five year revenue stream in the break-even
analysis, the number of traps that could be
distributed rises to 6.0 percent of the
subscriber base. * * * The finding that
the cost of distribution of boxes is not
feasible for a cable system is confirmed by
the statement of Playboy's expert witness,
John Mancell. Mancell attested that the
cost of distributing negative traps to 56
percent of subscribers without addressable
converters would exceed $434 million, * *
* which is far above cable operators'
revenues from adult-networks, estimated
at $78 million. * * * Economic theory
would suggest that profit-maximizing
cable operators would cease carriage of
adult channels if the cost of distributing
boxes exceeded the revenue generated by
the adult channels, or even if costs rose to
such a point that the profit from adult
channels was less than the profit from
channels unlikely to require blocking.
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III. Conclusions of Law
Standard ofReview
** * Our first task is to determine the
standard of review to which we will
subject the statute at issue. At the
preliminary injunction stage, we held that
"5 505 should be treated as a
content-based restriction on speech" and
that "we should apply either strict scrutiny
or something very close to strict scrutiny
when a content-based law, applicable in
the cable television context, is challenged
on the grounds that it violates the First
Amendment." * * * We recognize in this
regard that no majority of the Supreme
Court has ever accepted the argument that
sexually explicit, but not obscene, material
receives less protection under the First
Amendment than artistically, politically, or
scientifically valued forms of speech. ***
Nothing presented at trial, and no
jurisprudence subsequent to the
Preliminary Injunction Opinion in 1996,
has changed the analysis or outcome
reached there. * * *
The Government continues to argue
that its constitutional burden is reduced
by virtue of the fact that this legislation is
content-neutral and attacks the
"secondary effects" of exposure to
sexually explicit material. * * * But it is
clear that the Renton "secondary effects"
analysis does not apply where regulation
of adult movie theatres is based on "the
content of the films being shown inside
the theatres." * * *
As in the preliminary injunction
opinion, we continue to view § 505 as a
content-based restriction on speech. * * *
Although 505 is aimed at preventing
signal bleed, a content-neutral objective,
the section applies only to signal bleed
occurring during the transmission of
"sexually explicit adult programming or
other programming that is indecent."
Signal bleed from the Disney Channel, for
example, does not come within the
purview of the statute. Congress's
targeting of signal bleed of solely sexually
explicit programming is a content-based
restriction.
To be sure, the context of this
content-based restriction must also be
considered because speech does not occur
in isolation. Cable television is a means of
communication that is both pervasive and
to which children are easily exposed. * * *
Thus, this context cannot go unnoted.
In cases such as this, it is the
Government's burden to demonstrate that
its interests are compelling and that the
means chosen "are carefully tailored to
achieve those ends." * * * The
Government must prove that § 505 is a
"least restrictive alternative," i.e., that no
less restrictive measures are available to
achieve the same ends the government
seeks to achieve. * * *
Compelling Government Interest
The Government asserts three
interests that in its view justify § 505: 1)
the Government's interest in the
well-being of the nation's youth-the
need to protect children from exposure to
patently offensive sex-related material; 2)
the Government's interest in supporting
parental claims of authority in their own
household-the need to protect parents'
right to inculcate morals and beliefs on
their children; and 3) the Government's
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interest in ensuring the individual's right
to be left alone in the privacy of his or her
home-the need to protect households
from unwanted communications.
In its First Amendment jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court has recognized the
need to protect children from "exposure
to patently offensive sex-related material."
* * * "The State has an interest 'to protect
the welfare of children' and to see that
they are 'safeguarded from abuses' which
might prevent their 'growth into free and
independent well-developed men and
citizens.'" *** There is no doubt that
the State has an interest in protecting
children. The question remains, however,
whether the "harm," from which the State
seeks to protect children, is in fact a harm
to children. In other words, does viewing
signal bleed of sexually explicit
programming constitute a harm to
children. If it is a harm, there is no doubt
the State has a compelling interest in
regulating it.
The Supreme Court has not required
empirical proof of harm to justify
content-based restrictions on
constitutionally protected speech when
children are involved. *** However,
some evidence of harm must be
presented. The mere articulation of a
theoretical harm is not enough. * * * In
short, some evidence of harm short of
definitive scientific proof must be
presented. This case demonstrates a
paucity of such evidence.
We have detailed the evidence of
harm put forward by the Government.
The Government presents no clinical
evidence linking child viewing of
pornography to psychological harms.
Rather, the Government argues by
analogy to clinical studies showing the
effect of child viewing of televised
violence as well as anecdotal evidence of
the effects of sexually explicit television.
The reference to televised violence
research is weakened by the lack of
evidence establishing the appropriateness
of the analogy. Even if watching televised
violence causes children to be violent,
should the same hold true for televised
sex? We cannot say that it would. The
next weakly proven inference is that the
effects of viewing signal bleed of sexually
explicit television are the same as viewing
sexually explicit television outright. This
lack of evidence is reflected by the same
dearth of evidence of harm within the
legislative history of 5 505. Moreover,
there are clear ethical questions
surrounding clinical research of the effects
of children viewing sexually explicit
programming.
The evidence presented on the type
and duration of the harm is equally
troubling. Dr. Benedek testified
concerning transient dysphoria, modeling,
and changed attitudes towards sexuality
associated with susceptible children
viewing explicit pornography. None of
her views, however, are derived from
observations of exposure to partially
scrambled images and sounds of sexual
activity. There is no evidence in this case
that such scrambled, garbled, intermittent
signal bleed has a harmful potential similar
to explicit pornography. Nevertheless, we
are not prepared to say that there is no
prospect of such harm.
We are troubled by the absence of
evidence of harm presented both before
Congress and before us that the viewing
of signal bleed of sexually explicit
programming causes harm to children and
that the avoidance of this harm can be
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recognized as a compelling State interest.
We recognize that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence does not require empirical
evidence. Only some minimal amount of
evidence is required when sexually explicit
programming and children are involved.
* * * In conclusion, then, on the basis of
the few scientific studies that have been
done in related areas, keeping in mind Dr.
Benedek's experience as a clinician and
the anecdotal evidence she was exposed to
in that capacity, and considering Dr.
Green's comment on the hazards of
children visually experiencing adult sex,
we conclude that there is sufficient risk of
harm to susceptible minors to warrant
protection from sexually explicit signal
bleed.
Turning then to the Government's
next concern, concomitant with its
interest in protecting children, it has an
interest in protecting parent's authority to
raise their children as they see fit. * * * A
parent has a right to "inculcat[e] moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements
of good citizenship." * * * On the
basis of this interest, the Supreme Court
has held that governmental restrictions of
access by children to sexually explicit, but
not obscene, material is justifiable. * * *
In Pacifica, the Court recognized the
parental interest in deciding whether their
child would be allowed to hear an
indecent radio broadcast; this interest
helped "justify the special treatment of
indecent broadcasting." *** Section 505
addresses this compelling interest in that it
ensures that parents can decide how best
to teach their children about sex without
the unwanted exposure to sexually explicit
signal bleed. In short, § 505 ensures, for
the most part that unwanted exposure
does not occur.
The third interest of the Government
is to protect the right of the individual to
be left alone in the privacy of his or her
home. * * * Section 505 embraces the
individual's right to be left alone in his
home by restricting signal bleed to the
safe harbour hours. Only individuals who
subscribe to Playboy and who have
therefore chosen to bring sexually explicit
programming into their homes are
exposed.
Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis
Recognizing that § 505 addresses three
interests which in sum can be labeled
"compelling," we must determine whether
§ 505 is narrowly tailored to serve that end
and whether it is the least restrictive
alternative. Playboy argues that § 504 is a
less restrictive alternative than § 505,
mandating that we grant Playboy's request
for declaratory judgment and injunction
against the enforcement of § 505. The
basic difference between § 504 and § 505
is in determining who takes the initiative
to remediate the signal bleed problem.
Section 505 is an advance blocking of
channels required of MSOs. Section 504 is
a voluntary blocking of channels upon
individual request. In either event, the
MSO must pay the cost.
To be a "less restrictive alternative," §
504 must be both less restrictive in the
sense that it inhibits protected speech to a
lesser degree and it must be a viable
alternative in that it allows the
Government to achieve the ends that are
its compelling interest. We think it is clear
that § 504 is in fact less restrictive.
The restrictiveness of § 505 is now
evident. The solution Congress crafted in
§ 505 to control the problem of signal
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bleed gave MSOs two alternative methods
of compliance: 1) complete scrambling, or
2) time channeling the programming into
safe-harbor hours. There is no doubt that
time-channeling has proven to be the
method of compliance of choice among
MSOs. * * * While the effect of time-
channeling on Playboy's profitability is
perhaps not clear, time-channeling
certainly diminishes Playboy's
opportunities to convey, and the
opportunity of Playboy's viewers to
receive, protected speech. Time
channeling amounts to the removal of all
sexually explicit programming at issue
during two thirds of the broadcast day
from all households on a cable system.
Since 30-50% of all adult programming is
viewed by households prior to 10 p.m.
and since the restricted programming is
protected speech, § 505 restricts a
significant amount of protected speech. *
* * Section 505 was designed to protect
minors, but cable operators are required
to prevent bleed in all non-subscribing
households, irrespective of whether a
household has children. In fact, as we
found, two-thirds of all households in the
United States have no children.
The Government argues that the
number of Playboy consumers is relatively
small, between 800,000 and 1.7 million,
compared to the 16.7 million children
potentially exposed to signal bleed.
Moreover, as technology upgrades of
equipment take place, more MSOs will be
able to fully block signal bleed, rather than
to time channel. The Government also
argues that time channeling is a minor
inconvenience, that the typical consumer
can alter his or her viewing time to the
safe harbour hours or can tape
safe-harbour programming and play it
back at his or her leisure. Therefore, the
Government argues, the effects of time
channeling are minimal. This misstates
the issue. The question is not the
significance of the totality of the effects of
time channeling standing alone. It is
instead the relative burden of one solution
versus another. ***
Section 504, by contrast to § 505, is
less restrictive of the First Amendment
rights of Playboy and its subscribers.
Section 504 provides for voluntary
blocking. Those consumers who request
a blocking device will have one installed
free of charge. However, for those who
wish to receive Playboy programming,
MSOs will be able to broadcast it 24
hours per day. In this way, neither
Playboy nor its subscribers will suffer any
First Amendment ill- effects. For that
reason, 504 is not restrictive of anyone's
First Amendment rights and is clearly
"less restrictive."
Furthermore, § 504 is a
content-neutral regulation. It does not
apply only to signal bleed of "sexually
explicit adult programming or other
programming that is indecent," as § 505
does. Rather, it applies to any signal bleed
or to any programming that the requesting
subscriber finds offensive. The fact that (
504 is content-neutral differentiates it
from the content-based restrictions of 6
505. * * *
While 5 504 is clearly less restrictive, it
must also be a viable alternative. The
Government argues that 504 is not an
effective alternative to § 505 because there
are inherent limitations to parent-initiated
blocking schemes which depend upon
subscriber initiative and vigilance. ***
Logically, a parent must be aware of the
problem of signal bleed, before he or she
is likely to examine potential solutions
such as a lockbox. The Government
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argues that parents usually become aware
of the problem only after the child has
been exposed to signal bleed, and then the
damage has been done. Furthermore,
once aware of the problem, the success of
§ 504 depends on parental awareness that
they have the right to receive a lockbox
free of charge from their local MSO.
Indeed, it was this same concern with
parental awareness of signal bleed and of
§ 504 that motivated our rejection of §
504 as a less restrictive alternative at the
preliminary injunction stage of this
litigation. * * * There, we explained that
"we ha[d] no evidence ... whether local
cable operators or producers of sexually
explicit programming [were] advertising
the free availability of the § 504 lockbox
or other blocking devices upon demand,"
and that we had no evidence whether
"parents [were] otherwise aware of the §
504 means of achieving complete blocking
of undesired channels." * * * "Upon
[that] record," we held that "the
government ha[d not] demonstrated an
expectation that § 504 [would] be a viable
alternative." * * *
That record has now been
supplemented with information during the
14 month period when § 504 was in effect
and § 505 was not. In that time, MSOs
distributed lockboxes to less than one half
of one percent of their subscribers. The
Government relies on this statistic to
establish that § 504 is clearly ineffective.
At most, it blocked 0.5% of signal bleed.
The first problem with the Government's
argument is that the finding of minimal
lockbox distribution is equally consistent
with an ineffective statute as it is with a
societal response that signal bleed is not a
pervasive problem. Indeed, the
Government has not convinced us that it
is a pervasive problem. Parents may have
little concern that the adult channels be
blocked.
The second problem with the
Government's argument that the 0.5%
statistic proves that § 504 is ineffective is
that the argument is premised on adequate
notice to subscribers. It is not clear,
however, from the record that notices of
the provisions of § 504 have been
adequate.
In the interest of ensuring that
adequate notice be given in the future, we
suggest that it be given along the
following lines: MSOs should
communicate to their subscribers the
information that certain channels
broadcast sexually-oriented programming;
that signal bleed, i.e., partially discernible
video images and full audio of those
channels, may appear; that children may
view signal bleed without their parents'
knowledge or permission; that channel
blocking devices that will block signal
bleed are available free of charge from the
subscriber's MSO; and that a request for a
free device to block the offending channel
can be made by a telephone call to the
MSO.
The adequacy of the notice will also
depend on the means by which it is made.
Appropriate means would include inserts
in monthly billing statements, barker
channels (preview channels of
programming coming up on Pay-
Per-View), and on-air advertisement on
channels other than the one broadcasting
the sexually explicit programming. In
addition, the notice should be conveyed
on a regular basis, at reasonable intervals.
Moreover, if an MSO were to change the
channel on which it broadcasts sexually
explicit programming, a special notice
indicating this should be mailed to
subscribers who have requested a
lockbox.
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The efficacy of § 504 with "adequate
notice" must be compared to that of §
505. The time-channeling requirement of
§ 505 ensures that during the hours when
children are likely to be watching
television, signal bleed cannot occur. We
note, however, that a resourceful minor
can still watch signal bleed after the
safe-harbour hours. By contrast, 9 504
depends on parental vigilance. * **
However, with adequate notice of the
issue of signal bleed, parents can decide
for themselves whether it is a problem.
Thus to any parent for whom signal bleed
is a concern, § 504, along with "adequate
notice," is an effective solution. In reality,§ 504 would appear to be as effective as §
505 for those concerned about signal
bleed, while clearly less restrictive of First
Amendment rights.
We hold therefore that 5 504 is a less
restrictive alternative to § 505 as long as
MSOs provide "adequate notice" to their
subscribers. We do not have jurisdiction
over the MSOs to require them to provide
such notice. We do, however, have
jurisdiction over Playboy. As a
consequence, we will require Playboy in its
contractual arrangements with MSOs to
ensure that MSOs provide "adequate
notice" of the availability of § 504
blocking devices. If "adequate notice" is
not provided, § 504 will no longer be a
viable alternative to § 505.
To be sure, MSOs retain the right not
to broadcast sexually explicit
programming, if, for example, it proves
not to be economically feasible. Playboy,
however, as well as other providers of
sexually explicit programming, will have
the incentive to ensure the economic
feasibility of lockbox distribution by
MSOs.
Under § 504, the Government is
undoubtedly correct that some minors
will find access to signal bleed from
sexually explicit programming if they
are determined to do so. As the
Supreme Court explained in the context
of dial-a- porn regulations: "[i]t may
well be that there is no fail-safe method
of guaranteeing that never will a minor
be able to access the dial-a-porn
system." * * * Nonetheless, the Court
did not deem the desire to prevent "a few
of the most enterprising and disobedient
young people," from securing access to
the pornography, to justify a statutory
provision that had the "invalid effect of
limiting the content of adult telephone
conversations to that which is suitable
for children." * * * Similarly, § 504
with "adequate notice" is not a perfect
solution; but neither is § 505. We have
balanced the rights of Playboy and of its
subscribers against the interest of the
government in regulating sexually
explicit programming. We find the
balance struck by § 504 with "adequate
notice" to be a less restrictive alternative
to that provided by § 505. For this
reason, we declare § 505
unconstitutional and enjoin its
enforcement. * * *
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CHILDREN'S ACCESS TO SEXY CABLE TV AT HEART OF CASE
The Miami Herald
Tuesday, June 22, 1999
Aaron Epstein, Herald Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court
agreed Monday to review a law intended to
prevent millions of children from seeing or
hearing sex acts on incompletely scrambled
"adult" cable television channels.
Congress passed the law three years ago,
after parents complained that their children
were exposed to the sexually explicit
content of the Playboy and Spice
channels-even though the families did not
subscribe to them.
A mother in Cape Coral, Fla., for
example, said she had found her son, 8, and
daughter, 7, "transfixed" by scenes on Spice
of "a naked man sodomizing a woman,"
accompanied by assorted "groans and
epithets."
Nonsubscribers' TV sets
The law, part of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, requires cable
operators to block sex-oriented channels on
nonsubscribers' TV sets-or to broadcast
adult fare only during hours when children
are unlikely to be watching. Those hours
are between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., the Federal
Communications Commission said.
The Supreme Court said it will rule,
probably early next year, on whether the
measure violates the First Amendment
guarantee of free expression.
The case, U.S. vs. Playboy
Entertainment Group, arrived on the
court's 1999-2000 docket in the aftermath
of high school shootings in Littleton, Colo.,
and Conyers, Ga., which have made
protecting children from violent and
sexually explicit entertainment a leading
topic of public debate.
House defeats a ban
Last week, the House of
Representatives defeated a proposal to
ban the sale or distribution of sexually
explicit and flagrantly violent material to
minors in films, videos and recordings.
The problem at the heart of the
dispute before the nation's highest
court, however, is the unintentional
distribution of X-rated material, a
phenomenon called "signal bleed." It
occurs when nonsubscribers to a
premium channel receive a partly
scrambled signal that often permits
them to discern images at intervals and
to hear sounds clearly.
Signal bleed plagues most cable
systems and could expose as many as
29.5 million children in 39 million
homes to pictures and sound from the
Playboy and Spice channels, according
to the government.
Playboy disputes estimate
Playboy, for its part, said the
government's estimate of exposure is
too high because it fails to subtract
households that subscribe to adult
programming and those on cable
systems with expensive digital
technology that prevents signal bleed.
Playboy, which has purchased the
Spice channel since the case began, said
forcing it to give up all adult
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programming before 10 p.m. would cause a
15 percent loss of revenues.
Enforcement barred
Last December, after a trial, U.S.
District Circuit Judge Jane Roth of
Wilmington, Del., barred enforcement of
the law, saying it was so broad that it
violated free-speech guarantees.
She suggested that a less restrictive
alternative, also written into the 1996
decency law, would protect children while
allowing Playboy to broadcast 24 hours a
day. The alternative requires cable operators
to provide a free lock box to any consumer
who requests one. The box would
completely block a sexually explicit channel.
"In this way," Roth wrote, "neither
Playboy nor its subscribers will suffer any
First Amendment ill-effects."
Voluntary blocking opposed
U.S. Solicitor General Seth Waxman,
appealing to the Supreme Court for the
Clinton administration, said voluntary
blocking would not work because requests
for lock boxes by as few as 6 percent of
cable customers "would make it
uneconomical for cable operators to carry
sexually explicit channels."
Waxman relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's 1978 decision upholding an FCC
restriction on the hours that comedian
George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words"
monologue could be broadcast on radio.
'Pig in a parlor'
In that case, the Supreme Court,
likening afternoon broadcasts of vulgar
language to "a pig in a parlor instead of
a barnyard," said broadcasts of
objectionable language could
constitutionally be limited to times in
which children were unlikely to be
listening.
Robert Corn-Revere, a lawyer for
Playboy, said such a restriction should
not be applied to cable TV because
cable operators, unlike radio
broadcasters, have the technology to
block unwanted programming at the
viewer's request.
The case will be argued in the
Supreme Court's next term, which will
begin Oct. 4.
The justices still have 10 cases to
decide before beginning their summer
recess, probably next week.
Several of the remaining cases focus
on the rights of people with disabilities.
One asks whether states must place
mentally disabled patients in a
community-based facility rather than a
state institution. Another disputed issue
is whether federal anti-discrimination
law protects a person whose disability
can be controlled or corrected by
medication, glasses or some other
means.
Copyright C 1999 The Miami Herald
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JUSTICES TO DECIDE IF ADULT CABLE FARE CAN BE
LIMITED AT NIGHT
The Washington Post
Tuesday, June 22, 1999
Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court said yesterday it
would decide whether Playboy Television
and other adult cable networks can offer
sexually explicit programs to subscribers
around the clock or whether the federal
government may restrict such shows to late-
night hours.
The federal government is appealing a
district court ruling that struck down a
provision of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 requiring that any adult
programming that could not be fully
scrambled or blocked from non-subscribing
households be shown only between the
hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.
Justice Department lawyers told the
high court that Congress wanted to protect
children from exposure to the glimpses of
sex scenes that can be viewed through
partially scrambled signals and the erotic
dialogue that accompanies them. But a
federal district court in Delaware, where
Playboy Entertainment Group challenged
the law, said the provision violates First
Amendment free speech guarantees because
it is not the least restrictive way to further
the government's interest and attack what is
known as "signal bleed."
The district court noted that the
provision requires complete scrambling of
the video signal even to households without
children and effectively imposes a ban on
adult cable networks for two-thirds of the
day. Further, the court observed that a
separate portion of the law already requires
cable operators to fully block both audio
and video signals, free of charge, if a
subscriber requests it. The case of
United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group will be heard next fall and a
ruling is likely sometime in 2000.
Separately, in a day of varied court
business, the justices let stand, without
any comment, an appeals court decision
that allows prosecutors to promise
leniency to witnesses in exchange for
their testimony against other criminal
defendants.
The court's action yesterday closed
out a controversial chapter in federal
criminal law that began a year ago when
a three-judge panel of the 10th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals challenged the
standard prosecutorial practice of
securing accomplices' testimony in order
to build a case against more dangerous
defendants.
In a novel interpretation that
conflicted with many other courts, the
10th Circuit panel said such deals
violated a federal bribery statute that
prohibits offering anything of value to a
witness for his testimony. The full 10th
Circuit quickly suspended the panel's
decision and eventually reversed the
interpretation.
"In light of the longstanding
practice of leniency for testimony, we
must presume that if Congress had
intended [to make such practice illegal
under the bribery law] it would have
done so in clear .. . language," the full
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appeals court said. Yesterday's order in
Singleton v. United States leaves that
decision and an entrenched prosecutorial
practice in place.
Ruling in a Maryland case yesterday, the
court said police need not obtain a warrant
to search a car they have reason to believe is
carrying illegal drugs. Consistent with prior
cases, the justices said a search warrant is
not required even if police had sufficient
time to request one after receiving a tip that
a car would be carrying drugs. The decision
in Maryland v. Dyson reversed a Maryland
Court of Special Appeals opinion and
reinstated Kevin Darnell Dyson's
conviction on charges of conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute.
The justices also ruled yesterday that
new federal limits on attorneys' fees
awarded to inmates who successfully
challenge prison conditions apply only
to legal work done after the law took
effect in 1996 (Johnson v. Hadix).
Copyright C 1999 The Washington Post
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PLAYBOY WINS CHALLENGE TO SECTION 505
District Court Declares Law Unconstitutional. Enjoins its Enforcement
PR News wire
Wednesday, December 30, 1998
Responding to a challenge by the
Playboy Entertainment Group, a U.S.
District Court panel unanimously has
declared Section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
unconstitutional. Section 505 prohibited
cable operators from offering adult-oriented
networks like Playboy from 6 a.m. until 10
p.m. daily, unless new and expensive
blocking equipment was installed in more
than 30 million cable homes. While 505 was
intended to block momentary bits of audio
or video programming that can accidentally
"bleed" through on premium or pay-per-
view channels on some cable systems, the
Court concluded that less restrictive means
of addressing the problem are available.
This decision again allows Playboy
programming to be carried round-the-clock.
"We are extremely pleased that the
Court agreed with our position that Section
505 is unconstitutional and unnecessary,"
said Christie A. Hefner, chairman and chief
executive officer of Playboy Enterprises,
Inc.
The District Court found that Section
504 of the Act, which requires cable
operators to block any cable channel upon
the request of a subscriber-and which
Playboy supports-protects the interest of
the Government and parents, when
adequate notice of this provision is provided
to cable viewers.
"This affirms our long-standing position
that the family, not the government, should
be in control of television viewing,"
Hefner said.
In declaring Section 505
unconstitutional, the District Court held
that the Government's interest in
preventing signal bleed must be
balanced against the "lost First
Amendment opportunities" experienced
by Playboy and its viewers, resulting
from the removal during two-thirds of
the broadcast day of Playboy's
constitutionally protected programming.
Given that 30% to 50% of all adult
programming is viewed by households
before 10 p.m., the Court found the
impact on Playboy and its viewers was
"significant."
Playboy TV and AdulTVision, the
company's adult movie channel, are
available in about 20 million cable
households representing about 500
cable systems.
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (NYSE:
PLA, PLAA) is an international
multimedia entertainment company that
publishes editions of Playboy magazine
around the globe; creates programming
for Playboy TV networks and home
video distribution around the world;
operates a direct marketing business,
including Critics' Choice Video,
Collectors' Choice Music, Playboy and
Spice catalogs and Web sites; markets
Playboy-branded consumer products
sold worldwide; operates Playboy
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Online, which includes the Playboy.com and
Playboy Cyber Club Web sites; and plans to
open the Playboy Casino & Beach Hotel on
the Greek island of Rhodes.
Copyright C 1998 PR Newswire
Association Inc.
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ERIE v. PAP'S A.M.
Stipping Away the Confusion: The First Amendment and Nude
Dancing
Matthew Curtis *
Hoping to clarify an earlier decision on nude dancing and the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear Erie, Pa. v. Pap'sA.M. during the upcoming term. The case
involves a statute passed by the city of Erie, Pennsylvania which prohibits appearing nude in
a public place. The statute is identical to an Indiana statute upheld by the Court in 1991.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). But, what would initially appear to be an
easy case for the Court is made considerably more difficult by the lack of any consensus
within what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described as the "hopelessly fragmented Barnes
Court."
In Barnes, all of the justices except Justice Scalia agreed that nude dancing was entitled to
some degree of First Amendment protection, but they were unable to agree about the level
of protection. The disagreement between the Justices generally boiled down to a question of
what government interest was being furthered by the statute. For Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor and Kennedy, the interest being furthered by the statute was the state's interest in
preventing public nudity. "Public nudity," they argued, was the non-speech element of the
expressive speech communicated through nude dancing. Because the statute was limited to
regulating "public nudity" and only incidentally burdened the expression inherent in nude
dancing, the three justices concluded that the statute was permissible.
Justice Souter, on the other hand, argued that Indiana's interest was in "combating the
secondary effects" of nude dancing - prostitution and sexual assault. Souter argued that the
prevention of such "secondary effects" permitted some infringement of expressive speech.
Furthermore, he argued, the requirement of a G-string and pasties had little impact on the
dancer's "capacity and opportunity to express the erotic message."
Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens, Marshall and Blackmun, argued that the
legislature had concluded that the message communicated through nude dancing encouraged
such "secondary effects" as sexual crime. Thus, the Indiana statute outlawed nude dancing
precisely because of the message the legislature believed it communicated. Therefore, White
concluded, the interest furthered by the regulation was the direct suppression of the erotic
message communicated by the dance rather than simply an incidental burdening.
Because of the different characterizations, the majority and dissent relied on different
precedent in their analyses. Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter applied the Court's
four part test from United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In 0 Brien, the Court upheld
the prosecution of O'Brien for burning his draft card because of the "sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element" of the expressive activity.
Specifically, 0 7rien required (1) that the government regulation be "within the constitutional
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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power of the government;" (2) that the regulation must further an "important or substantial
governmental interest;" (3) that the interest cannot be related "to the suppression of free
expression;" and (4) that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
[cannot be] greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the governmental] interest."
Because of the characterization of the interest furthered by the statute by these members of
the Court, the 0 Brien test was satisfied.
White, however, concluded that the Indiana statute must be analyzed under "strict
scrutiny" as required by Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), because the statute directly
regulated expressive conduct. White held, therefore, that any statute regulating nude dancing
must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve the governmental interest. He stated that a statute
that imposed a minimum distance between the dancer and spectators, or that limited the
hours of such entertainment, could satisfy the strict scrutiny test.
What was the precedent established by Barnes? In Erie, the Pennsylvania appeals court
relied on Justice Souter's opinion and upheld the statute. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
rejected the reasoning of the appeals court and concluded that the lower court's
characterization of Souter's opinion as the "narrowest" holding in the case was wrong
because a majority of the justices had not agreed with the holding. Justice Cappy, writing for
the majority, reasoned the lower court should have relied on the opinion of eight of the nine
Supreme Court Justices who held that nude dancing is accorded some protection under the
First Amendment's guarantee of "freedom of expression." Cappy then concluded that
because the Supreme Court had failed to reach a consensus on what degree of protection
was required, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was forced to conduct its own analysis of the
Erie statute.
Cappy then gave great weight to the dissenting opinion of Justice White in Barnes, noting
that of all the opinions, it had received the most votes. Relying on White's reasoning, Cappy
applied the strict scrutiny test and determined the Erie statute was not "narrowly tailored" to
achieve Erie's interest in curbing incidents of prostitution and rape - the Court's "secondary
effects." Therefore, Cappy concluded, the Erie statute - even though identical to the
Indiana statute upheld in Barnes - was an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of
expression.
Although concurring in the opinion, Justice Castille rejected Cappy's reasoning. Castille
argued that the Supreme Court had clearly spoken in Barnes regarding the constitutionality of
a statute identical to the one in the present case. Therefore, Castille concluded, regardless of
the Court's fragmented reasoning, the ruling was clear as to the statute at issue - it was
constitutional.
Will the current Court follow Justice Cappy's lead and rely on Justice White's dissent, or
will it rely on the general precedent established by the majority which upheld the Indiana
statute? The Court could use Erie to provide the clear guidance it failed to provide in Barnes.
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98-1161 Erie, Pa. v. Pap's A.M.
Ruling below (Pa., 719 A.2d 273):
City ordinance that bans nude dancing is content based, is not narrowly drawn to accomplish
compelling governmental interests, most compelling of which is deterring sex crimes, and
thus unconstitutionally burdens First Amendment freedom of expression.
Question presented: Did Pennsylvania Supreme Court improperly strike ordinance of
Erie, Pa., that fully comports with principles articulated in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560 (1991), thereby willfully disregarding binding precedent in violation of supremacy
clause?
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PAP'S A.M. t/d/b/a Kandyland, Appellant
V.
The CITY OF ERIE, Appellees.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Decided October 21, 1998
CAPPY, Justice.
This is an appeal by allowance from
the order of the Commonwealth Court
reversing the trial court's order
permanently enjoining the enforcement of
the City of Erie's Ordinance 75-1994
("Ordinance"), and striking the Ordinance
in its entirety. For the following reasons,
we now reverse. (footnote omitted)
On September 28, 1994, the City
Council for the City of Erie ("City
Council") enacted the Ordinance.' The
'The Ordinance states in relevant part:
1. A person who knowingly or
intentionally in a public place:
c. appears in a state of nudity
*** commits Public Indecency, a
Summary Offense.
2. "Nudity" means the showing of
the human male or female genital
(sic), pubic area or buttocks with
less than a fully opaque covering;
the showing of the female breast
with less than a fully opaque
covering of any part of the nipple;
the exposure of any device,
costume, or covering which gives
the appearance of or simulates the
genitals, pubic hair, natal cleft,
perineum anal region or pubic hair
region; or the exposure of any
device worn as a cover over the
nipples and/or areola of the
Ordinance states, inter alia, that it is a
summary offense to appear in a "state of
nudity". In order to avoid being in a
"state of nudity," a female person over the
age of ten years of age would have to
wear, at a minimum, what are commonly
known as "pasties" and a "G-string". The
effective date for the Ordinance was
October 12, 1994.
Pap's A.M. ("Appellant") is the
operator of an establishment known as
"Kandyland" which features nude erotic
dancing performed by women. On
female breast, which device
simulates and gives the realistic
appearance of nipples and/or
areola.
3. "Public Place" includes all
outdoor places owned by or open
to the general public, and all
buildings and enclosed places
owned by or open to the general
public, including such places of
entertainment, taverns,
restaurants, clubs, theaters, dance
halls, banquet halls, party rooms
or halls limited to specific
members, restricted to adults or to
patrons invited to attend, whether
or not an admission charge is
levied.
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October 14, 1994, Appellant filed a
complaint in equity, naming the City of
Erie, the mayor for the City of Erie, and
the members of the City Council
("Appellees") as defendants. In its
complaint, Appellant requested a
declaratory judgment declaring the
Ordinance unconstitutional as well as
injunctive relief and attorney's fees.
The Court of Common Pleas of Erie
County held hearings on this matter. On
January 18, 1995, the trial court
determined that the Ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.
It therefore granted the permanent
injunction and struck down the
Ordinance. * * *
Appellant and Appellees
cross-appealed to the Commonwealth
Court. The Commonwealth Court
determined that the trial court erred when
it held that the Ordinance was
unconstitutionally overbroad.
Furthermore, it determined that
Appellant's additional claim that the
Ordinance impermissibly infringed upon
Appellant's right to freedom of expression
as guaranteed by the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions was not borne
out. It therefore reversed the trial court's
order striking the Ordinance and awarding
Appellant injunctive relief. (footnote
omitted)
Appellant then filed a petition for
allowance of appeal with this court. We
granted review, limited to the issues of
whether the Ordinance violates the right
to freedom of expression as guaranteed by
the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions and whether the Ordinance
is unconstitutionally overbroad. (footnote
omitted)
In examining whether the Ordinance
violates Appellant's freedom of expression
as guaranteed by the First Amendment
(footnote omitted), we must initially
determine whether nude dancing
constitutes expressive conduct which is
within the First Amendment's protective
ambit. The act of being in the nude is
not, in and of itself, entitled to First
Amendment protection because no
message is being conveyed. Cf Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397. 403-406 (1989) (act
of desecrating flag is not critical point in
determining whether actor is engaging in
expressive conduct; rather, the question to
be answered is whether the actor intended
to convey a particularized message). Yet
the act of dancing nude, with its attendant
erotic message, is an expressive act
entitled to First Amendment protection.
We can say this with certainty because a
majority of the United States Supreme
Court recently endorsed such a view in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991). Although Barnes was an otherwise
hopelessly fragmented decision, eight of
the nine members of the Court agreed
that nude dancing, as it portrayed an
erotic message, is expressive conduct and
is entitled to some quantum of protection
under the First Amendment. Id. at
565-566 (Rehnquist, C.J., authoring the
opinion announcing the judgment of
Court, joined by O'Connor and Kennedy,JJ.); id. at 581 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at
587 (White, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.)
As we have determined that nude
dancing is entitled to some First
Amendment protection, we must next
decide whether the Ordinance is related to
the suppression of expression. Johnson, at
403. In making this determination, we
determine whether the governmental
interest in enacting the Ordinance was a
content-neutral one. See United States v.
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O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Resolution of this inquiry is critical to our
analysis for if the Ordinance is related to
the suppression of expression, then the
onerous strict scrutiny test applies.
Johnson, at 403 (citation omitted). If,
however, the governmental interest is
content-neutral, and therefore is unrelated
to the suppression of expression, "then
the less stringent standard ... announced in
United States v. 0 'Brien for regulations of
non-communicative conduct controls."2
Johnson, at 403.
In determining whether the Ordinance
is related to the suppression of free
expression, the Commonwealth Court
below turned for guidance to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Barnes,
supra, a case which presented a situation
very similar to the one presented in the
matter sub judice. After engaging in the
difficult task of determining what, if any,
holding could be gleaned from the
hopelessly fragmented Barnes Court, the
Commonwealth Court determined that
2 The O 'Brien Court stated that the
"government regulation is sufficiently
justified" if it meets all factors of the
following four-part test:
1) Promulgation of the regulation is
within the constitutional power of
the government;
2) The regulation furthers an
important or substantial
governmental interest;
3) The governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
4) The incidental restriction on First
Amendment freedoms is no greater
than essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
the concurring opinion authored by
Justice Souter was dispositive.
We, too, begin our analysis of whether
the Ordinance is content-based by
reviewing the Barnes decision. The Court
in Barnes analyzed an Indiana statute,
which is strikingly similar to the
Ordinance we are examining, to determine
whether that statute violated the First
Amendment. Unfortunately for our
purposes, the Barnes Court splintered and
produced four separate, non- harmonious
opinions. We must review each of the
opinions to see if any holding can be
gleaned from them.
The Chief Justice, in his opinion
announcing the judgment of court,
concluded that nude dancing is expressive
conduct within the peripheral boundaries
of First Amendment protection. He
determined that the statute in question
was a content-neutral restriction on
speech since the governmental interest in
protecting societal order and morality was
unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. Id. at 568. He went on to
conclude that the statute met the less
stringent standard of 0 'Brien.
Justice Scalia authored a separate
concurring opinion. Barnes, at 572 (Scalia,
J. concurring). Although he agreed with the
Chief Justice's conclusion that the statute
was constitutional, Justice Scalia arrived at
this conclusion by a radically different
route. Disagreeing with the other eight
members of the Court, he would have
found that nude dancing is entitled to no
First Amendment protection, and that
only a rational basis for the statute need
exist for the statute to be found
constitutional. Id. at 580.
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Justice Souter also agreed with the
result reach[ed] by the Chief Justice, but
wrote separately to express his view that
the content-neutral governmental interest
forwarded by the statute was prevention
of the negative secondary effects (such as
prostitution, sexual assault, and other
criminal acts) which are associated with
nude dancing establishments. Id. at 582
(Souter, J., concurring).
Justice White's dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, garnered the most
votes of any of the Barnes opinions. Id. at
587 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White
expressed the opinion that the purpose of
the statute was "to protect the viewers
from what the State believes is the
harmful message that nude dancing
communicates." Id. at 591. Thus, since
the statute was content-based, it was
subject to analysis under the strict scrutiny
test, a test which the dissenters believed
the statute could not pass because the
statute was not narrowly tailored. Id. at
594.
From this hodgepodge of opinions,
the Commonwealth Court selected the
concurring opinion authored by Justice
Souter as expressing the position of the
Court and accorded it the status of
binding precedent. In arriving at this
conclusion, the Commonwealth Court
quoted the United States Supreme Court's
dictate that where "a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments
on the narrowest grounds...." Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
Applying Marks to the Barnes opinions, the
Commonwealth Court concluded that
Justice Souter's opinion provided those
"narrowest grounds" and therefore
accorded it precedential effect.
While we empathize with the
Commonwealth Court's plight when faced
with trying to make sense out of Barnes,
we cannot agree that Justice Souter's
concurring opinion is binding precedent.
We agree that it is possible to cobble
together a holding out of a fragmented
decision. (footnote omitted) Yet, in order
to do so, a majority of the Court must be
in agreement on the concept which is to
be deemed the holding. It is certainly
permissible to find that a Justice's opinion
which stands for the "narrowest grounds"
is precedential, but only where those
"narrowest grounds" are a sub-set of ideas
expressed by a majority of other members
of the Court. The mere finding that one
Justice expressed a narrower belief than
others does not dispense with the
requirement that a majority of the Court
need agree on a concept before that
concept can be treated as binding
precedent.
It is simply not possible to find that
Justice Souter's position in Barnes
commanded five votes. * * *
We find that the Commonwealth
Court's determination that Justice Souter's
"secondary effects" rationale represents
the "holding" of Barnes is simply not
borne out. In fact, aside from the
agreement by a majority of the Barnes
Court that nude dancing is entitled to
some First Amendment protection, we
can find no point on which a majority of
the Barnes Court agreed. Thus, although
we may find that the opinions expressed
by the Justices prove instructive, no clear
precedent arises out of Barnes on the issue
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of whether the Ordinance in the matter
sub judice passes muster under the First
Amendment.
Having determined that there is no
United States Supreme Court precedent
which is squarely on point, we turn to our
own independent examination of the
Ordinance itself to determine whether it is
related to the suppression of free
expression. The City Council stated
plainly in the Ordinance that it was
adopting this regulation
for the purpose of limiting a recent
increase in nude live entertainment
within the City, which activity
adversely impacts and threatens to
impact on the public health, safety
and welfare by providing an
atmosphere conducive to violence,
sexual harassment, public
intoxication, prostitution, the spread
of sexually transmitted diseases and
other deleterious effects.
We acknowledge that one of the
purposes of the Ordinance is to combat
negative secondary effects. That,
however, is not its only goal. Inextricably
bound up with this stated purpose is an
unmentioned purpose that directly
impacts on the freedom-of expression:
that purpose is to impact negatively on the
erotic message of the dance. We find that
Justice White expressed this position most
eloquently in his dissenting opinion in
Barnes when he declared that
it cannot be [said] that the statutory
prohibition is unrelated to
expressive conduct. Since the State
permits the dancers to perform if
they wear pasties and G-strings but
forbids nude dancing, it is precisely
because of the distinctive, expressive
content of the nude dancing
performances at issue in this case
that the State seeks to apply the
statutory prohibition. It is only
because nude dancing performances
may generate emotions and feelings
of eroticism and sensuality among
the spectators that the State seeks to
regulate such expressive activity,
apparently on the assumption that
creating such thoughts and ideas in
the minds of the spectators may lead
to increased prostitution and the
degradation of women. But
generating thoughts, ideas, and
emotions is the essence of
communication.
Barnes, at 592 (White, J. dissenting). We
believe that Justice White's analysis is
directly applicable to the situation before
us now, and that the stated purpose for
promulgating the Ordinance is
inextricably linked with the content-based
motivation to suppress the expressive
nature of nude dancing.
We find further support for our
rationale in the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Forsyth County, Georgia v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
In Forsyth County, a county ordinance
imposed a fee for the issuance of parade
permits. The administrator responsible
for setting the fee was directed to take
into account, among other things, the
possible costs of police protection needed
at certain events. Id. at 127. "The fee
assessed will depend on the
administrator's measure of the amount of
hostility likely to be created by the speech
based on its content. Those wishing to
express views unpopular with bottle
throwers, for example, may have to pay
more for their permit." Id. at 134.
As in the matter sub judice, the
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governmental entity in Foryth declared
that the ordinance permitting the
adjustable fee was content-neutral because
it was "aimed only at a secondary effect---
the cost of maintaining public order." Id.
at 134. The Court flatly rejected this
argument, stating that the secondary
effects rationale was inextricably linked
with the suppression of speech for the
negative secondary effects were related to
the content of the expressive message
conveyed by the marchers. The Court
cogently stated that "[1]isteners' reaction
to speech is not a content-neutral basis for
regulation." Id.
Similarly, the negative secondary
effects associated with nude dancing are
inextricably linked to the erotic message
of the dance. Thus, as in Forsyth County,
we find that a content-neutral reason is
insufficient to save the Ordinance since it
is inextricably linked with a content-based
motivation for the restriction.
Since the Ordinance's restrictions are
content-based, we must now determine if
the Ordinance passes the strict scrutiny
test. Grace, at 177. In order to pass the
strict scrutiny test, the burden is on
Appellees to establish that the Ordinance
is narrowly drawn to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest. Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
[O]ur own independent analysis of
this issue leads us to conclude that the
strict scrutiny test cannot be satisfied.
The most compelling governmental
interest which could be articulated in
connection with the Ordinance is the
interest in deterring sex crimes. It is
beyond cavil that curbing crimes such as
prostitution and rape is a compelling
governmental interest.
Yet, that determination satisfies only
one half of the strict scrutiny test. It still
must be established that the Ordinance is
narrowly tailored to meet this compelling
interest. On this front, we come to the
inescapable conclusion that the Ordinance
must fail. We agree with Justice White's
statement in Barnes that there are several
ways to combat these social ills without
banning the expressive activity of nude
dancing. Justice White suggested that
"the State could perhaps require that,
while performing, nude performers
remain at all times a certain minimum
distance from spectators, that nude
entertainment be limited to certain hours,
or even that establishments providing
such entertainment be dispersed
throughout the city." Barnes, at 594.
These restrictions, unlike the restrictions
found in the Ordinance, could be viewed
as content-neutral restrictions on the time,
place, and manner in which nude dancing
could be conducted, and, if so, would not
trigger the strict scrutiny test.
Furthermore, we also find it highly
circuitous to prevent rape, prostitution,
and other sex crimes by requiring a dancer
in a legal establishment to wear pasties
and a G-string before appearing on stage.
We believe that imposing criminal and
civil sanctions on those who commit sex
crimes such as prostitution or rape would
be a far narrower way of achieving the
compelling governmental interest.
276
The order of the Commonwealth
Court below is reversed. (footnote
omitted)
CASTILLE, J., files a concurring opinion
in which ZAPPALA, J., joins.
CASTILLE, Justice, concurring.
I agree with the majority that Sections
1(c) and 2 of the ordinance at issue must
be stricken. However, because a majority
of the United States Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of a virtually
identical ordinance under the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
and because this Court is bound by the
United States Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Federal
Constitution, I must disagree with the
majority's conclusion that the provisions
of the ordinance at issue fail under the
First Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. Instead, I believe that the
provisions of the ordinance at issue here
must be stricken under Article I, § 7 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, I
concur only in the result reached by the
majority in this matter.
The United States Supreme Court case
which lies at the crux of this matter is
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991). In Barnes, the United States
Supreme Court reviewed a statute which
was, as the majority herein states,
"strikingly similar" to the ordinance sub
judice. 1 The critical issue in Barnes was
The ordinance in Barnes provided:
Sec. 1. (a) A person who knowingly
or intentionally, in a public place:
the characterization of the purpose of the
statute, for if the purpose of a statute is
the suppression of protected expression,
then under prevailing First Amendment
precedent, the strict scrutiny test applies.
According to the majority in the
instant matter, there was "no point on
which a majority of the Barnes Court
agreed," aside from agreeing that nude
dancing is expressive conduct for First
Amendment purposes. Maj. Op. at 278.
Thus, the majority gleans that Barnes is not
binding precedent on the issue of whether
the ordinance sub judice can be
characterized as relating to the
suppression of free expression under the
First Amendment. Finding no such
binding precedent in Barnes, the majority
proceeds to determine that the ordinance
at issue here is related to the suppression
of free expression, and further finds that
the ordinance fails to pass constitutional
muster under the strict scrutiny test. I
believe that the majority herein strains to
find discord in Barnes where none exists.
In so doing, the majority circumvents
binding United States Supreme Court
(3) appears in a state of nudity
commits public indecency, a Class A
misdemeanor.
(b) 'Nudity' means the showing
of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area or
buttocks with less than a
fully opaque covering, the
showing of the female breast
with less than a fully opaque
covering of any part of the
nipple, or the showing of the




My disagreement with the majority
centers on the fact that five Justices, and
thus a majority, voted to uphold the
ordinance in Barnes on the basis that the
ordinance at issue in Barnes could not be
characterized as relating to the
suppression of free expression for
purposes of the First Amendment.
Therefore, a five-Justice majority declined
to apply the strict scrutiny test.
Thus, the basic premise upon which
five Justices of the United States Supreme
Court agreed is that the purpose of a
statute virtually identical to the one at
issue here cannot be characterized as the
suppression of protected expression.
(footnote omitted) Accordingly, none of
these five Justices believed that the strict
scrutiny test was appropriate. The
majority herein overlooks this fact, deems
the Barnes Court "hopelessly fragmented"
and discerns no binding common ground
in Barnes. Consequently, the majority
adopts the position of the Barnes
dissenters, finds the ordinance at issue a
content-based ordinance which is aimed at
the suppression of protected expression
and applies the strict scrutiny test. By
applying the First Amendment strict
scrutiny test in spite of Barnes, the majority
here defies binding precedent.
Although I believe that Sections 1(c)
and 2 of the Ordinance at issue here do
not fail under the First Amendment in
light of Barnes, I nevertheless concur in
the result reached by the majority since I
believe that those provisions must be
stricken under Article I, § 7 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which
provides: "... The free communication of
thoughts and opinions is one of the
invaluable rights of man, and every citizen
may freely speak, write and print on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty ...". Pa. Const. Art. I, § 7.
Justice White's dissent forcefully
articulates the position which I believe
that this Court should adopt for purposes
of our interpretation of Article I, § 7 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. * * The
true purpose of the ordinance, as applied
to appellant and others similarly situated,
is to prevent the customers in appellant's
and like establishments from being
exposed to the distinctive communicative
aspects of nude dancing. One might call
this a moral justification, insofar as the
drafters of the ordinance seem to be
expressing their moral condemnation of
those citizens of the Commonwealth who
are attracted to this distinct form of
communication, but lawmakers cannot
invoke the sword of morality specifically
to attack a form of protected expression.
The fact that this particular form of
protected expression may not ascend to
the level of a high art form is irrelevant.'
' This concept was eloquently articulated
by Justice Harlan: "It is largely because
government officials cannot make
principled decisions in this area that the
Constitution leaves matters of taste and
style so largely to the individual." Cohen v.
Cakfornia, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). Or, put
another way: "While the entertainment
afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln
Center to those who can pay the price
may differ vastly in content (as viewed by
judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics),
it may not differ in substance from the
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Lawmakers may not categorically
proscribe any form of protected
expression simply because they are not at
ease with its content.
Accordingly, for purposes of Article I,§ 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, I
believe that the strict scrutiny test is
appropriately applied in this case. I
concur in the majority's application of the
strict scrutiny test, as well as the
remainder of the majority's disposition of
this case.
ZAPPALA, J., joins this concurring
opinion.
dance viewed by the person who ... wants
some 'entertainment' with his beer or shot
of rye." Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 501 F.2d
18, 21 n. 3 (2d Cir.197 4 ), afd in part sub
nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975).
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WHEN IS 'SPEECH' SPEECH?
Tulsa World
Thursday, March 18, 1999
JamesJ. Kilpatrick, Universal Press Syndicate
At Kandyland the girls dance naked.
That much is clear. But are these
ballerinas of bump and grind clothed in a
constitutional g-string? That is the subject
of today's homily. Let us pray.
"Congress shall make no law," says
the Constitution, "abridging the freedom
of speech." What is the meaning of
"speech"? Is it simply expression? Any
kind of expression? The word is harder to
define than "alone," which recently
puzzled the moral leader of the free
world.
To the dictionaries! Speech, says
Random House, is the ability to express
one's thoughts and emotions "by speech
sounds." It is "something that is spoken;
an utterance." It is a form of
communication in spoken language.
Merriam-Webster is to the same effect.
American Heritage adds nothing useful.
The New World Dictionary distinguishes
a speech from an address, an oration and
a lecture, but this gets us constitutionally
nowhere. The point is that all of the
lexicographers define "speech" only in
terms of the spoken word.
Over the past 68 years the Supreme
Court has taken a far more expansive
view. In 1931 the court struck down a
California law that made it a crime to
display a red flag. The case involved a
teacher at a summer camp with
communist connections. Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes reasoned that the
flag was a form of political "expression"
and was thus protected by the First
Amendment.
Since then the high court repeatedly
has upheld symbolic speech as
distinguished from oral speech. In 1968
the court upheld an act of Congress
prohibiting the mutilation of draft
registration cards, but the rationale rested
chiefly upon the federal power to raise
armies and support a navy.
In another Vietnam-era decision, the
court ruled in 1969 that Des Moines,
Iowa, could not punish students for
wearing black armbands. Like the case of
the communist counselor, the issue went
to the heart of political expression -- and
political expression enjoys the highest
level of constitutional protection.
Over the past 25 years this sound
doctrine has flourished. It peaked in 1989
and 1990 in two cases in which the high
court struck down flag-burning laws. This
was symbolic expression that caused
nationwide revulsion, but nationwide
revulsion is no defense. What about the
naked dancers of Kandyland? In 1994 the
city of Erie, Pa., adopted an ordinance
making it unlawful for any person
"intentionally to appear in a public place
in a state of nudity." (The law provides an
exception for children and nursing
mothers.) The owners of Kandyland
challenged the ordinance as a violation of
the dancers' right to free expression, and
they won. Said the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania:
"The act of dancing nude, with its
attendant erotic message, is an expressive
act entitled to First Amendment
protection. We can say this with certainty
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because a majority of the United States
Supreme Court recently enforced such a
view in Barnes vs. Glen Theatre (1991)."
Erie petitioned the Supreme Court for
review.
The Glen Theatre case is a frail
crutch. It came from South Bend, Ind.,
where the Kitty Kat Lounge wanted to
present totally nude go-go dancing.
Another venue of classical culture in
South Bend, the Glen Theatre, wanted to
present nude dancers separated from
customers by glass screens. When the case
reached the Supreme Court in 1991, the
high court fell to pieces.
The court exploded with four separate
opinions. Not one of them commanded
five votes. This was the judicial equivalent
of goulash. It was constitutionally
inedible. The court appeared to be saying
that public nudity is an evil that Indiana
could suppress, but nudity that conveys a
message of eroticism is protected speech.
Justice Antornin Scalia argued in a
concurring opinion that the Indiana law
had nothing to do with "speech." It was
concerned only with conduct likely to
trigger immorality. Justice David Souter,
disagreeing, said that performance dancing
is inherently expressive, but nudity per se
is not. Nudity is a condition, he added,
not an activity.
There is no wholly satisfactory
solution to this dispute over the meaning
of "freedom of speech." When a
Kandyland cafe or a Kitty Kat Lounge
invokes the First Amendment, the
amendment is trivialized. It is not
symbolic speech, because it symbolizes
nothing. One of the South Bend dancers,
asked why she wished to dance in the
nude, said that she makes more money
that way. James Madison, why are you
rolling in your grave?
I doubt that the high court will accept
the Erie case. The court has better fish to
fry, but at some point the court must
directly answer the question: When is
"speech" speech?
Copyright C 1999 The Tulsa World
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NUDE DANCING STILL HAS ITS LIMITS
Performers in Liquor-Licensed Clubs Have to Wear G-Strings and
Pasties
Pennsylvania Law Weekly
Monday, December 28, 1998
Danielle N. Rodier of the Law Weekly
If bachelors and businessmen want to
see nude exotic dancers, they still have to
go to a BYOB club, according to a recent
Commonwealth Court decision upholding
the ban on nudity in liquor-licensed
establishments.
The three-judge Commonwealth
Court panel in Purple Orchid, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania State Police, PICS Case No.
98-2576 (Pa. Commw. Dec. 3, 1998)
Pellegrini, J. (22 pages), affirmed a fine
against the club for allowing dancers to
perform with only clear liquid latex
covering their nipples. The dancers
appeared bare-breasted, the court said,
and the Liquor Control Board's policy
against lewd, immoral or improper
entertainment prohibits that much
exposure. Pellegrini said the LCB policy
served a substantial government interest.
"[First], eroticism or sex, as the national
headlines establish, causes individuals to
engage in irrational conduct; alcohol
lessens inhibitions and clouds judgment
also causing people to engage in irrational
conduct; and the ultimate age-old truth,
sex and alcohol in combination causes
people to engage in incredibly irrational
and dangerous conduct," he said. "Taking
those 'truths' into consideration, the
board reasonably determined that nudity
and alcohol were a combustible mixture
and would foreclose the operation of an
orderly liquor establishment..."According
to the opinion, a state police officer
witnessed three female dancers at the
Purple Orchid performing with apparently
bare breasts. Their nipples were covered
with liquid latex but it was clear. The
officer cited the club with allowing lewd,
immoral or improper entertainment on its
premises, in violation of Section 493(10)
of the Liquor Code. On appeal, an
administrative law judge decided that
exposing breasts with clear latex covering
the nipples was the same as exposing bare
breasts and imposed a $ 1,000 fine. Before
the Commonwealth Court, the Purple
Orchid argued that Section 493(10) was
unconstitutionally vague. But the court
threw out that argument based on Tahiti
Bar, Inc., 395 Pa. 355, 150 A.2d 112 (1959),
in which the state Supreme Court shot
down the vagueness argument, finding
that liquor license actions did not have to
be interpreted as strictly as criminal
statutes because they are civil and
administrative in nature.
Kandyland
Pellegrini cited the state Supreme
Court's decision in Pap's A.M. v. City of
Erie, PICS Case No. 98-2233 (Pa. Oct. 21,
1998) Cappy, J. (28 pages), in which an
Erie County ordinance prohibiting nude
dancing was struck down and the court
opened the door for nude dancing in
clubs that are not a licensed liquor
establishments. The ordinance prohibited
nudity anywhere and the operator of a
bottle club called "Kandyland" fought the
constitutionality of the ordinance under
freedom of expression rights. The Erie
City Council did not have a compelling
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reason to forbid nudity in general when it
passed the ordinance in 1994, the justices
said in overturning a Commonwealth
Court decision in Pap's. "The act of being
in the nude is not, in and of itself, entitled
to First Amendment protection because
no message is being conveyed. Yet the act
of dancing nude, with its attendant erotic
message, is an expressive act entitled to
First Amendment protection," Justice
Ralph Cappy wrote. Cappy cited the 1991
U.S. Supreme Court case Barnes v. Glen
Theatre Inc., where eight of the nine
justices agreed that nude dancing is
expressive conduct and entitled to "some
quantum" of First Amendment
protection. But the court then rejected the
Barnes decision, which it called
"hopelessly fragmented," as a source of
guidance for Pennsylvania on whether the
ordinance is related to the suppression of
free expression and instead relied on its
own independent examination of the
ordinance. While the court acknowledged
the Erie City Council was trying to
"combat negative secondary effects" such
as violence, sexual harassment, public
intoxication, prostitution and the spread
of sexually transmitted disease, it
determined that "the stated purpose for
promulgating the ordinance is inextricably
linked with the content-based motivation
to suppress the expressive nature of nude
dancing," Cappy wrote. Once the court
declared the ordinance's restrictions
content-based, it applied the strict scrutiny
test. But Erie's brief did not include strict
scrutiny analysis, Cappy said, and its "utter
failure to carry their burden on this point
would be a sufficient reason to find that
the strict scrutiny test was not met here."
The court, granting that the most
compelling governmental interest served
by the ordinance is the worthwhile
objective of deterring sex crimes, said the
ordinance is not tailored narrowly enough
to meet that interest. The justices said it is
"highly circuitous to prevent rape,
prostitution and other sex crimes by
requiring a dancer in a legal establishment
to wear pasties and a G-string before
appearing on stage. "We believe that
imposing criminal and civil sanctions on
those who commit sex crimes ... would be
a far narrower way of achieving
compelling governmental interest," Cappy
wrote. But Pellegrini said the LCB policy
was not like the Erie County ordinance.
"Unlike the Erie Ordinance, which was a
total ban on public nudity anywhere and
any place, the prohibition here is not
total," he said. "We believe this is an
important distinction because otherwise
no restriction could be placed on nudity
under the Liquor Code, an outcome that
our Supreme Court obviously did not
intend. If that were so, it would be
protected speech for a person to come
into a city council meeting and dance
around naked to show to what condition
the tax burden was reducing him to or, for
an entertainer, to perform a nude dance
conveying an erotic message to show why
more zoning districts should permit adult
establishments."
The O'Brien Test
Pellegrini then analyzed the LCB
policy under the United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367. 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 LEd.2d
672 (1968), test which holds that an
ordinance is constitutional if: (1) the
interest served is within the power of the
government; (2) it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; (3)
the governmental interest served is
unrelated to free expression; and (4) the
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alleged restrictions on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. Pellegrini said the board's policy
met each prong of the test. The Purple
Orchid's last argument that the dancers'
nipples were covered with latex, and
therefore their performance was not lewd,
also failed because Pellegrini said the clear
color made the breasts appear nude. Zan
Hale contributed to this report.
Copyright © 1998 Legal Communications,
Ltd.
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BAN ON NUDE DANCING BACKED BY HIGH COURT
The 5-4 Decision Says Public's 'Moral Disapproval' Outweighs the Right
ofFree Expression
Los Angeles Times
Saturday, June 22, 1991
David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
The Supreme Court Friday gave
communities broad powers to ban nude
dancing, ruling that the public's "moral
disapproval" of nudity outweighs the First
Amendment's protection of free
expression.
The 5-4 decision stands as a
significant high court pronouncement on
the limits of free speech and expression.
The conservative justices said they are not
willing to read the Constitution broadly to
protect expressive conduct that offends
the majority.
The court's position marks a reversal
from two years ago, when a different 5-4
majority struck down all laws forbidding
the burning of the American flag. Next
year, the justices will consider the issue in
another context: May government punish
the symbolic burning of a cross, or is that,
too, a form of expressive conduct?
Friday's ruling raises, without
answering, the question of whether artists
and gallery directors have a constitutional
right to exhibit works that are deemed
offensive by city officials.
Government has the authority to
protect "societal order and morality,"
including the power to forbid "expressive
activity" within the confines of a private
establishment, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist said for the court.
However, the immediate practical
impact of Friday's ruling is limited.
Nineteen years ago, in the case of
California vs. LaRue, the high court said
states may use their constitutional power
to control alcohol sales as a basis for
banning topless dancing in bars and
nightspots. In subsequent decisions, the
court has made clear that cities or counties
may forbid such dance performances
anywhere alcohol is served.
In this case, Indiana officials used the
state's public indecency law to prosecute
not only nude dancers who worked in
bars and clubs but also those employed at
establishments where no alcohol was
served.
Last year, a federal appeals court in
Chicago ruled that the Indiana
prosecutors were violating the First
Amendment. Nudity on public streets and
beaches can be banned, the appeals court
said, but nude dancing in private
establishments is a form of protected
expression.
Rarely does the Rehnquist court rule
against a state government, and the
majority was true to form Friday.
The decision involved a case from
South Bend, Ind., in which owners of JR's
Kitty Kat Lounge joined an adult
bookstore and three dancers to challenge
the state's public indecency law, which
prohibited them from dancing nude.
Nude dancing is "expressive conduct
within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment," the chief justice conceded.
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Nonetheless, states clearly have the power
to forbid public nudity through their
public indecency laws, he said.
"Public nudity is the evil the state
seeks to prevent, whether or not it is
combined with expressive activity,"
Rehnquist said. "Indiana's requirement
that the dancers wear at least pasties and a
G-string is modest, and the bare minimum
necessary to achieve the state's purpose."
Only Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
and Anthony M. Kennedy joined
Rehnquist's opinion in the case (Barnes
vs. Glen Theatre, 90-26).
Justice Antonin Scalia said he would
go further and declare that nude dancing
is not expressive conduct entitled to any
First Amendment protection.
Justice David H. Souter cast the
decisive fifth vote but upheld the Indiana
law on narrower grounds. Nude
entertainment may be banned, not
because of moral disapproval, but because
of its potential "secondary effects" of
encouraging "prostitution, sexual assault
and associated crimes," Souter said.
State officials and conservative groups
applauded the court for upholding the
indecency law.
"The First Amendment is not an altar
on which American families must sacrifice
the traditional values that made this
country great," said Thomas L. Jipping,
director of the Free Congress Foundation.
The 5-4 ruling gives "a green light for
communities to aggressively enforce basic
standards of decency," he said.
Free speech advocates said they feared
Rehnquist's opinion could have a broad
impact.
"This is a dangerous and disturbing
decision because it says free speech can be
censored in the interest of public
morality," said Stephen Shapiro of the
American Civil Liberties Union in New
York. "They took on the issue of nude
dancing but ending up writing an essay,
and a bad essay, on the First
Amendment."
Eliott Mincberg, legal director of
People for the American Way, said the
decision is "potentially troubling" for
artistic groups. Rehnquist's opinion states
no exceptions for such productions as a
ballet that includes nudity or the
counterculture musical "Hair," he noted.
Last year, officials in Cincinnati tried
to close down an art gallery's exhibit of
Robert Mapplethorpe photos on the
grounds that they were obscene. The
effort failed when a jury concluded that
the works were not obscene.
"Rehnquist's opinion suggests the city
fathers in Cincinnati could have
accomplished the same thing by invoking
their public indecency statute," he said.
At the same time, Souter's narrow
opinion suggests that he would not
support a broad attack on nudity in artistic
works, Mincberg added.
Friday's decision provoked an odd
scene in the courtroom. Tourists who
arrived to see the justices solemnly take
the bench were surprised to then hear the
chief justice discoursing on the First
Amendment implications of "pasties and
G-strings."
Meanwhile, in their written opinions,
two justices engaged in a remarkable
exchange over nudity in the Hoosier
Dome, the sports arena in Indianapolis.
In his concurring opinion, Scalia said
that the court had never adopted the
"Thoreauvian 'you may do what you like,
so long as it does not injure someone else'
beau ideal. The purpose of Indiana's
nudity law would be violated, I think, if
60,000 fully consenting adults crowded
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into the Hoosier Dome to display their
genitals to one another, even if there were
not an offended innocent in the crowd."
In dissent, Justice Byron R. White said
he agreed with Scalia's observation, but
not with its application to private
establishments. "No one can doubt,
however, that those same 60,000 Hoosiers
could be perfectly free to drive to their
respective homes all across Indiana and,
once there, to parade around, cavort or
revel in the nude for hours in front of
relatives and friends," he said.
Despite the view expressed by the
court's majority, the state law is not an
absolute ban on nudity, but a ban on it
only in certain public areas, White said. In
barrooms, "the viewers are exclusively
consenting adults who pay money to see
these dances," he said.
"That the performances in the Kitty
Kat Lounge may not be high art, to say
the least, and may not appeal to the court,
is hardly an excuse for distorting and
ignoring settled doctrine," White said.
"The court's assessment of the artistic
merits of nude dancing performances
should not be the determining factor in
deciding this case."
White was joined by Justices
Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun
and John Paul Stevens.
Copyright © 1991 The Times Mirror
Company
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LAPD v. UNITED REPORTING PUBLISHING CORP.
Does Prohibiting the Release ofArrestee Records for Commercial
Purposes Violate the First Amendment?
Matthew Frey*
A California law barring police from releasing arrestee records to companies planning to
sell the information they contain is set to come under scrutiny this term before the Supreme
Court. The plaintiff in the case, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), will be asking
the Court to overturn a June 1998 appellate court ruling that struck down the law on First
Amendment grounds. The LAPD's adversary, United Reporting Services Corporation, on
the other hand, will be seeking to preserve two lower court opinions that ensured the
company's access to a thriving commercial market for information about the recently
arrested.
United Reporting Services initially challenged the law when the California Assembly
amended it to include the ban against releasing arrestee information to companies for
commercial use. Previously the measure required authorities to make available arrestee
information "to anyone for any purpose." Under that old law, the company sold
information about persons arrested to a variety of clients, including attorneys, drug and
alcohol counselors, and driving schools.
In upholding a district court ruling striking down the new law, a Ninth Circuit three-
judge panel declared that the LAPD had failed to show that the law "directly and materially"
advanced what it agreed was the government's "substantial" interest in protecting the privacy
of arrestees.
The LAPD had claimed that the anti-disclosure law reduced the opportunity for
commercial interests "to create and maintain an unreliable criminal history information bank
which could have the effect of destroying the employment potential of the innocent, the
reformed, the pardoned and the young." Writing for the court, however, Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain pointed out that the LAPD had offered little evidence to support its claim of
such a lurking danger. He went on to attack the law as at best a toothless effort to protect
arrestees' privacy, one that moreover failed to satisfy commercial free-speech requirements.
Writing that the "pure economic transaction" of selling arrestees' information to clients
was a textbook example of commercial speech, Judge O'Scannlain noted that First
Amendment doctrine therefore required courts to afford it "a limited measure of
protection." This reduced protection, however, was more than enough to fend off the
LAPD's attack. "[T]he numerous exceptions to [the law] for journalistic, scholarly, political,
governmental, and investigative purposes render the statute unconstitutional under the First
Amendment," Judge O'Scannlain wrote. "It is not rational for a statute which purports to
advance the governmental interest in protecting the privacy of arrestees to allow the names
* College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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and addresses of the same to be published in any newspaper, article, or magazine in the
country so long as the information is not used for commercial purposes."
"Having one's name, crime, and address printed in the local paper is a far greater affront
to privacy than receiving a letter from an attorney, substance abuse counselor, or driving
school eager to help one overcome his present difficulties," the court concluded.
Along with Reno v. Condon, another case this term, LAPD seems to herald a new interest
in addressing information privacy, an interest that will only increase as the information
economy unfolds.
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98-678 Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.
Ruling below (9 Cir., 146 F.3d 1133, 67 U.S.L.W. 1026, 26 Media L. Rep. 1915):
California statute that prohibits commercial use of arrestees' addresses but that permits law
enforcement agencies to disclose such information for "scholarly, journalistic, political, or
governmental purpose" clearly violated First Amendment.
Question presented: Does government violate First Amendment when it releases arrestees' and
crime victims' records but forbids their commercial use?
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UNITED REPORTING PUBLISHING CORP., Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, Defendant,
and
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided June 25, 1998
O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge.
We must decide whether a state
regulation that prohibits the release of
arrest information for commercial
purposes violates the First Amendment.
I
Prior to July 1, 1996, California
Government Code § 6254 provided that
"state and local law enforcement agencies
shall make public ... [t]he full name,
current address, and occupation of every
individual arrested by the agency." * * *
This provision made arrestee addresses
available to anyone for any purpose. On
July 1, 1996, however, California
Government Code § 6254(f) was amended
to prohibit the release of arrestee
addresses to people who intend to use
those addresses for commercial purposes.
California Government Code § 6254(f)
now provides that state and local law
enforcement agencies shall make public:
the current address of every
individual arrested by the agency
and the current address of the
victim of a crime, where the register
declares under penalties of perjury
that the request is made for a
scholarly, journalistic, political, or
governmental purpose, or that the
request is made for investigation
purposes by a licensed private
investigator.... Address
information obtained pursuant to
this paragraph shall not be used
directly or indirectly to sell a product
or service to any individual or group
of individuals, and the requester
shall execute a declaration to that
effect under penalty of perjury. ***
United Reporting Publishing
Corporation ("United Reporting") is a
private publishing service that had been
providing, under the old version of the
statute, the names and addresses of
recently arrested individuals to its clients.
These clients include attorneys, insurance
companies, drug and alcohol counselors,
religious counselors, and driving schools.
The Los Angeles Police Department
("LAPD") maintains certain records
relating to arrestees, including names,
addresses, and the charges of arrest.
II
The LAPD contends that the district
court erred in holding that 6254(f)(3)
violates the First Amendment right to
freedom of expression. Specifically, the
LAPD maintains that the district court
misapplied the four-part test laid down by
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the Supreme Court in Central Hudson
Gas and Electric Corporation v. Public
Service Commission of New York * * *
for analyzing the constitutionality of
government regulations limiting so-called
"commercial" speech.
For its part, United Reporting argues
that, contrary to the district court's
finding, the activity in which it engages,
selling arrestee information to clients, is
not commercial speech at all, but
noncommercial speech, the regulation of
which is subject to strict scrutiny under
the United States and California
constitutions. In the alternative, United
Reporting claims that § 6254(f)(3) burdens
its dissemination of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech
concerning the right to retain competent
counsel and other assistance in violation
of the United States and California
constitutions.
III
We start with a comment on the
protection provided under the First
Amendment to what has been commonly
designated "commercial" speech.
Although the Supreme Court once held
that the First Amendment did not protect
commercial speech, see Valentine v.
Chrestensen * * * (1942), it repudiated that
position in Virginia State Bd. ofPharmay v.
Virginia CitiZens Consumer Council, Inc., * * *
(1976). The current debate centers not on
whether commercial speech is a form of
expression entitled to constitutional
protection, but on the validity of the
distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech. * * We are
compelled, however, under the Supreme
Court's current jurisprudence, to afford
commercial speech less protection from
governmental regulation than some other
forms of expression. * * * Consequently,
restrictions that might be violative of the
First Amendment in other areas of
expression may be tolerated in the realm
of commercial speech. * * *
* * * United Reporting is correct that
speech which "merely proposes a
commercial transaction" falls within the
boundaries of commercial speech; indeed,
this is the "core notion" of commercial
speech. * * * This "core notion" is the
beginning of our inquiry, however, not the
end, as United Reporting claims. In
Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
indicated that it would regard as
commercial speech any "expression
related solely to the economic interests of
the speaker and its audience." * * * This
is obviously broader than speech which
proposes a commercial transaction;
people often discuss their economic
interests without proposing commercial
transactions. The Supreme Court has
abstained from creating bright-line rules in
this area and so should we. * * * Hence,
we must examine the disputed
communication in light of its surrounding
circumstances to determine whether it is
entitled to the qualified protection
accorded to commercial speech.
That said, United Reporting's speech
would be considered commercial under
either a broad or a narrow definition.
United Reporting makes an effort to link
its speech to that of its clients'
solicitations to arrestees in an effort to
demonstrate that it does more than
propose an economic transaction. This
effort fails. United Reporting sells
arrestee information to clients; nothing
more. Its speech can be reduced to, "I
[United Reporting] will sell you [client] the
X [names and addresses of arrestees] at
the Y price." *** This is a pure
economic transaction, ***
comfortably within the "core notion" of
292
commercial speech. * ** Although this
does not disqualify United Reporting from
First Amendment protection, * * * it does
mean that its speech is entitled to only "a
limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment
values." ***
IV
In Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
articulated a four-part test under which to
analyze the constitutionality of
government regulations limiting
commercial speech:
At the outset, (1) we must determine
whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within
that provision, it at least must
concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, (2) we ask
whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, (3)
we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and
(4) whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that
interest. * * *
The parties agree that the speech at issue
is neither illegal nor misleading under the
first prong. Rather, their dispute centers
around the remaining three prongs of
Central Hudson.
A
Before the district court, the LAPD
and its codefendants advanced two
governmental interests in support of $
6254(f)(3):
From a law enforcement
perspective, (1) the processing of
the requests puts a tremendous
strain on already scarcely allocated
time and resources. F[rom] a
consumer perspective, (2) this is a
invasion of privacy. While these
records are justifiably public in
many ways, the unsolicited direct
mail advertisements are
unwarranted. * * *
Only the second interest, protecting the
privacy of arrestees, need concern us here.
The district court found the interest in
protecting the privacy of arrestees to be
substantial. * * * The district court was
persuaded by the fact that numerous other
courts considering similar statutes have
reached the same conclusion. * * * Its
finding is well-grounded: "The State's
interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society." *** Indeed, "[the
Supreme Court's] precedents ... leave no
room for doubt that 'the protection of
potential clients' privacy is a substantial
state interest.' " * * * The Court has
"noted that 'a special benefit of the
privacy all citizens enjoy within their own
walls, which the State may legislate to
protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions.'"
* ** Hence, we hold that the district
court was correct in finding the privacy
interest of arrestees to be substantial.
B
Determining the asserted interest in
privacy to be substantial does not end our
inquiry, however. Rather, we now turn to
Central Hudson's third prong, whether the
challenged regulation "advances the
Government's interest 'in a direct and
material way.'" *** The LAPD, the
"party seeking to uphold [the] restriction
on commercial speech[,] carries the
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burden of justifying it." *** This
burden may not be satisfied by "mere
speculation or conjecture." *** Instead,
"'a governmental body seeking to sustain
a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree.' " * * *
" '[T]he regulation may not be sustained if
it provides only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose.' "
The district court found that the
amended statute does not directly and
materially advance the government's
interest in protecting the privacy and
tranquility of its residents. * * * The
LAPD claims that the district court erred
in so finding, arguing that a prohibition
against the release of arrestee information
"reduces the opportunity for commercial
interests to create and maintain an
unreliable criminal history information
bank which could have the effect of
destroying the employment potential of
the innocent, the reformed, the pardoned
and the young" and prevents the "direct
intrusion into the private lives and homes
of arrestees and victims."
First, the LAPD has provided no
evidence whatsoever in support of its
contention that there is a danger that
commercial interests would create
"unreliable criminal history information
banks" if they had access to arrestee
addresses. In fact, these addresses were
available to commercial interests prior to
the amendment of § 6254 and, as far as
we can tell, no commercial interests have
ever maintained the aforementioned
"criminal history information banks."
This asserted harm appears to be no more
than speculation and conjecture, which is
insufficient to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech. * * * Because the
LAPD has failed to sustain its burden of
proving that this harm is real, we need not
consider whether the restriction will
alleviate the asserted harm to a material
degree. * * *
The second harm asserted by the
LAPD, preventing the "direct intrusion
into the private lives and homes of
arrestees and victims," is somewhat more
weighty. The district court rejected the
contention that § 6254(f)(3) directly and
materially advances the governmental
interest in protecting the privacy and
tranquility of its residents. * * * The
district court found that § 6254(f)(3) does
not restrict all (or probably even most)
possible invasions of a person's privacy. *
* * It noted that " '[a]nyone may access
the records in question so long as they do
not do so with an eye towards using the
information for certain types of
commercial solicitations.'" * * * The fact
that journalists, academicians, curiosity
seekers, and other noncommercial users
may peruse and report on arrestee
records, the district court observed, belies
the LAPD's claim that the statute is
actually intended to protect the privacy
interests of arrestees. * ** Instead, it
appears to be more directed at preventing
solicitation practices. * * * The district
court also noted that "[i]t is hard to see
how direct mail solicitations invade the
privacy of arrestees. If they don't like the
solicitation, they can simply throw it
away." * * * The district court correctly
remarked that the privacy of arrestees was
not invaded by the solicitation itself, but
by the solicitor's discovery of the
information that led to the solicitation. *
* * For these reasons, the district court
held that § 6254(f)(3) failed the third
prong of Central Hudson. * * *
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We agree with the district court. The
myriad of exceptions to 6254(f)(3)
precludes the statute from directly and
materially advancing the government's
purported privacy interest. * * * We take
our direction from Coors Brewing, * * * in
which the Supreme Court held that 27
U.S.C. § 2 05(e)(2), which prohibited
brewers from disclosing the alcohol
content of beers on their labels, violated
the First Amendment. * * * The Court
held that the government's asserted
interest in avoiding alcohol "strength
wars" was substantial, but that § 2 05(e)(2)
did not directly advance that interest
"because of the overall irrationality of the
Government's regulatory scheme." ***
In reaching its decision, the Court
emphasized the numerous exceptions to §
205(e) (2), including the exception for
wines and distilled spirits, which were
allowed to list alcohol content on their
labels, and the failure to extend the ban on
disclosing alcohol content to
advertisements. * * * The Court held that
"[t]here is little chance that [the regulation
at issue] can directly and materially
advance its aim, while other provisions of
the same act directly undermine and
counteract its effects." ***
In Valley Broadcasting, we considered
whether federal regulations which
criminalized the broadcast of
advertisements for casino gambling
violated the First Amendment. * * *
Applying Coors Breaing, we held that the
federal ban on broadcast advertisements
did not directly and materially advance the
government's interests in reducing public
participation in commercial lotteries and
in protecting those states which chose not
to permit casino gambling within their
borders. * * * We were compelled to
reach this result in light of the numerous
exceptions to the ban, including those for
state-run lotteries, fishing contests,
not-for-profit lotteries, and gaming
conducted by Indian tribes. * * * As did
the Court in Coors Brewing, we held that the
regulatory scheme could not directly and
materially advance its aim while other
provisions of the same statute directly
undermined and counteracted its effects.
Likewise here, we are compelled to
hold that the numerous exceptions to §
6254(f)(3) for journalistic, scholarly,
political, governmental, and investigative
purposes render the statute
unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. It is not rational for a
statute which purports to advance the
governmental interest in protecting the
privacy of arrestees to allow the names
and addresses of the same to be published
in any newspaper, article, or magazine in
the country so long as the information is
not used for commercial purposes.
Having one's name, crime, and address
printed in the local paper is a far greater
affront to privacy than receiving a letter
from an attorney, substance abuse
counselor, or driving school eager to help
one overcome his present difficulties (for
a fee, naturally). The exceptions to §
6254(f)(3) "undermine and counteract"
the asserted governmental interest in
preserving privacy just as surely as did the
exceptions in Coors Brewing and Vally
Broadcasting. We must therefore conclude
that § 6254(f)(3) fails to satisfy Central
Hudson.
V
Having concluded that § 6254(f)(3)
violates Central Hudson, the district court
properly struck it down as an
unconstitutional infringement of United
Reporting's First Amendment rights. ***
AFFIRMED.
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Executive Director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
Reporters' information-gathering
abilities may be threatened
Governors in Florida, South Carolina
and Colorado said in late January they
were shocked to discover that digitized
versions of driver's license photos had
been sold to a New Hampshire company
at a handsome profit for the states'
treasuries.
In response to cries of outrage from
drivers offended by the thought of their
mug shots being zapped out of state, the
governors sought court injunctions and
legislation to stop it.
What does Image Data LLC want to
do with the photos? Its nefarious scheme
is to create a national database that would
be sold to retailers who want to verify a
customer's identity before accepting a
credit card or check. If this is such an
offensive idea, you'd think it would be
simpler to pass a law making the creation
of such databases illegal.
But aside from interfering with free
enterprise, passing legislation like that
would implicate the First Amendment,
because peddling accurate information -
which journalists also do - is protected by
the Constitution. Rather than grapple with
that issue head on, the three states are
working to cut off access to the
information at the source. No sale. No
data. No database.
At about the same time this photo
furor was going on, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to review a decision of the
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which
last June declared unconstitutional a
California statute prohibiting the release
of addresses of people who have been
arrested if the requester plans to use the
records for "commercial purposes."
Before the law was enacted in 1996, a
private publishing service called United
Reporting Publishing Corp. had obtained
this arrest information from various
California police departments. United
Reporting then passed it on, for a fee, to
its clients, including lawyers, insurance
companies and driving schools. But under
the new law, only requesters falling under
protected categories would be allowed
access. They include journalists, scholars,
private investigators and those seeking
information for political purposes and
who are prepared to swear under penalty
of perjury that the data wouldn't be used
to sell a product or service.
United Reporting sued the California
Highway Patrol and the Los Angeles
Police Department, among others,
contending that by enforcing a law that
limits access to information, they violated
a constitutional right to disseminate the
truth. Consistent with many state access
laws and the federal Freedom of
Information Act, which do not consider
journalism to be a commercial activity,
United Reporting argued its publishing
business wasn't commercial at all, but
pure speech, entitled to the highest level
of First Amendment protection.
Alternatively, United Reporting said, even
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publications that are commercial speech
enjoy some protections.
The 9th Circuit made short work of
the pure speech argument, finding that
United Reporting sells arrest information
to clients, "nothing more." But the court
also found that United Reporting's
publishing was commercial speech. As
such, it can't be regulated by the
government unless it is false or misleading
or implicates a substantial government
interest.
The three-judge panel ruled last June
that the government's interest in
protecting the privacy of arrested persons
was substantial. But the court struck down
the statute because its multiple exceptions
to the rule of secrecy meant the
information wasn't secret at all.
Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain
reasoned that it was not rational for a
statute purporting to protect privacy to
allow newspapers and magazines to obtain
and publish information that would be
denied to a commercial requester.
"Having one's name, crime, and address
printed in the local paper is a far greater
affront to privacy than receiving a letter
from an attorney, substance abuse
counselor, or driving school eager to help
one overcome his present difficulties," he
wrote.
Reasonable people might disagree
over that analysis. In any event, the 9h
Circuit's ruling, if affirmed by the high
court, will imperil at least a dozen state
laws that prohibit the disclosure or sale of
public record information to requesters
seeking access for commercial purposes.
On the surface, that makes sense. If
information is public, it should be
available to anyone on demand, and it is
none of the government's business what
the requester plans to do with it. But such
a ruling could have a more insidious effect
that could be bad news for journalists.
If the Supreme Court finds that states
can't deny access to records based on
what the requester plans to do with them,
the states may respond by simply closing
off access to multiple categories of public
records to anyone-including journalists.
All in the name of protecting privacy, of
course.
Copyright C 1999 American Journalism
Review
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APPEALS JUDGES BACK RELEASE OF ARREST RECORDS
The U.S. 9th Circuit Ruling Says that Police Agencies Must Turn the
Information Over to Firms
Los Angeles Times
Friday, June 26, 1998
Da van Maharaj, Times Staff Writer
A federal appeals court ruled
Thursday that state law enforcement
agencies are obligated to release
individuals' arrest records to businesses
that use them for pre-employment
background checks and other commercial
purposes.
Attorneys for the Los Angeles Police
Department, which opposes the release of
such records, said they fear the court's
decision could hurt job hunters, especially
those who have been arrested but never
convicted of a crime.
The case involved a 2-year-old state
law that denied private publishing
companies access to arrest records. These
companies sell the information to
background checkers, attorneys, insurance
companies and other businesses.
The case was filed by attorneys for
United Reporting Publishing Corp., one
of four Southland companies that profit
from compiling and selling the records-
ranging from drunk-driving to felony
arrests. Nearly half of all large American
corporations check whether job applicants
have criminal records.
A federal judge in San Diego struck
down the state law in 1996, prompting an
appeal by the LAPD and the California
Highway Patrol, whose records were also
sought by United Reporting.
Attorneys for the law enforcement
agencies argued in court papers that
releasing arrest records to United
Reporting and other private companies
would create "unreliable criminal history
information banks which could have the
effect of destroying the employment
potential of the innocent, the reformed,
the pardoned and the young."
It would also invade the privacy of
crime victims and individuals who have
been arrested because attorneys and
others scrutinize arrest records to solicit
business, the law enforcement lawyers
contended.
But a three-judge panel of the U.S. 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both
arguments.
Judges said the law violated the 1st
Amendment rights of the private
publishing companies because it made the
same arrest records available to
journalists, private investigators and
others.
"Having one's name, crime, and
address printed in the local paper is a far
greater affront to privacy than receiving a
letter from an attorney, substance-abuse
counselor, or driving school eager to help
one overcome his present difficulties for a
fee naturally ," wrote Judge Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain for the unanimous panel.
Alan F. Westin, a Columbia University
political science professor and publisher
of a newsletter called Privacy & American
Business, said courts are likely to see more
similar cases as companies known as
"look-up" services take advantage of
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computer technology to gather and sell
public records.
The "look-up" business has
proliferated in the last few years as
employers, prompted by concerns from
workplace violence to embezzlement, dig
ever deeper into the personal histories of
job applicants.
In a recent survey of 500 large
companies, the American Management
Assn. found that 42% check whether job
candidates have criminal convictions.
Westin said studies have shown that
10% of arrest records, similar to the type
mined by companies like United
Reporting, are erroneous.
"With these records, there has to be
some safeguards," Westin said. "People
should be allowed to challenge them. An
arrest doesn't always mean that someone
has done something unlawful."
Guylyn R. Cummins, a San Diego
attorney who represented United
Reporting, said the 9th Circuit Court "is
telling the government that you cannot
pick and choose who receives
information. Either everyone gets it or
none at all."
But Assistant City Atty. Byron R.
Boeckman, who argued the case for the
LAPD, said he felt the court's ruling "is
not good public policy."
"We don't arrest people so we could
sell their names to a business," Boeckman
said.
He said the city attorney's office will
review the court's ruling before deciding
whether to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to
review the appeals court's ruling.
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